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Washington, D.C. 20520

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THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH  
SOVIET PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

MAY 30 - JUNE 3, 1990

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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BOOK I

SCOPE PAPER

Secretary Baker's Memorandum to the President

PRESS THEMES

THEMES FOR DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

- (1) U.S.-Soviet Relations
- (2) German Unification
- (3) The Baltics
- (4) Human Rights
- (5) European Security
- (6) Perestroika and U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations
- (7) Arms Control
- (8) Soviet Internal Politics
- (9) U.S.-Soviet Regional Dialogue

INR ANALYSIS OF GORBACHEV'S SUMMIT AGENDA

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

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THEME PAPER: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

BACKGROUND

When we considered our approach to U.S.-Soviet relations at the start of the Bush Administration, we laid out three broad objectives to guide our specific policies:

o in the strategic-military area, to enhance U.S. and allied security, in part by using arms control to translate Soviet "defensive" doctrine into a more stable strategic environment and decrease military competition as an element of the overall U.S.-Soviet/East-West relationship.

in the political-military area, to preserve strong ties with traditional friends and allies in Europe and Asia while encouraging greater autonomy in Eastern Europe, negotiated settlements to specific regional conflicts and reduced Soviet use of military levers in their Third World policy.

in the democratization area, while recognizing our leverage is limited, to promote genuine reform within the USSR and a break-up of the monopoly on political and economic power.

Progress has been uneven at times, but we have done well by these objectives, better than would have been predicted one year ago. Moscow's readiness for change -- e.g. unilateral force reductions, letting Eastern Europe go its own course, internal reform -- made many of these gains possible. But they were secured by agile policies on our part that exploited the changes and kept the pressure up when we needed further Soviet movement. As a result, we will have a range of concrete achievements to register at this summit.

Recent months, however, have seen progress slow, as the Soviet leadership has been seized with burgeoning internal problems and unnerved by the accelerating pace of German unification. Even as Gorbachev moves to consolidate his own power as the first President and to complete the de-Leninization of the Soviet system at July's Party Congress, the Soviet leadership seems to be losing confidence in its ability to control events affecting the USSR's most basic interests.

The loss of Eastern Europe and the nationalities crisis at home have evidently raised Soviet anxieties about their ability to defend and maintain the Soviet homeland. While now apparently prepared to complete START, Moscow may be rethinking its approach to CFE and other European security issues as old defense planning assumptions are overtaken by events. As one result, the beleaguered Soviet military has assumed a higher profile in the arms talks and at ministerials, and the political leadership has displayed increasing deference to its views.

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The Washington summit provides the opportunity to inject renewed momentum into the relationship. The main barriers to further progress are all closely related to Gorbachev's domestic problems. While recognizing the limits of our influence, the challenge will be to demonstrate to him -- in the context of his own agenda -- that it is in the USSR's interest not to impede German unification, and that active pursuit of our arms control agenda will yield security gains for both sides. Just as important, we must stress to Gorbachev the importance of breaking the impasse with Lithuania and the Baltics. Continued intimidation puts in doubt the very nature of perestroika and constrains how fast we can move in further improving U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly in the economic sphere.

Separate theme papers deal with German unification, European security, regional issues, human rights, the Baltics and perestroika. These contain themes addressing Soviet security concerns and seek to encourage a more resolute Soviet commitment to political liberalization and fundamental economic reform.

In your general discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations, you may wish to describe in conceptual terms your vision of a more cooperative relationship, one guided not by a desire to achieve unilateral advantage but rather one designed to expand points of mutual advantage. One effect of this may, in fact, be to help redefine the USSR's world role in a way that promotes Moscow's status and respect around the globe. The point to drive home to Gorbachev is that we are not seeking to exploit his domestic woes or the Soviet Union's eroding strategic position. On the contrary, we wish to continue to cooperate to stabilize the military competition, to create a new European security order in which the USSR plays a part, to resolve regional conflicts and to work together in addressing trans-national problems. And we want to continue to support perestroika in ways designed to ensure the USSR's successful transition to a more democratic society based on the rule of law and a market economy.

