Hist.100: Part 9

Mass Society and New Imperialism – 1870-1914

Dr. Dina Mira Copelman

Introduction

Welcome to George Mason University’s Western Civilization.  I’m Dina Mira Copelman.  By now you have probably gotten accustomed to the idea that studying history is a matter of interpretation, not justi information. So what interpretive lenses will I be applying? Interpretively what I want you to think about as a result of this lecture is the concept of b>paradox that something can exhibit seemingly contradictory qualities; in the words of the Merriam- Webster dictionary, that something “seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense” may, nevertheless, be “perhaps true.” I will develop the contradictions that engulf Europe around the turn of the 20th century as I go along, but let me introduce them in broad strokes here:

The paradox that Europe, especially Western Europe, at the turn of the century witnessed unparalleled prosperity and more people were able to partake of the products of industrialization, yet, at the same time, the term “unemployment,” was introduced in the late 1880s.  Working-class dissatisfaction and socialist politics were on the rise. Then, there was the paradox that “reason” at a basic level had finally triumphed as most nations were finally providing elementary education to the majority of the population and democracy—in the form of extensions of the franchise and representative political bodies—were spreading.  But at the same time the culture of the Enlightenment—belief in human goodness and perfectibility, in progress—were questioned as theories of race promoted new ideas of inequality. The paradox that Western powers dominated the globe militarily, economically and politically, yet the mood in the capitals of major European powers was that the respective power (read England, France, Germany) was under threat, struggling to survive in a hostile world.

This lecture focuses on the period 1870-1914, a time of great paradox.  In this lecture, I will:

First, provide a framework for understanding the social and economic history of the period between the clear emergence of the urban industrial system and the early 20th century—a period often referred to by its French name, the fin de siècle—turn of the century.  Isolating key aspects of this period I will focus on the development of what has been called “mass society”—the emergence of new forms of large scale information, manufacturing and distribution, political participation, and social and cultural possibilities.

The second salient feature of this period that I will focus on extensively is the growth of the “New Imperialism” in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Let me suggest first, that my emphasis on paradoxes represents my view that the fin-de-siècle is a mixed story of achievement and prosperity alongside significant problems and—especially when looking at the race to acquire imperial possessions—some of the most troubling legacies of Western civilization. Second, I find that the notion of paradox is itself a profoundly fin-de-siècle concept—indeed, one could argue that the cultural challenge of the age was to understand and position oneself among the many paradoxes the period posed.

Mid-century transition 

Industrialization brought about profound and often conflicting changes. The first half of the nineteenth century was a turbulent period—new economic processes and relationships and political movements aimed at enlarging the ranks of enfranchised male citizens marked this time. Between the 1850s and the 1880s, however, a relative calm seemed to have settled. This period saw a greater acceptance of the new economy and its new elite—the bourgeoisie, or the urban dwelling capitalist and professional middle classes. It is often this period that many commentators then and now have in mind when they imagine an opulent (and often stuffy!) minutely regulated Victorian culture. Indeed, to symbolize the middle decades of the century we often turn to the Crystal Palace, a sort of World’s Fair, held in London in 1851 to celebrate the technological and economic achievements of the age.

Fin de Siècle and Mass Society

That rosy glow cast by the middle decades of the nineteenth century had not exactly faded by the 1880s, but it was framed differently. There was a growing feeling of tension among many Europeans.  There are many reasons for this.  Let’s examine some of the main characteristics of the period to locate the sources of tensions. 

First there were economic changes. More people produced and consumed more goods at cheaper prices—in relative terms—than at any previous time in European history. New housing was built— such as in Paris, in the 1860s, where Baron Haussmann, razed many of the older, narrow streets of the French capital and replaced them with grand boulevards lined by graceful and comfortable bourgeois homes. Like Paris, London in the 1880s was a grand city, a fine capital offering elegance, refined culture and all the pleasures of modernity. Yet the cities—which now constituted home for the majority of the people in more and more countries—continued to be identified with the problems associated with class divisions and poverty. Paradoxically, this was a period that witnessed “a rediscovery of poverty”—fully one third of the population was believed to be living below a level adequate for subsistence. This situation was chronicled in the minutely detailed studies conducted by social scientists as well as in the more sensationalist exposes of journalists and others—the most famous of these exposes was titled the “Bitter Cry of Outcast London.” written in 1884 by a minister, the Reverend Andrew Mearns.

Another crucial economic aspect of the era was the new scale of mass production.  From the 1870s, there was significant turmoil in the agricultural economy. Improved transportation and communication introduced greater imports and exports of agricultural products.  The wheat fields of the United States could now feed Europe; so could cattle from South America, and so on. This hit farmers hard, especially smaller farmers, who could not afford new machinery and barely eked a living. However, foreign competition in large-scale agriculture led to cheaper prices that benefited urban populations. Nevertheless, the slump in agricultural prices could—and sometimes did—have a destabilizing effect, on the entire economy.   The slump further undermined small farmers in many countries thus giving way to greater agricultural concentrations in some countries, such as Britain and the United States. As domestic demand declined the depressed agricultural population was now less able to afford new machinery and thus less able to enjoy the benefits of industrialization.  The cycles of boom and bust no longer seemed aberrations—they were beginning to be understood as part and parcel of modern industrial capitalist economies.

