The fall of communism in Eastern Europe can be directly attributed to the failure of each individual nation economically. The inability to consistently provide a population with the basic necessities necessary to function is the leading cause for the discontent which led to opposition. At several points, people having to wait in line several hours to purchase basic consumer goods is discussed. At first I found this to be humorous, but after contemplating how humiliating that must be I quickly changed my opinion. To gauge what I feel public sentiment on such an issue would be, I would ask that all GMU students who reside on campus be told that they must wait for several hours outside the Giant Food Store in University Mall to buy toilet paper. Then have them photographed as they wait in line. Just one instance of such folly and it is quite easy to imagine the discontent if not pure hatred many of these people must have harbored for their leaders. I’m not even throwing in the variable of hunger into my own equation either.
The most important piece of information regarding the economic collapse of communism in Eastern Europe can be found on one of the first pages of the book. After the devastation wrought by World War II, the nations which became Soviet satellites were among the poorest in Europe. This violates one of the most basic fundamentals of communist doctrine, which contends that in order for communism to succeed, the nation to be governed must be economically developed, where a revolution will be led by the proletariat or workers against the greedy bourgeoisie, or upper class.
Naturally, a lack of economic base combined with the removal of competent economists’ in favor of communist party appointees did little to help find a solution. It can be repeatedly found where a party congress held a meeting and proclaimed that something must be done, yet no real solution drafted.
It is worthy to note that Hungary’s economy is discussed as the only one that was remotely successful. Essentially due to the legalization of private ventures in agricultural cooperatives and the allowing of skilled workers to contract their services outside of normal working hours. This “hands off” approach to economics by the Hungarian communist leadership stimulated their economy by essentially permitting the existence of a private or second economy which actually yielded legitimate profits. The downside of these economic achievements included a noticeable decline in the standard of living and life expectancy in Hungary until the fall of communism. The desire of Hungarian leadership to gain access to the IMF is also to blame for these declines.
So even in the case of economic achievement, the centralized planning system is still unable to provide adequate housing, food, and job security.
At this point I can find no reason to overly criticize Stokes’ sources of economic information, especially in regards to Hungary. The only change or addition I would make, would be to have interviewed several blue collar workers and obtain some first hand accounts of shortages, as opposed to viewing the situation from the top down as is the case in chapter 3.