POINTS TO MAKE

- o Before we get down to specific business, I would like to discuss the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship.
  - o We had good talks in Malta. One of the important things we did was set goals for this summit.
- And we've done quite a bit. This summit will record a number of significant and concrete achievements, in arms control, economic relations and many other areas. Both of our countries and peoples will benefit.

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- I'm especially pleased we will be signing an agreement to destroy the bulk of our two countries' chemical weapons stockpiles. This historic agreement should accelerate work on a global CW ban.
- o I've also been encouraged by recent trends in our dialogue on regional conflicts. I especially appreciate how your country supported the Nicaraguan election outcome and the transfer of power to Mrs. Chamorro.
  - This had a big and positive impact on Americans.
  - It showed that we are succeeding in getting away from competing with one another for influence in the developing world, and that we can work together to help the parties resolve regional conflicts.
- o I hope we can work together with similar success in bringing about a political settlement in Afghanistan, as well as ending the conflicts in El Salvador, Cambodia and other regions.
- o Of course, we still have our problems, and we will need to talk about these over the next three days. One of the most urgent is Lithuania.
  - If the crisis in Lithuania and the other Baltic states is not solved soon, it will create a real obstacle to further progress in our relationship.
  - Continued confrontation will only raise questions in Americans' minds about the true nature of perestroyka.
- o I know you are uneasy about the pace of German unification and the new order that is beginning to emerge in Europe -- even though these positive changes owe a lot to your "new political thinking."
- o We understand your concerns about the impact on Soviet security, particularly the impact of the issue of German NATO membership.
  - Change brings uncertainty. But we've tried to address those concerns in a variety of ways.
- o We want to work with you as partners in making a smooth and stable transition to a Europe that is whole and free, a Europe in which the Soviet Union plays a major role.
- o Because we view the problem this way, we are concerned about the slowdown in the CFE negotiations and the differences between us in the Two-plus-Four talks.

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- I hope we can make some headway on these subjects during these talks.
- If we are to have a CFE agreement -- and a CSCE summit -- this year, then we have to get moving.
- o We must seize this unique opportunity to put relationships in Europe on a new, more cooperative footing. If we fail to catch the moment, however, the change underway in Eastern and Central Europe could become a source of instability -- which neither of us wants.
- o Partnership is a term that I hope we can apply more and more to all aspects of our relationship.
  - We want to move quickly build on the agreements we hope to conclude this year -- Chemical Weapons, START, Nuclear Testing, CFE, Confidence-Building Measures, Open Skies. Our goal should be to further reduce our military competition and build a stable security framework that will last.
  - We also want to cooperate to defuse regional conflicts so that our energies can be directed toward solving the enormous transnational problems such as protecting the environment and fighting the drug trade.
  - And we want to work together to strengthen democracy and respect for human rights in our two societies and throughout the world, since freedom is the best guarantor of world peace.
- o But partnership takes two. It will take effort on both sides to find points of mutual advantage, particularly on sensitive questions like German unification.
  - We're ready to do our part. I hope you're ready to do yours.
- o I know the Soviet Union is going through a wrenching process of internal change and readjustment to new international realities.
- o I hope you will agree that we have been careful not to make things more difficult for you. On the contrary, since Malta we have tried to support perestroika in concrete ways.
- o Let me reassure you here today that I continue to support perestroika -- because it offers greater freedom and prosperity for the Soviet people, and because it is, in turn, the best guarantee of creating the more cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship we seek.

SUMMIT THEMES: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

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## THEME PAPER: EUROPEAN SECURITY

### BACKGROUND

Gorbachev's policies have set in train events which are rapidly changing the face of Europe. Yet having opened the way for the democratization of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the drawdown of Soviet forces, and German unification, Gorbachev now faces serious domestic difficulties coping with these developments. His response has been to try to slow them down, even as the forces promoting change in Eastern Europe and Germany press all the harder to consolidate their gains in the event the current window of opportunity closes.

Secretary Baker, in his recent meetings with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, has expressed understanding for the Soviets' concerns and has outlined the basis for arrangements which would assure the Soviet Union a secure and honorable place in a new European order. He cited your proposals, as set out in your Stillwater speech, to accelerate SNF negotiations, to move rapidly into follow-on negotiations on conventional arms after signature of a CFE Treaty, to revise NATO strategy, and to expand the role for CSCE. At the same time, he made clear that we could not agree to Soviet proposals to limit the sovereignty of a united Germany, including its sovereign right to choose continued membership in NATO.