The fin-de-siècle is sometimes referred to as a “Second Industrial Revolution.” This was a period of change and economic development built upon the first phase, yet distinct from, the industrialization which took place 50 years earlier. This Second Industrial Revolution was based more in heavy industries, particularly steel, engineering, and chemicals.  During this time, England was joined and even superseded by Germany and the United States as leading industrial powers and strong global competitors.

Greater economic competition between nations was accompanied by a greater concentration of capital, labor force, and companies within specific sectors. This was the age of cartels and trusts, the combination of firms or corporations formed by a legal agreement; esp: one that reduces or threatens to reduce competition.  It was also the age of the emergence of what has been termed monopoly capitalism: the capitalist economic system characterized by small groups of people or companies possessing control over a commodity or industry. This trend can be seen at many levels.  In the late 1800’s, the first department stores appear. (Galeries Lafayette; Harrod’s) The late 1800s also saw the first grocery chains, for example, Sainsbury’s in England. In the United States, the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company—or the A&P—which opened in 1859 and by the 1880s had stores stretching from the East Coast to the Midwest. By 1900, A&P had 200 stores, in 1925 it could boast 14,000.

Monopoly capitalism also developed in the chemical industry.    The German Bayer Company incorporated in 1881 into the larger chemical conglomerate Farbenfabriken.   By 1925 further growth and concentration would make Farbenfabriken the world’s largest chemical cartel.  Monopolies were the trend in the sugar industry, petroleum, and the manufacture of soap and matches. The paradox here?  The resulting monopolies could introduce greater efficiency and lower prices; but they could also produce price fixing and reduce competition, especially by marginalizing or pushing out the small producer. The independent corner grocery store and the small clothing store were often unable to stand up against industrial giants. And concentration did not guarantee stability—for if one of these giants encountered rough waters (in an economic sense) the ripple effect could feel like a tidal wave on the economy. Originally it was hoped that an industrial society could unlock the secret of how to stabilize supply, demand and distribution and somehow—miraculously?—produce prosperity and balance.  But it seemed, instead, that industrialization brought instability, unemployment, and cyclical depressions.

REVIEW: What have we learned so far?

In this lecture we are examining the period 1870-1914. These decades were:

1) Turbulent when compared to the relative calm of the middle decades of the 19th century. They were marked by sharp contrasts and paradoxes and the rise of mass society, which we defined as “the emergence of new forms of large scale information, manufacturing and distribution, political participation and social and cultural possibilities.”

2) To understand mass society we must look at its economic, political and cultural manifestations. Economically we have found that the period witnessed both the growth of the urban middle class and disturbing exposes of poverty.

3) Economic activity became more concentrated. In agriculture, small farmers were pushed out as cheaper goods—provided  by an expanded international market—forced many out of business. This was a period of agricultural depression.

4) In industry a “Second Industrial Revolution” based in steel, engineering and chemicals turned Germany and the United States into major international powers. This was also the era when cartels and trusts—the domination of an industrial sector by a few leading firms—were formed, which led to the eclipse of many small businesses. The rise of department stores and supermarket chains illustrate this development.

Let us continue to explore mass society by turning to its political and cultural manifestation.

Democracy and liberal politics

In addition to dramatic changes in the structure of the economy, another contributing factor that explains the tensions of the fin de siècle is disillusionment with the growth of democracy and liberal politics. By the 1880s some sort of franchise, or voting rights, for male workers had been established in most countries. In Britain for instance, an act passed in 1863 extended the vote to most stable male workers with a fixed residence. About two thirds of adult males could now vote. A further act, passed in 1884 extended the vote to agricultural laborers and other pockets of working-class men. Though a truly universal male franchise would have to wait for the 1900s, after 1884 it is fair to say that men of all classes had been enfranchised. Here’s the paradox, this did not in fact translate into power and access. Workers supported and looked to the Liberal Party to represent them. Politicians like William Gladstone and Joseph Chamberlain seemed to respond to their needs. William Gladstone was the popular Liberal party leader who stood for national self-determination and a laissez faire system tempered by a caring government.  Joseph Chamberlain was the mayor of Birmingham who, as a Liberal party member of parliament, sought to use government power to provide services and improve living conditions.  Nevertheless, both at the local and national level, the established political parties did not welcome working class participation and few working class representatives were elected to governing bodies. Furthermore, Gladstone and Chamberlain notwithstanding, late Victorians remained extremely reluctant to use the state to address social problems. The French Third Republic and Germany’s Bismarck government grappled with similar issues. And although Germany proved more willing to experiment with state power, in all major industrial nations, this period witnessed a growing interest in the establishment of distinctly working class and even socialist political parties.

