No. P/213/38

To: Cdes. Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, and Rakhmanin

Extract from Protocol No. 213 of the Session of the CPSU CC Politburo on 3 September 1980

On Theses for the Discussion with Representatives of the Polish Leadership.

To endorse the theses for the discussion with representatives of the Polish leadership (see attached).

CC SECRETARY

Regarding point 38 of Prot. No. 213

To be transmitted by the KGB in encrypted form to the designated point.

1. To give a precise evaluation of and take a clear position on the agreement with the so-called “United Strike Committees” (ZKS) in Gdansk and Szczecin.¹

The agreement concluded by the PPR government, and endorsed by the plenum of the PZPR CC, exacts a high political and economic price for the “regulation” it achieves. We, of course, understand the circumstances in which you had to make this onerous decision.² The agreement, in essence, signifies the legalization of the anti-socialist

¹ Translator’s Note: Momentous agreements were concluded between the Polish government and the Inter-Factory Strike Committee (Miedzyzakladowy Komitet Strajkowy, or MKS) in Szczecin and Gdansk on 30 and 31 August, respectively. These agreements, coming after two months of deepening unrest all over Poland, were swiftly approved by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR). Three days later, another agreement was concluded between the Polish government and the MKS in the Silesian mining town of Jastrzebie. The three agreements marked the full-fledged start of the Solidarity era in Poland.

² Translator’s Note: The PZPR First Secretary, Edward Gierek, had been on vacation in Crimea from late July to mid-August (see below), but he had to cut short his trip when an "occupation strike" (strajk
opposition. An organization has emerged that aims to spread its political influence through the entire country. The complexity of the struggle against it stems, in particular, from the fact that the members of the opposition disguise themselves as defenders of the working class and as laborers.

The agreement does not eliminate the underlying causes of the crisis events; and what is more, the urgent problems of the Polish economy and Polish society are now becoming more complicated.

Because the opposition intends to continue the struggle to achieve its aims, and the healthy forces of the party and society cannot acquiesce in regressive movement by Polish society, the compromise that has been achieved will be only temporary in nature. One must bear in mind that the opposition is expecting, not without reason, that help will be forthcoming from outside.

2. Under the pressure of anti-socialist forces, who have succeeded in leading astray

_ookupacijny_) began at the huge Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk on 14 August. By the time Gierek arrived back in Warsaw on 15 August, the crisis was slipping beyond his control. The PZPR Politburo had met in an emergency session on 14 August at the behest of Stanislaw Kania, a senior Politburo member responsible for security affairs, who had ordered the mobilization of three army regiments near the strike areas and the severing of communications with Gdansk. On 15 August the PZPR Politburo resumed its deliberations, with Gierek present. Kania gave a disconcerting update on the crisis, prompting Gierek to aver that the strikers were acting "at foreign inspiration." He warned that the situation might soon become "so dangerous" that they would have to approve the "use of force" (uzycie sily). To this end, a task force was set up on 16 August at the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs to prepare for a harsh crackdown, using the codename _Lato-80_ (Summer '80). Under the supervision of a deputy minister, General Boguslaw Stachura, the _Lato-80_ task force devised a plan involving the deployment of commandos in military helicopters to storm the Lenin Shipyard, followed by mass arrests. See the transcripts "Protokol Nr. 16 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 14 sierpnia 1980 r.," 14 August 1980 (Secret), and "Protokol Nr. 17 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 15 sierpnia 1980 r.," 15 August 1980 (Secret), both reprinted in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., _Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc" 1980-1981_ (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 23-28 and 28-34, respectively. On the _Lato-80_ planning, see "Posiedzenie Sztabu MSW, 29.VIII.1980 r.," 29 August 1980 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Urzedu Ochrony Panstwa (AUOP), Sygnatura (Sygn.) 2309/IV, Tom (T.) 2. See also the contributions by Janusz Krupski and Jarema Maciszewski in Kancelaria Sejmu, _O stanie wojennym: W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej_ (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 108-110 and 126-128, respectively. The task force's plan was never put into effect because of deep rifts within the PZPR Politburo, which came to a head at a meeting on 29 August. Before the 29th, Gierek had considered requesting Soviet military intervention to crush the strike movement, but he received no response from Moscow to his tentative overtures. Hence, by the 29th he had decided to seek other options. A few members of the PZPR Politburo, especially Wladyslaw Kruczek, wanted to cease negotiations with the strike committee and to impose martial law right away. Their position was based in part on Stachura's contention that the security forces could quickly "exterminate the counterrevolutionary nest in Gdansk." Most members of the Politburo, however, were much less sanguine than Stachura was. Kania, in particular, said it was a "fantasy" to expect that a large-scale crackdown could be implemented so soon. Heeding Kania's advice, the Politburo decided, if only with grave misgivings, to sign the proposed agreements establishing a "free, self-governing trade union." No one on the Politburo welcomed this decision — Gierek insisted that "under threat of a general strike, we must choose the lesser evil and then find a way to get out of it" — but in the absence of a viable alternative (including Soviet military intervention), the Politburo reluctantly concluded that, for the time being, the strikers' demands would have to be fulfilled. See "Protokol Nr. 28 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 29 sierpnia 1980 r.," 29 August 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., _Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego_, pp. 84-90.
a significant portion of the working class, the PZPR had to go on the defensive. Now the problem is how to prepare a counterattack and reclaim the positions that have been lost among the working class and the people.