The Soviets have expressed a positive interest in our proposals for SNF, CFE and CSCE, but they have not yet proved ready to engage seriously on any of these topics. It seems unlikely that Gorbachev will come to Washington ready to drop his objection to a united Germany in NATO, or to explore in depth the broader framework for East-West cooperation we have set out. You should encourage an open discussion of the changes underway in Europe, urging upon Gorbachev the need to move expeditiously to create a new framework of European relationships in which to accommodate these developments. You should note that democratization, economic reform and, in the case of Germany, unification are irreversible and still gathering pace. Whether these changes contribute to a more stable and peaceful European order will depend heavily upon decisions reached over the next six months.

### POINTS TO MAKE

- o Very positive changes are underway throughout Europe.
- o In the East, encouraged by your own policies of glasnost' and perestroika, a profound process of democratization and economic reform has begun.

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- o In the West, we are beginning to re-examine our defense strategy, restructure our military forces, and consider new avenues for East-West cooperation.
  - A major restructuring of COCOM and Soviet participation in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are first steps in the economic area, for instance.
- o In the next few months we will have a unique opportunity to put relationships in Europe on a new footing, to create a new framework of cooperation -- in a word, to build what I have called a Europe whole and free, and what you have labelled a European home.
  - Both of us must play a constructive role in this process if we are to be full participants in the new Europe.
- o The foundation of this new structure must be the Helsinki Final Act and the sovereign equality of all European states.
- o Arms control arrangements can provide the common roof.
- o We are thus ready to conclude a CFE accord. We want to explore with your government solutions to each of the outstanding issues.
- o We believe this accord should be wrapped up quickly.
- o We also recognize that German unification raises new issues with respect to the security balance in Europe.
  - We are thus prepared to discuss with you how these changes might be addressed in a subsequent negotiation, one which should follow very shortly on the conclusion of a CFE I accord.
- o We also want to move more quickly toward negotiations on short-range nuclear forces, in which we envisage very substantial reductions being agreed.
- o You have acknowledged that a continued U.S. troop presence in Europe is a stabilizing factor.
  - NATO serves this common goal and will play a key, albeit evolving, role in this new structure.
  - And a unified Germany's full membership in NATO, if that is what the Germans choose, will help underpin the new, stable Europe we both seek.

- o We believe the CSCE process should be strengthened and extended in order to provide a framework for broader European cooperation which involves both the U.S. and USSR.
- o We in the West are not prepared to abandon our own arrangements for political, defense and economic cooperation.
  - These institutions are voluntary and peaceful. They offer a source of stability and prosperity. Their continuity has been welcomed by all Europeans, East and West alike.
- o We are prepared, however, to participate actively in the creation and animation of broader structures for European security and cooperation.
- o We would like to begin discussing with you how the CSCE process could be strengthened, expanded and institutionalized to provide these new structures.
- o Our ideas for CSCE include:
  - regular consultation at official, ministerial and perhaps even summit level;
  - new mechanisms to promote the peaceful management of disputes and thus reduce the risk of conflict; and
  - innovative confidence-building measures, such as arrangements to request clarification of unusual military activities.
- o All of this should come together over the next six months -- a CFE accord, a CSCE summit, agreement on the objectives for SNF talks and for follow-on talks on conventional forces.
- o This is an ambitious timetable, but an essential one if we are to keep pace with the changes underway in Europe today.
- o The changes underway in Europe, including democratization, economic reform and German unification, are irreversible and still gaining momentum.
- o Democratic governments have taken office throughout Eastern Europe. In a few weeks Germany will have a single currency and common economic system.
- o We cannot slow these changes. But if we seize the moment, we can encompass them in a broader European framework in which both our countries play an important, positive role.

SUMMIT THEMES: European Security

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Gorbachev clearly hopes his new position as president, above and apart from the party and state bureaucracies as well as the Supreme Soviet, will give him authority and independence to manage the difficult times ahead.

If Gorbachev prevails, the July congress is likely to support a comprehensive overhauling of the party, including the abolition of the Politburo and the introduction of intra-party elections and democratization. The goal will be to make the party an explicitly political organization, removing it from the governing role it has exercised since 1917, and completing the transition of power to the new presidential system.