Cultural changes

The third and final characteristic that helps explain the tensions of the fin-de-siècle is cultural change.  The economic and political changes we’ve already examined came together and combined with other potent forces in the cultural arena.  The end product was a set of striking fin-de-siècle cultural phenomena that collectively put a distinctive stamp on mass culture. Here, again, we can see the impact of the forces promoting concentration in growing urban centers creating new forms of expression as well as new forms of manipulation. Take, for example, the development of the mass press.  The average Western European of the 1890s had achieved a basic literacy, thanks to the effect of compulsory elementary education that had been established in many countries. These new readers presented a new and potentially lucrative market, a market that was quickly provided for. In both Britain and the United States “press barons” emerged such as Alfred Harmsworth in Britain, and William Randolph Hearst in the US. These men produced inexpensive newspapers which combined simple language, and short articles with vivid, often sensationalist imagery  to feed the craving for information and diversion. It worked. Circulation shot up.   Founded in 1896, Harmsworth’s paper, the Daily Mail, was selling more than 500,000 copies a day within three years—more than twice the number of copies sold by any other paper before. At peak points during the Boer War, circulation climbed to 1 million copies. Among Harmsworth’s lasting innovations was the tabloid, a newspaper that was half the size of the traditional newspaper page allowing easier handling.  It was a format more in line with the simplified approach of the popular mass press. Now the growth of a mass press, in and of itself, is undoubtedly a good thing. Western societies hold dear the concept of freedom of the press.  The more accessible print is to the people, the more that concept can be realized. But this general truth has to be tempered. The mass press was not necessarily free—the press barons not only made huge profits, but they also wielded enormous power. Courted by politicians, press barons could mold public opinion and did not hesitate to do so. In the United States “yellow journalism”—a term coined to describe sensationalist scandal oriented writing—took credit for pushing the country into war with Cuba in 1898. Hearst’s paper, the Morning Journal—was embroiled in a circulation war with another New York paper.  To boost sales, the Journal exaggerated and exacerbated the political tensions between the United States and Spain.  When war finally broke out, Hearst took credit in a headline asking “How do you like the Journal’s War?” When an illustrator sent out to provide images of war atrocities reported back that he could find none to draw, Hearst reportedly answered: “You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the war.” So, the mass press provided information to people previously outside of the reading public—but it did not use this opportunity to enhance the possibilities of the masses to express themselves, but rather, to promote particular agendas and to inflame passions, often for destructive ends.

In addition to the paradoxes of the mass press, there are many examples of paradoxes in late 1800s mass culture.  Let me single out one other crucial aspect of the mass culture of this period, new consumer opportunities -- especially for women.

This is the era when mass consumerism reached new levels, fueled by new production and distribution methods as well as by rising living standards among many urban groups. The growth of advertising accompanied this new consumerism.  Today we consider many of the advertisements of that period as significant forms of artistic expression. Then, as today, appeals to consumers could be read as invitations to spend money frivolously, to look for fulfillment outwardly in materials goods, rather than inwardly to spiritual growth or personal development. But, paradoxically, consumerism had its utopian aspects as well.  For women, the opportunity to go out and shop in the bustling urban downtowns really was a significant freedom. Instead of being relegated to the home and rigidly chaperoned, women now could enjoy the previously male privileges of free movement on public conveyances, and huge department stores devoted to their pleasure.  A French novelist, Emile Zola, titled a work dealing with department stores Au Bonheur des dames—which roughly translates “The Ladies' Paradise.” Women could relax in restaurants and tearooms catering especially to them, they could enjoy themselves at the theater, the music hall, or, by the early 1900s, at the movies. These pleasures were easily compatible with bourgeois family ideology that defined women as first and foremost wives and mothers, not independent citizens or workers.

But the sense of freedom and opportunity provided by expanded public activities inspired women to imagine new identities,to search for and explore new social and political arrangements. The new service and consumer-oriented economy not only took women’s money, it also paid them by providing new jobs for women. The department stores employed female sales clerks and many stores even provided dormitories for their female employees. New forms of communication—the telegraph and telephone, for instance—also provided white-collar work for women. These women kept the new consumer economy going; they also turned around and participated in it.

Women’s roles were changing.  They were the new service workers -- a group that included nurses and teachers, as well as women in retail and office work. Many middle class women developed a niche for themselves in philanthropic work.  A smaller group of middle class women pursued secondary and higher education in new high schools and colleges devoted expressly to expanding women’s opportunities. Even smaller numbers sought to break down the barriers against women in traditionally male occupations such as medicine and journalism.  Put all of these women together, and provide them with activities that make them visible in the heart of the great cities—then, indeed, you can understand why contemporaries were fascinated with what they perceived to be a novel social group, what they termed “New Women.”

REVIEW: Political and Cultural Characteristics of the Fin de Siècle

We saw that economically, fin de siècle mass society was characterized by increasing concentration. Politically and culturally the challenges of the age were to shape, provide for and accommodate the needs and aspirations of great numbers of people. These challenges were only partially met.

1. Politically, most Western countries had granted, by the 1880s, some measure of voting rights to most male workers and had introduced at least some limited representative political body. But formal provisions did not translate into increased power—established elites did not welcome workers into existing political organizations.

2. In the cultural arena concentration  opened up many new cultural possibilities, but also produced new forms of manipulations. We examined these processes by looking at the rise of cheap newspapers and powerful press syndicates; and by examining the expanded consumer and leisure opportunities available to women—developments which not only lured women as consumers, but also provided white collar employment for significant numbers.

