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1. I gain the impression that, despite many assurances in loyalty to the defensive military doctrine, the real reappraisal of strategic conceptions in this direction has not even started in our country.

On page 3 of the report [Kulikov] attempts to prove a thesis that, despite the INF Agreement, war danger in Europe will not decrease, but, in fact, will increase. Arguments brought to prove this thought are not convincing. Meanwhile it effectively justifies a program of reactive [otvetnogo] increase of our military power. When planning rearmament of all branches of military forces, [the military] do not provide data about resources that this would require, although the list alone makes it clear that military expenditures would not go down, but would significantly go up. And this is proposed when the process of disarmament has begun and, in particular, the prospect of talks and achievement of an agreement on conventional arms reductions and military forces in Europe is getting brighter.

2. It is known that for a long time the Romanians have been bluntly rejecting our programs of military build-up, and the leadership of other [East European] countries accept them without enthusiasm, tied by the Alliance discipline. Nevertheless, the report addresses a rebuke to the fraternal countries who increasingly decline to purchase [Soviet] armaments (p. 6).

Military expenditures in Eastern Europe (although according to Western data) per capita are twice as high that in the majority of NATO countries. Our friends understandably cannot afford to carry this burden any further, all the more so under conditions of a pre-crisis economic situation in almost every [East European] country. What is more profitable for us: that they continue their armament and march towards economic disaster or, on the contrary, that they spare on military expenditures and improve their economic situation, reinforcing de facto the security of the commonwealth?

3. Doubtful is the thesis that the role of “chemical support of combat actions of troops” has increased (p. 5). The report says also that chemical troops will be reinforced with flame-throwers and the means of camouflage (p. 11). How does this correspond to our declarations of our readiness for a complete ban on and liquidation of chemical weapons?

4. The document contains a declaration about the need to support military-strategic parity with NATO (p. 7).

This thesis under current conditions should be spelled out to avoid its “verbatim” implementation.

5. It is not clear what it means that the combat and numerical strength of each Allied army “is intended to be preserved on the level prescribed by the Protocols by the end of
1999." Does it mean a plan over-fulfillment, building up a larger military might ahead of
time?

6. As an example that [the military] understand the concept of defensive doctrine in
highly bizarre way can be found in the thesis about the intention to devote in the next five
year plan more attention to the air-borne paratrooper formations [udarno-shturmovim
otriadam] (p. 9). Until now this arm of the service existed predominantly not for
defensive tasks.

Another example. On page 11 the report recommends to increase the stockpile of
fuel, ammunition, to create their stockpiles on the territory of Hungary and Bulgaria, to
create stockpiles of armaments and equipment for deployment of formations from the
reserves, etc.

On p. 12 the report points out the need to expand the net of air-strips, to continue
equipping protective hangars for military aircraft.

In general the report admits that implementation of the prescribed tasks, which
should maintain the military-strategic parity, would require big efforts from the Allied
Command and the Ministry of Defense in procurement of troops, [and] large-scale
mobilization of the scientific and industrial potential of the socialist countries.

In other words, overall the report speaks not about a reduction of military efforts,
but, on the contrary, their intensification. It would not be at all surprising that even if the
report of the Commander-in-Chief does not leak to the West (and in present
circumstances in the WTO such leaks cannot be excluded), the West were able easily to
conclude on the basis of the facts and those measures for a build-up that would be
implemented that in reality we do not want to disarm – moreover, we do not even want to
lower the level of armed confrontation.

In essence, the presented document does not indicate that any attempt is about to
be made to reassess the real military-strategic situation in Europe. The key component of
this situation is the continuing Western intention to preserve nuclear arsenals on a certain
level. The focus is still on nuclear deterrence, but not on the task of waging an offensive
war by conventional means. With this in mind, we should remake our strategy. The
existing nuclear means guarantee us from a direct aggression and thereby makes
redundant a further increase of conventional armaments and military forces.

On the other hand, as many politicians from the Left are telling us, with some
justice, only our concrete steps in reduction of armaments will trigger corresponding
measures in the West. This will provoke such a wave of popular movement there, that
governments will have to move towards us.

Then should we provide bourgeois militarists with arguments to continue and
intensify the arms race?

instructions."

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