But the transformation of the CPSU may be even more dramatic. As Soviet leaders have acknowledged, the makings of a multi-party system already exist in the USSR. All that remains is for reality to be formalized. This could happen as early as the party congress. Recent trends suggest that the CPSU will split into two parties:

- One is likely to be an essentially social democratic party committed to radical reform and democratization, holding on to Marxist ideology in name only. This group could maintain control of the CPSU and its resources, perhaps renaming itself the "Social Democratic Workers Party" (the original name of the CPSU).
- The second party, likely to be in the minority, would consist of CPSU members unwilling to part with the party's traditional ideology. This party could continue to call itself communist, but would be unlikely to hold on to much of the CPSU's current membership. Nonetheless, a party with even a tenth of the CPSU's current membership of 19 million would still be a powerful force.

As Embassy Moscow noted in "Gorbachev Confronts Crisis of Power" (Moscow 15714, attached), change will continue in the USSR for objective reasons regardless of Gorbachev's fate. Its course will likely be uneven, and a dramatic interruption to the process of change and reform cannot be ruled out.

Gorbachev probably will hold on to as much of the Bolsheviks' iconography as he can. But he, and the Soviet Union as it is currently constituted, cannot long survive unless the very basis of the country's social and economic system is dramatically altered. Gorbachev's most recent statements indicate he recognizes this.

POINTS TO MAKE

- o I have been following with great interest the progress of reform in the Soviet Union and, in particular, preparations for the upcoming 28th party congress in early July.
- o I recognize the importance of the congress for the progress of political reform in your country and the impact it will have on the way the Soviet Union is governed.
- o You have declared your intention to use your new presidential powers to accelerate the progress of reform and restructuring.
  - Which major reforms will be pursued in the near future? Which, if any, have been deferred?
- o How strong is the opposition to your program within the party? Do you anticipate trouble from the delegates in overhauling the party's rules and structure?
- o How great are the possibilities for a split in the party between conservatives and reformists?
- o What, if any, effect might the congress have on Soviet foreign and defense policies?
- o Looking ahead, how do you see the process of democratization developing?
- o How do you see the rise of Russian nationalism? As a threat, as a positive force, or as a combination of both?
- o How do you see the future role of the Communist Party in a reformed, democratized Soviet Union?

SUMMIT THEMES: Soviet Internal Politics

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TO: The Secretary

FROM: INR - Douglas P. Mulholland *DPM*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Summit Agenda: Looking Ahead

Despite signs of increased domestic unease over the course of Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev will come to Washington able to deal. He is probably satisfied that there are enough agreements in place to ensure a successful summit and set the stage for the Party Congress in July. He will strive to sell his agenda for US-Soviet relations not only to the Administration, but to Congress, business interests, and the American public. The attached INR analysis concludes:

- Arms control remains a top priority; Gorbachev will seek US commitments to follow-on negotiations, even if a START treaty is not ready for initialing at this summit.
- Gorbachev will continue to oppose a united Germany's membership in NATO, but will be open to US suggestions for alternative security arrangements. He may indicate the USSR's readiness to delay the CFE treaty until German security problems are resolved.
- Gorbachev will continue to encourage US tolerance of Soviet policy toward the Baltic republics and internal unrest. He will also try to deflect US complaints about human rights by focusing on positive developments and by promising further progress.
- He will try to elicit US investment commitments, and may be quite frank about the need for western help to ensure that his reforms succeed.
- Gorbachev will focus on regional conflicts to the extent they threaten to irritate US-Soviet relations. He probably sees the various regional issues as on track, not susceptible to US-Soviet action at this time, or, as in the case of Afghanistan, moving in the USSR's favor.

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GORBACHEV'S SUMMIT AGENDA: LOOKING AHEAD

If the Moscow ministerial demonstrated one thing, it is that Gorbachev is in control of foreign policy and prepared to bargain. Despite signs of bureaucratic disarray around him, Gorbachev still has a clear vision of what he must accomplish. He views this summit both as a mark of how far US-Soviet relations have come--the START framework, trade agreement, chemical weapons agreement, nuclear testing protocols, and ever expanding bilateral agreements--and as an opportunity to chart the future course of bilateral relations during a period of dramatic international change. Moreover, it enables him to set the stage for the 28th Party Congress in July and claim a foreign policy success. He will continue to demonstrate political savvy, particularly the ability to anticipate problems down the road as well as confront those at hand.