Political Responses

Thus far we have examined economic, political and cultural factors which distinguish the fin de siècle and which contributed to making this the period which is associated with the emergence of mass society. In this final section of the first part of my lecture, I want to focus on some of the popular political responses that were evident in the decade before World War I, paying particular attention to the emergence of an international women’s suffrage movement.

Women’s Suffrage

Feminism can trace its roots at least back to the French Revolution, but the sustained effort to grant women voting rights was of more recent origin. Women’s suffrage was first formally raised in British Parliament in the 1860s by the leading Liberal theorist John Stuart Mill. By the 1890s feminists were in a relatively strong position to launch a mass suffrage movement. Building upon advances in women’s education, their greater occupational presence, and their generally increased participation in public life, a broad spectrum of women’s organizations joined together in 1897 to form the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies.  The NUWSS was an umbrella organization claiming a combined membership in the tens of thousands. Committed to lawful, “constitutional” means, the NUWSS launched a campaign to pressure politicians to pass a Parliamentary bill granting adult women the right to vote. After the Liberal party came to power in Britain in 1906, the hopes of suffrage activists mounted since they expected the Liberals—and their working class Labor allies—to be more favorable to their cause. Nevertheless, by the early 1900s a number of women had grown disillusioned with the politics of polite petitioning. IN 1903, women eager to see more rapid progress formed the Women’s Social and Political Union. Under the leadership of the charismatic Emmeline Pankhurst and her strong-minded daughters Sylvia and Christabel, the WSPU developed a more “militant” style of political activity. The WSPU joined in mass demonstrations.  These were impressive and striking events. Visually very savvy, the demonstrators filled the streets of London with powerful images of women’s achievements and of their need for a political voice. Taking to the street in this fashion was a huge step for women. Remember that women were still supposed to be the guardians of the home, of private spaces and domestic life—they did not belong on the dirty and dangerous streets. And, indeed the streets were, if not exactly dangerous for the demonstrators, at least challenging.  Women were jeered and heckled and many suffrage demonstrators were imprisoned. Members of the Women’s Social and Political Union were ardent participants in all the major suffrage demonstrations. The women of the WSPU—or, as they were derisively called, the “suffragettes” (a term WSPU women adopted for themselves) became renowned among European and American feminists for their destruction of property.  Suffragettes broke shop windows in West London; put bombs in mailboxes, poured acid on golf courses, they even slashed paintings, disrupting politicians and public life.   Instead of participating in the Census of 1911, for instance, some groups of women organized ways of evading the census takers. Many suffragettes continued their political activity even after being imprisoned, by participating in hunger strikes.

The militant suffragettes of the WSPU were renowned in many countries. They were connected through international networks, maintaining significant women’s activism throughout Europe and in the United States.

By 1914, the women’s movement had made significant inroads. But World War I interrupted suffrage activity. Suffrage organizations voluntarily put their campaigns on hold as many women devoted their energies to the war effort. A minority used the international connections that had been established over the years of suffrage campaigning to mount a women’s pacifist movement. By the end of World War I women in Britain, the United States, Germany, and Russia, among others achieved at least partial suffrage.

The sight of respectable middle class women taking to the streets—even committing acts of violence and going to jail—was shocking to late Victorians. But women were not the only people dissatisfied with their lot. The years from 1880 to 1914 saw other forms of protest as well. The capitals of Europe were home to discontented workers in search of better work places and a greater voice in determining the conditions of their lives.

Many nations were challenged by minority populations seeking greater self-determination. Britain encountered this challenge in Ireland.  Here we see Irish leader Charles Stuart Parnell addressing an independence meeting.   Germany had to contend with dissatisfied French in Alsace and Lorraine, two regions Germany controlled after the Franco Prussian War of 1870.  France was awash in anti-semitism as demonstrated by the Dreyfus affair where a Jewish French Army Captain was falsely accused of treason. The Austro-Hungarian Empire sought to control numerous groups of seething Slav nationalists.

For the most part, those political challenges did not pose any revolutionary danger.  But examining these discontented populations dispels notions that the tensions of the time would be easily resolved. While autocratic governments were continuously pressured to allow reform, liberal, urban, industrial societies were also faced with dissatisfied, vocal and, increasingly organized masses.

REVIEW: Political Responses

When we defined mass society we looked at the its economic, political and cultural manifestations. In this last section we took an in-depth look at the women’s suffrage movement as an example of how a major social group—women—built a political movement demanding basic changes in their status. Women’s suffrage was not successful before World War I, but, along with other political movements of the period, made the fin de siècle an era of significant political activism. 

Summary to Part I: Returning to the interpretive focus I established at the beginning, we can now see how the fin de siècle invites paradoxical conclusions. Though a period filled with accomplishments and one where the masses in many ways found a voice and even significant comfort, nevertheless, by the 1890s, the kind of optimism, of naive belief in progress as an independent or evolutionary process that would allow nations to work out the problems brought about by new economic and social arrangements, was in short supply all around. As we shall see, this skeptical view was evident at the level of the nation state as well.