In launching this counterattack, it would be advisable to use all the capabilities afforded by the ruling Party and its strong, healthy core, by the state apparatus, and by mass social organizations, while showing political flexibility. These institutions will provide necessary support to the vanguard ranks of the working class. If circumstances warrant, it would be advisable to use the contemplated administrative means.\(^3\)

The Party must give a principled political evaluation of the August events and must also accelerate the formulation of its own program of action, which will include steps to improve the life of workers.

3. It is necessary to give overriding significance to the consolidation of the leading role of the Party in society.

The current political crisis has sharply weakened the influence and authority of the Party among the working class. In such circumstances one must adopt all necessary measures for its organizational and ideological cohesion and for the reestablishment of its influence and authority.

Among some concrete recommendations, one might list the following:

\(^3\) Translator's Note: Planning for the use of "administrative" measures had begun in Poland even before the Gdansk and Szczecin accords were signed. One sign of this was the creation of the Lato-80 task force (see previous annotation), which remained in existence until early 1982. In addition, a "Party-Government Crisis Staff" (Partyjno-rzadowy Sztab Kryzysowy) was set up on 24 August 1980, just after the conclusion of a PZPR Central Committee plenum, which endorsed personnel changes in the PZPR Politburo and approved efforts to seek an agreement with the striking workers. The newly-appointed prime minister, Jozef Pinskiowski, was chosen to head the Crisis Staff. (Pinkowski had been designated to replace Edward Babiuch, whose removal adumbrated Gierek's own downfall on 6 September.) The Crisis Staff sought to keep the Gdansk and Szczecin accords as vague as possible so that Solidarity's gains could be gradually eroded. In conjunction with the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Crisis Staff devised "administrative" measures to curb the growing unrest. But by the end of September, when it had become clear to most officials that administrative measures were likely to be insufficient, the Crisis Staff authorized the drafting of preliminary guidelines for the imposition of martial law (discussed in annotation no. 17 below). The origins and role of the Party-Government Crisis Staff were first disclosed in 1987 by Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, who called it by an alternative name, the Party-Government Leadership Staff (Partyjno-rzadowy Sztab Kierowniczy). Kuklinski was a top aide to Jaruzelski in 1980-81 and was one of five officers on the Polish General Staff overseeing preparations for the military aspects of martial law. (The Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible for planning other aspects of the crackdown.) Kuklinski had been a crucial intelligence source for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since the early 1970s, having provided many thousands of pages of highly classified documents about Soviet and Warsaw Pact war planning and Soviet-Polish military relations. He had to escape from Poland in November 1981. Six years later, Kuklinski agreed to a lengthy interview, "Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," Kultura (Paris), No. 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 3-55, which provides invaluable information for those studying the 1980-81 crisis. His discussion of the Party-Government Crisis Staff, on pp. 17-18 (and elsewhere), has been amply corroborated by newly declassified documents from the Polish military and internal affairs ministry archives.
— On an urgent basis, carry out measures to raise the combativeness of all Party organizations, taking account of the lessons of the political crisis. Act decisively in removing people who are clearly alien to the Party, while conforming with the specific conditions existing right now in the country.

— Convene a plenum of the Central Committee as soon as possible in order to work out a detailed, positive program specifying the main policy directions. The program must, in particular, undercut the significance of the demands of the strike committees in Gdansk and Szczecin as much as possible in the eyes of the workers. In accordance with materials from the CC plenum, convene expanded plenary sessions of PZPR provincial, municipal, and local committees, sessions of the Party aktiv, and Party meetings at enterprises.