Domestic Context. Gorbachev sees the summit as a means of easing domestic pressures; he hopes to use it as leverage to shift resources from defense spending to such critical areas as agriculture, housing, and medical care. By all appearances, he has decided to cut the military budget even more than the 14.2 percent already announced, and needs both the substance and the atmospherics of a successful summit in political support of such cuts, especially in the face of likely strong opposition from the large and influential military-industrial complex within the Council of Ministers.

Although there are signs of military unease and concern, Gorbachev is less constrained by military opposition to his foreign and arms control policies than he is by the USSR's need to reassess its security interests in light of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, German unification, and prospects for Baltic independence. The uncertainty surrounding the implication of these events has raised Soviet anxieties and produced disarray in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, Gorbachev remains in charge and Soviet policies are beginning to crystalize--and change--as Moscow adapts to the new alignments.

A successful summit also will reinforce Gorbachev's stature at home as he prepares the country for a new stage of economic reform, to be debated at the July Party Congress. In this context, he hopes to show that any "losses" resulting from his foreign policy in Eastern Europe will be offset by the gains in strategic arms control and increased western economic cooperation.

Gorbachev probably expects Lithuania and the other Baltic republics to be high on the American agenda, and will be prepared to address criticisms head on with the President as well as in meetings with members of Congress and the public. He appears confident in his approach and will argue he

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cannot go further until Lithuania suspends its independence declaration.

Anxiety Over German Unification. More than at Malta, the German question will occupy Gorbachev's mind. His attitude to a unified Germany in NATO continues to be resoundingly negative, and there is no sign of willingness or ability to back down. Instead, he is likely to continue to seek alternatives or, at a minimum, to delay a decision. The urgency of the German question appears to be such that Moscow is prepared to put other policies at risk. The Soviets now appear prepared to make a CFE agreement dependent on the outcome of the two-plus-four talks, thereby imperiling a set of important objectives such as a 1990 CSCE summit and negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. They also seem prepared to obstruct unification over the NATO membership issue, e.g. refusing to relinquish four-power rights, insisting on a peace treaty, or maintaining Soviet troops in the GDR, moves which would complicate Soviet efforts to improve relations with West Germany as well as other NATO member countries.

While Gorbachev recognizes that the US and USSR cannot resolve the political-military status of Germany at the summit, he will be looking for understanding on the depth of Soviet concerns and support for alternate approaches, including an expanded role for CSCE.

But while Gorbachev will be open to using CSCE to guarantee pan-European security and diminish the need for military alliances or Germany's membership in NATO, he is likely to insist on establishing parameters for Germany itself. Gorbachev will insist that any alternative must place limits on the size of the Bundeswehr, ban nuclear weapons on German soil, commit the new Germany to fulfill the GDR's agreements with the USSR, and allow for the deployment of Soviet forces on German territory during a transition period. It is clear the Soviets are looking to the two-plus-four talks to produce a legally binding document that will ensure these objectives.

Arms Control: The Centerpiece of Relations. While the initialing of a framework START agreement is a major goal, Gorbachev will be satisfied even if the chemical weapons agreement and the nuclear testing protocols are the only arms control texts signed at the summit. Whether a START framework is initialed or not, Gorbachev will press for a US commitment to follow-on strategic negotiations despite the possibility that he will stall on conventional reductions. He probably wants to be able to point to a productive dialogue on short-range nuclear missiles, and may even hope to get the US

to broaden talks on confidence-building measures at sea in order to show movement toward naval arms control, but neither of these issues will be central to his summit arms control agenda.

**START.** Willingness, in the end, to close a deal on ALCMs and SLCMs in Moscow demonstrates that the Soviets consider completing a "framework" START agreement one of the keys to a successful summit, and they will try to reach agreement on those issues that the US maintains are necessarily part of a framework. Nevertheless, the Soviets can be expected to resist strongly any proposal that appears to be a unilateral concession, such as further limits on heavy missiles, or limits on MIRVed mobiles.