Changes in Geo-Political Landscape—New Imperialism

Let’s now change our focus to the changes developing in the geopolitical landscape and the rise of New Imperialism. The first half of the 19th century can justly be considered as dominated by Britain. Having emerged least disrupted by the French Revolution and wars with Napoleon, its economic transformation and relative political stability put it in an enviable position when compared to the more volatile situation in France, or the disunited state of Germany. From its superior position, in the mid-century Britain espoused a policy of free trade trade based on the unrestricted international exchange of goods with tariffs used only as a source of revenue. Nations were not supposed to put up stiff tariffs against the merchandise of other nations or to provide unfair support to domestic industries. Instead, the belief was that a market as unfettered as possible should be allowed to determine the movement and prices of goods across national boundaries.b> In the middle decades of the century, “free trade” essentially equaled British supremacy. By the last decades of the 19th century Britain was no longer able to set such favorable terms for itself. A very different political and economic map of Europe emerged.  The rivalries and struggle for domination that ensued led to what has been called New Imperialism.  Italy and Germany had unified into stronger nations.  The United States, France, and Germany—especially Germany -- were challenging Britain’s global economic position. Free trade was challenged as new industrial powers introduced tariffs to protect and stimulate domestic industries. This challenge was also played out in global competition for colonial expansion, especially in Africa and Asia.

Though empires and imperialism have old and complex histories, those histories are not continuous or linear. In order to understand different phases of massive conquest and empire building, we have to look at specific periods and the contexts within which those empires were built. The late Nineteenth Century is considered a specific phase of imperialism, different from the earlier European mercantilist imperialism which was primarily identified with the conquest of the New World and which ended symbolically, with the American Revolution and subsequent independence movements.

The “New Imperialism” of the turn of the century was different in many ways. It was a product of the struggle of modern, industrial or industrializing nations to achieve global domination. New Imperialism was also a product of the many problems modern industrial societies faced—unemployment, economic depression, the search for new markets and new sources of riches and resources. New Imperialism was defined by the carving up of Africa among European nations. It was also, in many ways, “irrational,” producing few political and diplomatic advantages for many of the participating nations. In addressing this new imperialism, I will focus on the British Empire, though I will be drawing in comparisons with the activities and interest of other nations. The focus on the British Empire is more than just a convenience. The British created the largest empire. Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Holland all created empires, but their size and scope could not hope to compete with Britain -- an empire on which the sun never set, they proudly claimed, because it stretched all around the globe. By the end of the 19th century, the British Empire comprised nearly one-quarter of the world's land surface and more than one-quarter of its total population.

By the 1870s Britain already had extensive imperial possessions—the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica and others; spheres of influence in Asia; and, “the jewel in the crown, ” India. In the mid-century India had indeed witnessed two decisive turning points in the development of British imperialism: first, the brutal suppression of the Indian Mutiny —also known as the Sepoy rebellion. Sepoy is the term for native troops serving in the British military. The rebellion broke out because the British military used both lard and beef tallow to grease gun cartridges. The cartridges had to be bitten off and were thus offensive to both Muslim and Hindu troops whose religious beliefs prohibited them from eating animals and animal byproducts.  This specific issue sparked a large scale rebellion which was not only put down, but which resulted in the British government establishing direct control over India, taking over from the British East India Company which had ruled the colony since the 1700s.  Here we see a mutineer being executed.

The second turning point occurred nearly two decades later when the Conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli proclaimed Queen Victoria Empress of India.  This act may have been symbolic, since the British already exerted control—but the symbolism was significant, demonstrating the new and increased interest in imperialism.

This growing interest can be traced at many levels. In practice, the actual empire was growing even before the “official” rise of New Imperialism. Crises over access to the Suez Canal resulted in the British establishing control not only over Egypt, but also over the Sudan. Imperialism played a greater role in public discourse as well. Prime Minister Disraeli himself is credited with spurring a greater interest in imperialism in a speech he gave at the Crystal Palace in 1872. In his speech Disraeli painted a special destiny for Britain, one as not just a major Continental power, but a future “where your sons, when they rise, rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of their countrymen, but command the respect of the world…”

By the 1880s public political discourse was very much focused on questions of Britain’s dominion over other areas. The most immediate and urgent aspect of this discussion focused on the fate of Ireland. Rent strikes, rural unrest and British coercion—all marked Anglo-Irish relations in this period and motions to grant Home Rule—a measure of domestic self-government—to Ireland failed in the 1880s and 1890s. Introduced by Liberals in the Gladstonian wing of the party, Home Rule led to a split in the Liberal Party. Among the many prominent politicians to break over the issue of Home Rule was Joseph Chamberlain. To Chamberlain and others like him, relinquishing control over Ireland spelled British withdrawal from its imperial destiny. Subsequent to his break over Home Rule, Chamberlain became a more and more adamant imperialist and eventually served as Colonial Secretary in the 1890s. We will return to Chamberlain’s imperial policies shortly.