— Consider the possibility of convening a Party Congress, at which a full-scale program of action for the Party would be worked out, new directives for the five-year plan would be affirmed, and necessary changes in the leading organs would be introduced.

— An increase in the combativeness of the Party in rural locations will require the comprehensive organizational strengthening of the PZPR's local committees, which since the administrative reforms of 1975 have been serving in the role of regional committees.

— Consider directions for the leading work in party organs carried out by

---

4 Translator's Note: A PZPR Central Committee plenum was convened on 6 September 1980. The main action taken at the plenum was the removal of Edward Gierek as PZPR First Secretary. Stanislaw Kania was elected to replace him.

5 Translator's Note: The PZPR's Extraordinary Ninth Congress was not convened until mid-July 1981.

6 Translator's Note: Changes in the PZPR's administrative structure in 1975 were the last in a series of modifications begun in the early 1970s. Until the early 1970s Poland was divided into 17 provinces (wojewodztwa), which were sub-divided into counties (powiaty), which in turn were sub-divided into localities (gromady). Party organizations existed at all three levels, each of which was strictly accountable to the highest party organs in Warsaw. In 1975 this four-tier system (four tiers counting the highest-level organs) was replaced by a three-tier structure based on 49 newly demarcated provinces (wojewodztwa), which encompassed hundreds of localities (gminy). Under the old system, local party officials often had been frustrated in trying to manage their own affairs, but the new structure devolved greater authority to them. For the Polish state security organs, however, the changes were far less welcome. In March 1981 a senior official from the Polish internal affairs ministry complained that "the elimination in 1975 of the lower rungs of the administrative division of the country—the powiaty—meant that in the localities nothing was left of the state security organs, the police, and the PZPR (they were preserved only in the wojewodztwo capitals). In practical terms, this meant that the only remaining source of influence and authority in the localities was the Catholic Church. As a result of this, and also because of the opposition's efforts to disparage government organs, including the state security organs, it is now extraordinarily difficult [for us] to obtain accurate local information, especially about the Catholic Church." Quoted from "Spravka ob informatsii, poluchennoi pri vstrechakh s sotrudnikom MVD PNR," No. 2/508 (Secret), 3 March 1981, by Colonel P. A. Gordienko, deputy head of the Ukrainian KGB directorate for L'viv oblast, with a cover note by V. Dobrik, first secretary of the L'viv oblast committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UkrCP), in Tsentral'nii Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadnykh Ob'ednan Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), Fond (F.) 1, Opis’ (Op.) 25, Spravka (Spr.) 2235, Listy (Ll.) 16-20. Gordienko's claim that the Security Service (Sluzba bezpieczenstwa, or SB), police, and PZPR had no branches at the local level is spurious, but his general perception of the matter seems to have been widely shared within the SB.
experienced political workers of the Polish Army.

4. The reestablishment of severed links between the Party and the working class will require a fundamental renewal of the activity of trade unions. Do everything necessary to prevent the dissolution or disintegration of the existing trade unions (CRZZ) and their organizations. Convene as soon as possible the regular 9th Congress of the trade unions of Poland, where the foremost task will be to move the trade unions as close as possible to the workers and to earn their full confidence.

— Put up a defense of the basic principles of the trade union movement in the conditions of a socialist society. Abide by certain provisions in the agreement with the ZKS and at the same time adopt all measures to limit and neutralize the effect of the most dangerous articles in the agreement. Come forward with bold initiatives of a social character, which would bolster the authority of the trade unions.

— Raise the quality of personnel in trade union organizations by bringing in advanced, trustworthy workers. Carry out elections of trade union activists before this is done in the so-called “self-governing” trade unions.

— Seek to limit the activity and influence of the so-called “self-governing” trade unions among the masses, a task that will be accomplished predominantly by mobilizing public opinion. Move actively in infiltrating the so-called “self-governing” trade unions with people devoted to the Party.

---

7 Translator's Note: Poland's official Central Council of Trade Unions (Centralna Rada Związków Zawodowych, or CRZZ) had been thoroughly discredited by the time this document was issued.