Mobile Missiles--Soviets Want to Keep it Simple. On mobile missiles, the Soviets would probably require a ceiling of around 550 launchers and 950-1,050 weapons to meet their needs. To gain US acquiescence in this, they would probably accept a verification regime involving notifications of movements, although they are likely to insist that these be held to a minimum. The Soviets will also be wary of types of movement restrictions that they fear might lead to inadvertent treaty violations, particularly since, until the US deploys mobile missiles, these restrictions will apply only to them.

Backfire. They also are unlikely to accept new limits that would compel them to alter their deployment plans. The Intelligence Community, for example, projects that, by 1999, the Soviets will have deployed some 500 Backfire bombers. Of these, approximately 210 will belong to naval forces. Although it may be possible to persuade the Soviets to accept a global limit on Backfires, if that were the price of a framework agreement, the limit would have to be comfortably above 500.

Throwweight--Progress Unlikely. The Soviets will probably wish to leave the question of throwweight vague in a framework agreement. The gap between the US desire to account for "potential" throwweight and the Soviet position of counting only "demonstrated" throwweight is wide. Moreover, the Soviets perceive that throwweight restrictions, and any possible attendant ambiguities and unforeseen consequences, are likely to apply only to them.

Linkage--A Last-Minute Stick in the Spokes? Despite the evident Soviet desire to announce a framework agreement at the summit, we cannot exclude the possibility the Soviets will attempt to revive their efforts to link a START agreement to the ABM Treaty. While claiming that linkage has been dissolved, the Soviets continue to remind us of the importance of agreeing on activities permitted and prohibited under the

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ABM Treaty, and on conditions for leaving the START Treaty because of ABM compliance problems. If they are unsatisfied on this issue at START, they can be expected to pursue it during any follow-on negotiations.

Looking to the Future. The Soviets have given ample proof of their interest in follow-on negotiations to START that would lead to further reductions in strategic arms. They are far more likely to propose a START-like additional 50 percent reduction than to favor extreme cuts to the level of several hundred warheads.

The Soviets have indicated on various occasions that they would consider further reductions in heavy missiles as part of follow-on negotiations. They have also signaled an interest in de-MIRVing. We believe, however, that the Soviets are interested in these issues mainly as levers to bring about further restrictions in US forces. Until the Soviets fundamentally change their strategic nuclear doctrine--and we see no evidence that this has occurred--they will be dependent on MIRVs. The attraction of de-MIRVing proposals for the Soviets is limited to the possibility of putting restrictions on US forces--notably the Trident SSBN force. Similarly, further cuts in heavy missiles will be tolerable for the Soviets as newer, lighter, and more accurate missiles replace the SS-18. Offering up further cuts in--or even a ban on--heavy missiles could be seen by the Soviets as sacrificing something of waning value in order to extract a high price from Washington--such as limitations on the US Trident force.

Last, the Soviets may suggest that other types of arms be included in follow-on negotiations. Anti-satellite weapons, which they have said they wish to ban, are one possibility. They also might argue that, if deeper cuts than those of START are contemplated, it will be necessary to begin reducing French and British nuclear forces at the same time.

CFE. With the wrap up of START, attention should shift to CFE, but Moscow's overriding concern about the security implications of a united Germany is apparently forcing the Soviets to rethink the issue, which has resulted in considerable Soviet foot-dragging in Vienna.

The Soviets are anxious to limit the Bundeswehr, and can be expected to press this issue either in CFE or two-plus-four. Gorbachev is likely to repeat the Soviet CFE proposal that each alliance be limited to 750,000 troops in the central zone. To support this, Gorbachev could argue that since the scheme is not specifically directed at Germany, it should not run afoul of Bonn's sensitivities regarding "singularity." He also may

point out that because the proposed central zone limits are alliance wide, NATO will have to reach intra-alliance agreement on troop levels, thereby enhancing NATO's political role--an important US objective.

Bilateral Issues: Enlarging the Agenda. Though largely symbolic, Gorbachev views completion of the trade agreement, and the other bilateral agreements, as well as progress on various transnational issues such as ecology and counter-terrorism, as key to improving the long term prospects for stable US-Soviet relations and, most importantly, securing economic benefits. He can be expected to play up these agreements--especially those expanding people-to-people contacts--in his public comments as indicators of growing cooperation and trust between the two countries and as examples of where future relations should go.