Two other staunch imperialist voices—voices speaking in different ways and at a different pitches—were those of Cecil Rhodes and Rudyard Kipling. Kipling, represented usually by his poem “The White Man’s Burden” spoke for empire as a responsibility—an unwelcome one, as presented in the poem—that white people from the West had to take on in order to help the lower races of the world to improve their lot. Rhodes spoke in more strident tones: the white race—especially the British—was both unquestionably superior and engaged in a life and death struggle for survival with the darker races of the world. The spread of British rule, according to Rhodes, seen here in a contemporary cartoon was not only just, but it was also imperative because the British needed greater economic outlets and places where its population could establish themselves. For both Kipling and Rhodes (who, by the way, were personal friends) the concept of b>race—of biologically distinct human populations—was crucial. They and others of their generation took Darwinian theories of evolution and sought to apply them to contemporary social conditions—an intellectual/social stance known as b>Social Darwinism, the application of evolutionary principles to racial and ethnic groups.  Meaning that some races and ethnic groups deemed “fitter” and more worthy of survivol than others.

According to Social Darwinism, different populations, countries, cultures—all were not just variations on the general theme of humanity, but rungs on the steep ladder of civilization. At the top of the ladder belonged Western European whites (perhaps joined by Americans); below them in “scientific” order were the supposedly less intelligent and less civilized populations of the globe. According to Social Darwinists, because of their cunning and greater numbers (numbers which were increasing at a faster rate of growth than the rate of growth of the European population) the lower races were serious threats to white civilization—whites were engaged in a Darwinian struggle to survive, to maintain their rightfully superior position.

These concepts of race were crucial both as motivating forces behind imperial expansion and for the way they shaped British society and culture (of which more later). Although they provide only part of the rationale contemporaries used to promote imperial expansion, these ideas were powerful because they were not just espoused by prominent individuals but were capable of combining with other explanations that promoted imperial expansion. And those explanations abounded. Empire was necessary, it was argued, in order to:

---  develop new markets for European goods which might otherwise flood Western markets due to the tendency to overproduce on the part of  large scale enterprises

--- search for new sources of raw materials whether mineral, agricultural or other

--- provide outlets for surplus domestic populations—young men who could not establish themselves within the crowded European social structure would find opportunities in imperial economic ventures and imperial administration

--- bring Christianity and Western civilization to populations suffering in ignorance and heathenism

All of these reasons had their proponents and efforts linked to them. None of these reasons would actually pan out. The various costs of imperial adventures were often greater than the rewards, although in specific cases great fortunes and opportunities were realized and certain sectors of European society—the armaments industry, for example—were net beneficiaries.

In the final analysis, perhaps the greatest stimulus to imperial expansion was the least amenable to being pinned down: the diplomatic and strategic struggles of various European powers which impelled them to measure their strength in terms of the square miles of territory they controlled.

Review: New Imperialism

If  the rise of “mass society” distinguishes the fin de siècle when examining the domestic history of Western Europe, the rise of “New Imperialism” is the distinguishing feature of the period when we look at the international situation. Between 1870-1914, the major European nations engaged in a fierce competition to establish overseas empires. This trend was a product of many different forces: 

1) The defense of existing imperial possession resulting in greater imperial commitments—to defend existing interests, European powers found themselves committing more resources and claiming more territory.

2)  The search for new markets, new areas of settlement, and new sources of raw materials.

3)  The desire to “civilize” the less enlightened peoples of the world. This often involved missionary efforts to spread Christianity; it also reflected “Social Darwinism”—supposedly “scientific” views of the racial inferiority of non white populations.

But perhaps the most central feature distinguishing new imperialism was that it reflected the fierce competition among European nations for supremacy. Free Trade and liberal views of nationalism were giving way to “struggles for survival” and mastery which were fought out not in Continental wars, but in the race for new imperial possessions. In this process Britain built the largest Empire and claimed the most territory in the “Scramble for Africa” which dominated the imperial politics of the 1880s and 1890s. It is to that “scramble” that we now turn to.

Scramble for Africa

Responding to frustrated nationalism within Europe and the economic/strategic anxieties arising out of the increased competition between nations, European powers saw African conquest as a way bolster their geo-political positions. Two meetings in the German capital of Berlin provide a sense of these developments. In 1878 Bismarck called the major European powers to the city in order to work out a settlement that would bring peace to the Balkans. Various adjustments were made to the territories claimed by various Balkan nations, numerous powers both gained and lost spheres of influence, nationalist aspirations were both met and limited as a result. Perfect diplomacy, it would seem, a process which seemed to stabilize the region. But in fact, the acceptance of limits on the European continent spurred the powers to search out other areas which they could claim as theirs and Africa seemed the “logical” place to do so. Only a few years after the meeting called to arrange a Balkan peace, the great powers met again in Berlin, in 1884. Called together to settle competing claims to African territory by Belgium, Portugal and France, this Berlin Conference laid down ground rules for what would constitute legitimate dominion in Africa by a European power. After this conference merely planting one’s flag was not sufficient—“economic development” also had to be undertaken in the region. Again, it would seem that diplomacy worked, but it worked to continue the already begun scramble and it clearly “worked” to legitimate European claims to a continent where native rulers and native populations were almost completely disregarded. Whether the process even made sense to European rulers is not clear: in 1898 the French President remarked “We have behaved like madmen in Africa, having been led astray by irresponsible people called the ‘colonialists.’”