8 Translator's Note: An official campaign to infiltrate Solidarity soon began in earnest. Ryszard Kuklinski later recalled that "from around December 1980 to February of the following year, the [Polish] Ministry of Internal Affairs concentrated all its efforts on the use of agents to penetrate Solidarity." (Quoted from "Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," p. 26.) Kuklinski's testimony is borne out by countless documents in the Polish and Russian archives. To cite but one example: A memorandum prepared for the CPSU Secretariat in early 1981 revealed that PZPR officials in the Radom province of Poland had informed a visiting Soviet delegation that "the party organs are trying to infiltrate the governing committees of Solidarity' at enterprises with as many party members as possible." The Radom officials expressed "certainty that within a year-and-a-half to two years the new trade union will be under party control." See "Informatsiya o poezdke delegatsii Yaroslavskogo obkoma KPSS v Radomskoe voevodstvo PNR," Memorandum No. 0035 (Top Secret), 21 January 1981, from I. Zaramenskii, first secretary of the CPSU's Yaroslavl oblast committee, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), F. 5, Op. 84, Delo (D.) 85, Ll. 298-301. It is unclear precisely how successful this infiltration campaign proved to be. Although at least one-third (perhaps as many as two-fifths) of all PZPR members openly joined Solidarity, most of them seemed to be genuinely supportive of the union's goals. Even those who initially joined Solidarity as PZPR infiltrators were, in some cases, inclined to shift their allegiances to the union. A hardline PZPR official, Stefan Olszowski, complained in November 1980 that "many" party members who were enrolled in Solidarity were proving "unreliable" and "weak." See "Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Generalsekretars des ZK derSED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politburos und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei," 20 November 1980 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, J IV, 2/2 A-2363; reproduced in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen": Die SED contra Polen 1980/81 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), p. 105. Similarly, a Soviet diplomat reported in May 1981 that "members of the PZPR are taking part in strikes sponsored by
5. In light of the danger created by the activity of the anti-socialist forces, use state structures to carry out necessary measures for the strengthening of the socialist legal order.

— Pay greater attention to the army and devote special attention to the military-political preparation of soldiers. Use the opportunity to attract army command personnel to perform party-economic work as well.

— Adopt necessary measures to expose the political nature and designs of the ringleaders of the opposition.

6. In the sphere of the mass media and propaganda, concentrate efforts on the further strengthening of Party leadership and supervision over these organs. This is especially necessary when in practice the question has arisen of the “limitation of censorship” and the expansion of access for the anti-socialist forces and the Church to the

Solidarity despite orders from the PZPR Politburo that they must not participate.” Quoted in "O prazdnovanii pervogo maya i godovshchiny so dnya prinjatiya konstitutsii 3 maya (Politicheskaya zapiska)," Cable No. 68 (Secret), 4 May 1981, from N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in Szczecin, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 85, D. 597, Ll. 6-12. Soon thereafter, Soviet officials began expressing concern that Solidarity was steadily taking over the PZPR, rather than the other way around. In June 1981, for example, the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov, said he "could not exclude the possibility that a significant number of supporters of Solidarity will be included in the new PZPR Central Committee. This could cause the PZPR to lose its Marxist-Leninist character." Quoted from "Obstanovka v PNR nakonane IX S"ezda PORP," Cable No. 568 (Top Secret), 30 June 1981, from Aristov to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 17. Despite the questionable utility of the infiltration campaign, the proposal in this Soviet document is interesting insofar as it reveals the extent of Moscow's enmity toward Solidarity from the very start.

Translator's Note: As is evident in several documents below, Soviet and Polish leaders in 1980-81 were increasingly concerned about the reliability of the Polish armed forces for internal coercion. The passage of time meant that new recruits had been exposed to Solidarity's influence long before entering the army. As early as November 1980, a few senior PZPR officials were worried that "some 60 to 70 percent of the army is leaning toward Solidarity." Quoted from "Informatsiya o nekotorykh vyskazaniakh pol'skikh grazhdan sovetskim turistam v PNR iz Vinnitskoi oblasti," Report No. 03/284 (Top Secret), 26 November 1980, from A. V. Merkulov, head of the UkrCP Central Committee Department on Foreign Ties, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 2138, Ll. 46-49. This estimate, which was conveyed orally to a member of the CPSU Politburo Commission on Poland, Oleg Rakhmanin, may have overstated the problem, but Kania himself acknowledged in early December 1980 that "the adverse situation has also taken its toll in the army. . . . Among the new recruits are people who have taken part in strikes or whose parents have taken part in strikes. This means that political indoctrination and discipline in the armed forces are of the utmost importance. We must bear in mind the influence that the families of [new] troops in the army and security forces have on them." Quoted from "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," 5 December 1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMdB, ZPA, J 1V, 2/2 A-2368; reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., “Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen”, p. 150. Despite Kania's awareness of the problem, reports from Soviet diplomatic and intelligence officials continued to highlight "shortcomings" in the "military-political preparation of [Polish] soldiers." Just a month before martial law was imposed, a lengthy diplomatic cable described "evidence that the political training of [Polish] officers has been increasingly deficient." See "O politicheskoi situatsii i nastroinikakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo regiona PNR (Politis'mo)," Cable No. 179 (Secret), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Krakow, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 13-22.
mass media.\textsuperscript{10}

— In these circumstances it is necessary to provide an elaborate definition of what is permissible, having openly declared that the law on the press forbids any statements against socialism.

