Archive for the ‘Slovenia’ Category

Presentation on the Ten Day War

Tuesday, December 4th, 2007

I picked this topic because it was about the genesis of several wars which I knew very little about, despite my attention to Stokes. I knew very little about the Ten Days war, the War in the Balkans, and the various other wars that followed like Bosnia and Kosovo. In addition, the topic of asymmetric warfare is something I’d wish I didn’t hear about everyday, but it is a reality for we few and proud who choose to serve or are currently serving. As I continued to research on this subject I drew parallels between several issues and other more blatant issues (I assumed to be, at least) were not as they seemed initially. Some parallels would be the issue of media in war. It doesn’t matter where you are from or how many degrees you have, people will always listen to the media and what it tells us. The media shapes our reality so if we are watching Fox News, we tend to think things are going super duper in the war on terror and conversely if we are watching CNN. Well, Jelko Kacin who was the information minister threw the media a bone by telling them about the latest victories of the TO, like burned out vehicles which when viewed appear to show that the TO is kicking butt and taking names, when really the vehicle was abandoned and some kids set fire to it. Personally, I had the mindset that this war was a guerrilla war and ostensibly it is, but it in many ways it was nothing more than an organized armed protest (a few steps above the G8 or World Bank summit protests). What it I got out of my readings were that the Slovenes took advantage of their situation, both sides escalated tensions, there was a catharsis of sorts in the form of sporadic gun fire and the occasional tank/APC being immobilized, that immobilized armor being recorded, the JNA having no real plan and then everyone just going home because Slovenia couldn’t be suppressed. So many authors built the conflict up, but it wasn’t really a classic David versus Goliath situation like the Six-Day War between Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Iraq versus Israel, and many other wars in history. So right there, some sources like Gow and Carmichael and several others pointed out the fact that this war was largely a propaganda campaign against the weaker and ignorant JNA, which should change people’s opinions on the Ten Day war itself. This while other authors either ignore or haven’t found information validating that this war was largely a war for show. So my personal conclusions/bias doesn’t necessarily reflect the material I read, nor can I back the simplification up by facts because so much of it is over simplified, but that is where I’m coming from.

Originally my plan was to articulate the ideas I had in my paper and shed some light on new facts that were recently uncovered from other historians on the issue of the Ten Days War between the JNA and TDF. Unfortunately that didn’t happen. My argument is that the success of the Slovene resistance was the result of the Yugoslav state’s weakness, which is directly attributable to a series of decentralization efforts that benefited the TDFs and their autonomy throughout Yugoslavia. Moreover, that success was inevitable given the circumstances around 25 June 1991. The JNA chose to act against the Slovene guerrillas who had the desire to be independent from Yugoslavia, the Slovenes’ TO was trained in smaller unit tactics, were more agile and mobile, had first hand knowledge of their own country, and worse, had actual Slovenes and sympathizers within the JNA feeding them intelligence. On the other hand, the JNA had a plan, but the plan was specious and shortsighted. Their incursion was predicated on the assumption that the Slovenes would capitulate under the Yugoslav Army’s might. It was not the will of the JNA soldier to fight or die for their country, rather it was the officers at the higher echelons that desired the soldier to fight for their own control over the Yugoslav state, that was dying.

Journal article and paper topic

Saturday, October 6th, 2007

The more I read into what Stokes and others say about the situation between Yugoslavia and Croatia, and Yugoslavia and Slovenia – the more I want to read and understand the guerrilla scenario the Yugoslavs invited upon themselves when acting against Slovenia. I chose my paper topic to be on the resistance of Slovenes and Croats to the Yugoslav republic with the effort to juxtapose the guerrilla war’s success and the two conventional armies bloody onslaught. An article from the New York Times reflects the confusion of the conflicts between the factions. This was a “Special to the NY Times” article headlined as, “An Army Beseiged: Yugoslav Troops Fight for Status Quo as All Sides Question Their Conduct,” and dates from July 1, 1991.

One item I found particularly interesting was the author, John Tagliabue’s analysis of the JNA’s shortcomings: ethnic conscription, victimization by political maneuvering, and the binds of not being able to respond faster (because the JNA would be condemned by the international community for its eagerness to engage in war). This was all at the time in with Serbian nationalist Milosevic was making headway trying to bring the Army under Serbia’s authority within the 8 member counsel.

Lastly, the other item that stuck out was the issue of the officer corps in the JNA and their support of one Yugoslav Republic. I’ve studied other countries and the history of their officer corps, and how they have often been a source or the source of change like Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and others – whether or not anyone wants to admit it. The leadership in the case of the JNA desired to keep the country together in order to maintain their own income and higher-than-standard housing and subsistance. Though they and their subordinates desired not to be killed by the territorial defense forces of the Slovenes, they did however have alterer motives which were apparent even to a free-lancer trying to make a buck off the NY Times.

Paper topic

Wednesday, October 3rd, 2007

The early 1990s was a complex time for the former Yugoslav Republic and the nations which comprised it. The different groups which live in the area have a long tradition of warfare and foreign invasion. So fiercely was the Serb army was destroyed by Slovenian guerrilla forces. Why did this happen? How this all relates to the events of 1989 reflect how the peoples of the Balkans rejected what the communists attempted to do. For the paper I would like to study the Yugoslav wars, looking at how these events did not exist in a vacuum but was effected by everything around it. How did the graffiti on the walls of Belgrade affected the 18 or 19 year old soldier fighting an enemy all around him? While I try to narrow down the topic I will focus on the differences between the ethnic and national groups and how this played into the territorial defense and independence revolts of the 1990s.