The more I read into what Stokes and others say about the situation between Yugoslavia and Croatia, and Yugoslavia and Slovenia – the more I want to read and understand the guerrilla scenario the Yugoslavs invited upon themselves when acting against Slovenia. I chose my paper topic to be on the resistance of Slovenes and Croats to the Yugoslav republic with the effort to juxtapose the guerrilla war’s success and the two conventional armies bloody onslaught. An article from the New York Times reflects the confusion of the conflicts between the factions. This was a “Special to the NY Times” article headlined as, “An Army Beseiged: Yugoslav Troops Fight for Status Quo as All Sides Question Their Conduct,” and dates from July 1, 1991.
One item I found particularly interesting was the author, John Tagliabue’s analysis of the JNA’s shortcomings: ethnic conscription, victimization by political maneuvering, and the binds of not being able to respond faster (because the JNA would be condemned by the international community for its eagerness to engage in war). This was all at the time in with Serbian nationalist Milosevic was making headway trying to bring the Army under Serbia’s authority within the 8 member counsel.
Lastly, the other item that stuck out was the issue of the officer corps in the JNA and their support of one Yugoslav Republic. I’ve studied other countries and the history of their officer corps, and how they have often been a source or the source of change like Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and others – whether or not anyone wants to admit it. The leadership in the case of the JNA desired to keep the country together in order to maintain their own income and higher-than-standard housing and subsistance. Though they and their subordinates desired not to be killed by the territorial defense forces of the Slovenes, they did however have alterer motives which were apparent even to a free-lancer trying to make a buck off the NY Times.