Economic Issues. Gorbachev will press the President for greater US economic assistance, which is probably one of his highest priorities. He will likely call into question the sincerity as well as the depth of US support for perestroika, as he did at the Moscow ministerial, and urge direct US government credit as well as greater efforts by the Administration to encourage and support joint ventures and private investment by US business. He will also ask for political support for a number of government-to-government and private business projects, such as the American trade consortium, the Medical consortium and an agreement on technical assistance for the Soviet food industry.

A Possible Surprise: Request for Food Aid. Should the continued downward economic slide threaten social disturbances, Gorbachev could request emergency food assistance, including direct airborne emergency food shipments and short-term credits. In early February, the Soviets requested emergency food assistance from the FRG in an effort to forestall riots in remote parts of the USSR.

Human Rights. Passage of the Soviet emigration bill promised for May 31 is still uncertain. Apparently the Supreme Soviet still has not decided on how to respond to demands--from departing emigres and other travellers--for an increase in the amount of foreign exchange which can be taken out of the USSR. Gorbachev will be expecting criticism over direct flights to Israel and will likely restate Shevardnadze's earlier call for the US to increase its refugee and immigration quotas for Soviet Jews, seeing this as a way to answer both US arguments and Arab criticism.

Regional Issues. Gorbachev probably sees little danger that regional issues will threaten summit atmospherics or, for

that matter, overall relations. Given the press of other business--and barring any major changes on the ground--he is not likely to give these issues priority. Moreover, he probably views the various regional issues as either on track, not susceptible to US-Soviet action at this time, or, in the case of Afghanistan, as tending to favor Moscow.

Afghanistan. The ministerial and working group discussions identified the one issue blocking US-Soviet agreement on an Afghan settlement: "incumbency"--whether power is to be transferred from Najib to a new organ of power before elections. Soviet intransigence on this issue and Shevardnadze's reference to Nicaragua, where the US did not require Ortega to step down before elections, gives little basis for expecting the Soviets to change their position. Nor does Soviet handling of recent developments in the region: they have continued to supply Najib and publicize his political reforms; they have also been playing up rivalries within the AIG, the AIG's extremist elements, and alleged involvement in narcotics and excursions across the USSR border. At least in the short term, the Soviets seem to feel time is on their side.

Nonetheless, the Soviets are still interested in a settlement. A recent article in an influential Soviet foreign policy journal stressed the need to abandon burdensome, unsavory Third World regimes, and in a specific reference to Afghanistan, stated that reconciliation efforts require a "transitional, neutral status" which cannot be obtained by "maintaining in power one of the belligerents." While it is unclear whether this statement represents more than a minority view, Moscow warmly welcomed former king Zahir Shah's offer to participate in a settlement. At the summit, the Soviets are sure to return to "negative symmetry" and again call for an international conference on Afghanistan and a larger UN role. They may also argue that the situation in Kashmir makes a settlement all the more important.

Kashmir. The Soviets are likely to emphasize common US-USSR interests in seeing the Kashmir situation defused. They can claim with some justification that they have counseled restraint and dialogue on India and Pakistan. Criticism of Pakistan is nothing new; in an unusual recent flurry of articles, however, the Soviet press has criticized India for inept administration of Kashmir, for an excessive military budget, and for failure to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Soviets have told the Indians they will continue to fill orders for military equipment, but the Indians complain about delays and unsatisfactory performance and seem uneasy about the depth of the Soviet commitment.

[REDACTED]

He distinguished this, however, from international involvement in the Kashmir settlement issue, which the Soviets prefer to leave to the Indians and Pakistanis bilaterally, under the Simla agreement. Gorbachev is likely to support any means of bringing pressure on the two sides which does not challenge Indian sovereignty in Kashmir or injure Soviet-Indian relations.

Central America. The Nicaraguan elections took some of the pressure off US-Soviet relations, and Central America currently has little claim on Gorbachev's time. Moscow is, nevertheless, interested in continuing the dialogue as a low-cost way of staking out a claim to a role in the region, and in Latin America in general. Moreover, Moscow wants an improvement in US-Cuban relations to relieve the pressure on Havana--and the financial burden for itself of keeping the Castro regime afloat. The Soviets are likely to resist any efforts by the US to get the USSR to pressure Castro, arguing that Washington should address its concerns to Havana, not Moscow, and that the best way to ensure Castro's good behavior is to alleviate his sense of isolation.