Let’s turn to the efforts of the British in Southern Africa in order to both get a sense of how the scramble unfolded in a specific area and because Southern African was such a crucial area—not “typical” but of great significance to world politics at the time and into our own day.

European presence in Southern Africa had its origins well before the late 19th century. Settlers of Dutch origin—known as Boers—were coming to the region even before the 1700s. By the end of the 18th century they had significant white settlements, most notably the Cape colony, and they developed a distinct language—Afrikaans—and a culture hostile both to the Africans and the Dutch government of the Cape. Primarily agricultural, the Boers were building a white enclave in Southern Africa. In 1806 Britain gained control of the Cape Colony as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, thus spurring a Boer Great Trek into the interior, into the area of the Transvaal, as a disgruntled response to the British imposed abolition of slavery. Recognized by the British as an independent state in 1852, the Boers developed an agricultural society governed by strict apartheid—strict inequality in both Church and State between black and white populations.

Conflict between Boers and the British—which were never totally absent—escalated after 1867 when first significant deposits of both gold and diamonds were discovered Boer areas. By the 1880s British fortune hunters—prime among them Cecil Rhodes—flocked to the area, increasing the British population, challenging Boer authority and pressuring the British to extend their authority. Rhodes was a crucial player in this process, seeking both personal wealth and the promotion of his imperial vision which wanted to “paint the map red” [meaning to claim the world for Britain] and establish a railway linking the whole African continent… from the Cape to Cairo Rhodes had the support of both the British crown and the British government. From the 1880s on, acting for the British Cape government, Rhodes sought to extent British interests north and to supplant Boer rule with British control. The tactics employed in doing so were varied: whether he was negotiating treaties between whites and Africans, or spurring the British to press for political rights and representation in Boer areas. Though he met with criticism and setbacks, Rhodes’s goals were popular in the Colonial Office (especially after Chamberlain took control) and among British imperialists.   Chamberlain’s accomplishments will have spilled more blood in Africa than champagne in Kimberly.

By the late 1890s, tensions between the British and the Boers had fermented to the point of war and between 1899 and 1902 Southern Africa was wracked by a war between the two white settler groups over who would exert control over the riches and native populations of the region. It was a war watched and commented upon by all of Europe. The Boer War pitted a British force of about 500,000 against a Boer force of at most 87,000 Boers and Boer supporters.   Given the inequality in number one would think that the British could accomplish an easy victory. This was not the case. Boer forces knew the terrain better, and they controlled the local agriculture. The Boers managed to trap the British in key cities—Kimberly, Mafeking and Ladysmith—and impose a siege that lasted for months. British inefficiency was glaringly exposed. And when the tide did turn in favor of the British, it exposed their adoption of brutal methods. To defeat the Boers the British instituted a “scorched earth policy” where they burned Boer farms and forced Boer—and African—families into “concentration camps.” Note that although we associate the term and the practice of employing such camps with the Nazis in World War II, their first appearance was actually in the Boer War. In the camps some 25,000 Afrikaner women and children died of malnutrition and disease; some 14,000 Africans died in separate camps. Instead of representing the triumph of Western Civilization, these camps and the British victory they promoted were seen as the deployment of barbarism by many pro-Boer “anti-imperialists” in Britain and in Europe more generally. The Boer War and the British victory, which was finalized in 1902, can be seen as the point at which the cost and injustice of imperialism was finally forced into the public European discourse, raising public doubts about the whole imperial enterprise.

Review

Southern Africa was in many ways unique—certainly its gold and diamonds made it a lot more profitable than most other imperial sites. But our more in-depth analysis of Southern Africa and the Boer War both affords us a view of crucial chapters of New Imperialism’s history; it also reveals the conflict and violence which was always under the surface of imperialist ambitions; it reveals the strength—but also the weakness—of imperial powers (think of how hard it was for the British to defeat the Boers) and it highlights the costs and brutality that were all too natural to imperial ambitions.    By the time of the Boer War, imperialism was well entrenched in European life, but also challenged. And imperialist goals shaped not just diplomacy and foreign policy, but, as we shall see, daily domestic life as well.

Consequences and Legacies of Imperialism

Opposition to Imperialism  

New Imperialism encountered opposition. In all European nations there were politicians who saw imperial expansion as an unnecessary drain on national resources and did not equate territorial expansion with national greatness. By the early 1900s opposition to European expansion had created new understandings of the nature of modern industrial societies that went well beyond previous anti-imperialist sentiments. Let us look at two different anti-imperialist theorists and see how they argued against the imperial conquests of their time. John Hobson was a young British journalist with political aspirations and liberal views in the early 1900s. In 1902, in the shadow of the Boer War, he wrote Imperialism, A Study. Aware of the entrenched poverty and dissatisfaction of many working class citizens, he urged the country to focus on improving domestic social conditions. For Hobson, imperialism did not bring wealth and glory to the country. Instead, it benefited narrow, wealthy interest groups, such as the banking establishment and armaments manufacturers, draining resources out of the hands of the people. Instead of imperialism, he urged policy makers to consider investing in the national economy and increasing the buying power of the average family as a way of promoting economic growth. For instance, if workers were paid more, they would be more active consumers thus increasing domestic demand which would in turn stimulate the growth of domestic industry, leading manufacturers to require more workers who would then be able to keep the cycle going—economic growth would occur without the costs, both financial and social, of imperial conquest.