— Adopt necessary measures to put an end to the wide circulation of anti-Communist publications, films, and television productions in the PPR, and to maintain strict control over the sources of information emanating from Poland, including the activity of bourgeois journalists.

Strengthen party control over the work of the central and local press, over the supervisors of editorial collectives, and particularly over all television and radio broadcasts.

Using the mass media, show that events in Poland have been caused not by any shortcomings of the socialist system \textit{per se}, but by mistakes and oversights, and also by some objective factors (natural calamities, etc.). Through the mass media, actively and broadly counteract the anti-Polish and anti-Soviet attacks of hostile propaganda.

Objectively depict the economic advantages Poland derives from broad cooperation with the USSR and other fraternal countries. Refute the widely circulated slander that one of the reasons for the current difficulties in supplying the population of the PPR with consumer goods is the shipment of such goods to the other countries of socialism.\textsuperscript{11}

* * *

After expressing a number of points about the critical situation that has emerged in the PPR, we would like once again to draw the attention of our Polish friends to the

\textsuperscript{10} Translator's Note: When the Szczecin and Gdansk accords were signed, the chief government negotiator (and deputy prime minister), Mieczyslaw Jagielski, promised that Solidarity would soon be given access to the mass media and would be permitted to have its own publications. In subsequent months the authorities repeatedly stalled in fulfilling these promises. Jagielski also pledged that by the end of November the government would propose legislation defining the "limits of censorship." The Soviet Politburo seems to be expressing disapproval of the notion of "limiting censorship," but it should be noted that this concept was less ambitious than the strikers' original goal of \textit{eliminating} censorship. Solidarity was willing to put up with some censorship, so long as it was legally and openly regulated. In the past, censorship in Poland had been arbitrarily enforced in accordance with top-secret guidelines. \textit{See Czarna Ksiega Cenzury PRL} (London: Aneks, 1977-1978). \textit{See also} Laszlo Revesz, \textit{Pressrecht und Pressepraxis in Polen: ein Vergleich mit andern Ostblockstaaten} (Bern: Verlag SOI, 1988), esp. pp. 5-47.

\textsuperscript{11} Translator's Note: Poland's economic ties with the Soviet Union had long been a source of popular resentment in Poland. From the 1940s on, Soviet diplomats and military officers in Poland heard endless complaints about the "high price Poland is obliged to pay for friendship with the USSR" and about the "treaty links with the Soviet Union that are forcing Poland to reject highly profitable arrangements [and] far more advantageous economic opportunities" in Western Europe. Quoted from "O nekotorykh nastroeniyakh v Pol'she po voprosu pol'sko-sovetskikh ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii," Memorandum from Lieutenant-General A. Okorokov, head of Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces, to M. A. Suslov, 19 March 1947 (Top Secret), in Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI), F. 17, Op. 128, D. 284, Ll. 27-28, with cover note to M. A. Suslov.
recommendations and suggestions offered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during the discussions in the Crimea with E. Gierek both in 1979 and especially on 31 July 1980, as well as in his letter of 21 August 1980 addressed to the PZPR CC.  

Of particular importance in today’s situation are the following suggestions offered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on 31 July 1980:

— carry out, along a wide front, work aimed at fostering socialist internationalism, while decisively rebuffing all attempts to use nationalism in the propagation of anti-socialist and anti-Soviet sentiments, as well as all attempts to misrepresent the history of Soviet-Polish relations and the nature of cooperation between the USSR and the PPR; 