While they are not pushing the issue as actively as before, the Soviets may raise the need for a region-wide approach to area problems and, as part of this, movement on a settlement in El Salvador. They would like to see Cuban participation in settling the El Salvador conflict and in solidifying a region-wide peace accord as a way of diffusing US-Cuban tensions and relieving remaining Central American anxieties, but they still insist the US deal with the Cubans directly on a regional arms embargo. However, as in the Middle East, they may argue for multilateral talks on cutting arms transfers.

Middle East. The Soviets see the Arab-Israeli peace process stalemated and are reluctant to discuss the Gulf. Nonetheless, Soviet media sharply criticized the killings in the Occupied Territories, and Moscow is concerned Shamir will lead Israel's next government. At a minimum, the Soviets are likely to criticize Israel for obstructing the peace process and the Administration for failing to move Israel, while pushing the US to take a second look at Soviet ideas--namely bringing the UN Perm Five into the game--to get Israel to be more flexible. As at the ministerial, the Soviets will deflect any calls for improved USSR-Israel ties, including direct flights, claiming Israeli actions, such as new settlements, and violence, make it politically impossible for Moscow to do anything now. Gorbachev will probably ask us to open the doors to increased Soviet Jewish immigration.

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Gorbachev is likely to seek a joint statement condemning recent Israeli actions and calling on Israel to move the peace process forward. The USSR will also be watching the upcoming Arab summit; if criticism in that forum of Soviet Jewish emigration policy is particularly harsh, Moscow may push for a condemnation of Israeli settlement policy in the Occupied Territories.

Questions of regional proliferation, the Gulf situation, and Lebanon are likely to get short shrift. The Soviets may welcome a statement supporting the Taif accords in Lebanon, but probably see little reason to focus on the issue now. They are likely to justify their recently renewed offer to mediate talks between Iran and Iraq as in keeping with UN efforts, but will try to avoid detailed discussions on their bilateral relations with Tehran.

Cambodia. Barring real progress at the Perm Five meeting in New York on May 25-26, the Soviets at the summit will again press for a total arms moratorium, and endorse the current Thai cease-fire proposal. The Soviets may cite recent hints of flexibility from the Chinese and stress the importance of the US and USSR working with Beijing at the Perm Five. They are, however, hesitant about becoming deeply involved in a peace process that still appears to have little chance of success.

Despite their rhetoric, the Soviets cannot be expected to pressure either Hanoi or Beijing to slow arms shipments or accept peace formulas. [REDACTED]

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
The Soviets will also stress that the Hun Sen regime is the only force standing in the way of a Khmer Rouge return, and argue for the US accepting the "reality" of the Phnom Penh government.

Africa. The Soviets seem convinced that Angola is moving in the right direction, and that there is little the two superpowers can or need to do at this juncture. Moscow probably hopes the MPLA's pullout from Mavinga is seen as a gesture of conciliation and not a sign of weakness, and thus will pave the way for effective negotiations. The key, from Moscow's perspective, is to convince both UNITA and the MPLA hardliners the time is at hand to talk. At the summit, the Soviets will probably argue for a mutual arms cutoff and cease-fire.

The Soviets seem ready to cut their losses in Ethiopia but for the moment are prepared to let events take their course.

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Military supplies continue to trickle down, but it is unclear if they are the result of new deliveries or deals. There seems to be little Soviet enthusiasm for famine relief generally; even if there were, Moscow may not be in a position to render much help. Three Soviet transport planes in Ethiopia were recently bombed, according to Ambassador Dubinin.



Although concerned about North Korea's nuclear programs and refusal to sign IAEA safeguards agreements, the Soviets probably calculate that further pressure on Pyongyang will bear little fruit without significant change in the military situation on the peninsula, and could even be counterproductive, given warming USSR-ROK ties. The Soviets may try to address the issue in the larger context of the need for a North/South dialogue on regional security, including the creation of a nuclear free zone or zone of peace, and reductions in US military presence, especially naval.