Vladimir Lenin, a leading Russian communist, active in international socialist circles agreed with many aspects of Hobson’s analysis, but pushed it further. In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, written during World War I, Lenin disagreed with Hobson on the possibility of capitalism reforming itself. Instead the problems Hobson identified, and many others were, argued Lenin, intrinsic to capitalism’s drive to expand its reach while denying workers its benefits.

Though criticism of imperialism was a part of turn of the century political discussion, it was a discussion that was both relatively marginal—it did not command the same kind of attention and support as pro-imperialist views—and the critiques of imperialism had their own, internal limits. For instance, in the Boer War, opposition to the War focused primarily on the unfair ways the white Boers were treated; concern for the fate of native Africans was less evident and less outraged. Instead, they were relegated to the background while the white Boers, a small minority of the population compared to the native African population, were portrayed as the true victims of the war.

But there were unintended—though very predictable—consequences for the Europeans as well. Europeans met with opposition from the local rulers and people wherever they went. The Egyptian cartoon on your screen right now, showing how the French and the British benefited from their brutal treatment of Morocco and Egypt, is clear in its anger and rejection of European conquest. By the middle of the 20th century, such sentiments would fuel mass native anticolonial movements, leading to the formation of independent states in most of the areas which had been claimed by Europeans at the end of the 19th century

Domestic imperialism

Imperialism was not just a political policy of expansion and rule over foreign areas; it was a way of life shaping the practices and attitudes of both the conquered and the conquerors. In Britain, the language of imperialism and race permeated daily life. Politicians exhorted the people to support a policy—such as providing free lunches to poor schoolchildren—in order to ensure that the British at home would themselves be fit and worthy of being considered an “imperial race,” a people who could claim superiority over the rest of the world.

Imperialism also changed the way Europe looked and the ways Europeans saw things. Advertisements used imperial imagery—scantily dressed “natives,” or lush “primitive” settings—when they wanted something to seem exotic and both strange and alluring. But there were other influences as well: Europeans learned from and even appropriated the cultures of the people they conquered. Pablo Picasso, for instance, the great 20th century artist, was clearly influenced by African art works which had started to be exhibited in Europe. His great painting,the “Demoiselles of Avignon” painted in 1907 and usually considered the first example of Cubist painting, a style that experimented with new ways of using geometric shapes to represent both the visual and more emotional aspects of reality—drew on traditional African sculpture. Picasso’s ability to draw inspiration from African art was clearly an enriching process for European art. What was troubling about it was that the inspiration came with a big price tag—it was based on exploitation, and it did not produce many benefits or rewards for the Africans themselves. African culture was still deemed inferior, but Picasso was considered a great master.

Conclusions

As Empires go, the vast dominions created at the end of the 19th century were short-lived—less than a 100 years later most of the British, French and other empires had been dismantled. But formal dissolution is only part of the story, for we are still very much a world living in the shadow of those empires—indeed many analysts talk of today as an era of “post-colonialism” or “post-imperialism” (post meaning “after”)—a world still shaped by imperialism even if the formal control of territories around the globe is no longer the dominant political and military practice.

We see the legacy in many different ways: Let’s consider the recent history of South Africa. In the 1980s, the policy of apartheid was challenged by South African blacks—many of them not even out of high school—and a jailed lawyer and political activist, Nelson Mandela, symbolized the fight against that entrenched system of inequality. In the West, universities, companies and individuals were confronted by a strong anti-apartheid movement that urged boycotting the apartheid system by withdrawing from all investment that supported the regime. By the 1990s, in the West and elsewhere people had abandoned their South African investments; instead of investing in the region, they had been divested; international opinion was against the regime, and even within the South African government many were acknowledging the need for reform. By the 1990s Nelson Mandela had not only been released from prison, but had became the President of South Africa; today the country is struggling to develop a just, multi-racial society. But the poverty and social inequities built over generations are harder to root out and combined with a devastating AIDS epidemic, South African blacks still find themselves poor and with limited prospects.

The legacy of imperialism is evident in the West as well. The period since the end of the Second World War has been one of significant global migrations, and a large part of those migrations have been of “(ex)colonial subjects” from the Third World seeking to find work and settle in the First World, in the West. There have also been many political refugees—persons escaping from countries where they faced political and social persecution. In many cases the movement was from ex-colony to “mother country”—Indians and Jamaicans to Britain; Algerians, Vietnamese and West Africans to France; Philippines and Cubans to the United States. The United States has been the destination of many of these groups and we are currently in the midst of trying to understand how to create a national identity that benefits from and builds on the rich diversity as well as the complex histories of peoples from all over the world. Like Europeans in the late 19th century we hope to ensure continuous prosperity and national well-being. Perhaps this time around, with knowledge of the accomplishments as well as the more tragic aspects of the fin de siècle, pursuing prosperity and a positive identity as a nation will not be at the expense of others around the world. That is one of the major challenges facing all of us.