12 Translator’s Note: During the Brezhnev era, it was common for East European leaders to hold bilateral talks in late July or August with Soviet Politburo members who were vacationing in the Crimea. Gierek’s departure for the Crimea in July 1980 came amid a wave of strikes in Poland triggered by an announcement on 2 July of steep increases in food prices. Before Gierek left for the Soviet Union, he consulted with Kania and other senior Polish officials about the possibility of delaying or cancelling his trip, but they repeatedly assured him that everything would remain under control while he was gone. Numerous archival documents, including this one (see below) and the secret report distributed by the CPSU Politburo about the nature of Brezhnev’s talks in the Crimea, indicate that Brezhnev and Gierek discussed the burgeoning crisis at some length during their meeting on 31 July. See, for example, "Informatsiya ob otklikakh sekretarei partiinikh komitetov Kompartii Litvy na itogi krymskikh vstrech General'nogo sekretarya TsK KPSS, Predsedatelya Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR tov. Brezhneva L. I. s rukovoditelyami bratskikh partii sotsialisticheskikh stran v 1980 году," Report No. 949s (Top Secret), 27 August 1980, in Lietuvos Visuomenes Organizaciju Archyvas (LVOA), Fondo (F.) 1771, Apyros (Apy.) 257, Bylo (B.) 193, Lapai (La.) 113-117. Curiously, though, the joint communique published on 1 August made no direct mention of the unrest. See "Druzheskaya vstrecha," Pravda (Moscow), 1 August 1980, p. 1. At a Warsaw Pact summit in early December 1980, Brezhnev harkened back to the 31 July meeting, claiming that he had "continually emphasized to Gierek that a resolute campaign against the anti-socialist elements is necessary. But all we heard in response [from Gierek] was: 'Nothing is going on, no opposition exists, the Polish government and party are in control of the situation.'" (This is indeed what Gierek had been hearing from his Polish colleagues.) Brezhnev went on to say that he could not be sure why Gierek would have made such claims, but that it might have stemmed from "foolishness or overconfidence [or] excessive ambition." Quoted from "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," pp. 189-190. Brezhnev’s letter of 21 August, which still pledged qualified support for Gierek, was raised briefly at a PZPR Politburo meeting the following day; see "Protokol Nr. 22 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 22 sierpnia 1980 r.," 22 August 1980 (Secret), reprinted in Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego, p. 51. See also Gierek’s recollections in Edward Gierek: Przerwana Dekada, comp. by Janusz Rolicki (Warsaw: Fakt, 1990), p. 177. After sending the letter to the PZPR Central Committee on 21 August, Soviet leaders gradually lost all remaining faith in Gierek and decided that he would have to be replaced. They provided behind-the-scenes support to Kania, who was chosen as Gierek’s successor at a Central Committee plenum on 6 September.

13 Translator’s Note: The unrest in mid-1980 rapidly brought to the surface long-suppressed demands in Poland for an accurate accounting of "blank spots" in Soviet-Polish relations, including the Russian-Polish war of 1919-20, the partition of Poland in September 1939, the Katyn Forest massacres in March 1940, the Soviet Army’s failure to support the Warsaw uprising against German occupation forces in the summer of 1944, and the Soviet-Polish standoff in October 1956. Concerns in Moscow about “the use of nationalism in the propagation of anti-socialist and anti-Soviet sentiments” in Poland remained acute throughout the crisis. In a typical case in November 1981, Soviet intelligence sources reported that “information flowing in gives reason to believe that a sweeping explosion of chauvinistic sentiments is possible in Poland, which would be fraught with adverse consequences for attempts to overcome the political and economic crises in the PPR." Quoted from "Ob izmenenii politicheskoi situatsii v PNR," Memorandum No. 0231/3 (Secret),
— launch relentless counterpropaganda against efforts to water down the class content of socialist patriotism under the slogan of “All Poles in the world are brothers,” as well as the efforts to idealize the pre-revolutionary past of Poland; and

— in the political struggle against anti-socialist elements, carry out appropriate attacks against them, rather than merely going on the defensive.

3 September 1980

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 37.]

11 November 1981, from V. Dobrik, first secretary of the UkrCP's oblast committee in L'viv, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 2295, L. 35.

14 Translator’s Note: This slogan had taken on greater significance since 1978, when Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Krakow was chosen to be the new Pope, under the name John Paul II. The Pope returned to Poland on a triumphal visit in June 1979, an event that greatly bolstered the role and prestige of the Church in his native land. Many Poles increasingly viewed the Church, under John Paul’s leadership, as a repository of Polish nationalism and a rallying point for Poles around the world. Brezhnev’s discussions with Gierek in the summer of 1979, which were mentioned earlier in this document, had focused on the need to counter the Church’s newfound influence. The growing link between the Catholic Church and Polish nationalist traditions helps explain why Soviet leaders in 1980-81 were so wary of the Church and its ties with Solidarity.