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Trends in American Science

Nov 6, 2009
Mary Jane Reen
Science and Modernity

            During the first half of the semester, we explored the distribution of economic and political power in early twentieth-century America.  In his work “The History of Science Society”, John Servos examines the balance of intellectual power during this time period.  He seeks to explain why most intellectuals engaged in experimental rather than theoretical science.  Servos’ analysis seems particularly compelling in light of the other theories he discusses.  However, he fails to draw a few key inferences that would lend further support to his reasoning.

            Before presenting his argument, Servos discusses common explanations for why “in the sciences of physics and chemistry…Americans gravitate(d) toward experimental problems rather than toward the theoretical issues that occupied a significant number of their colleagues in Europe” (613).  Servos readily dismisses the notion that Americans’ inherent practicality and disdain for abstractness compelled them to embrace Bacon’s investigative scientific method.  After all, many experiments seem as impractical as theoretical inquiries.  Similarly, he quickly rejects the theory that American scientists embraced “Baconianism” because “they exalted in collecting facts and feared demon mathematics, an idol that could pervert an unprejudiced understanding of nature” (614).  Servos rightly deems this theory implausible since few scientists allow philosophical concerns to dictate their actions.

            Of all the theories Servos considers, the last seems the most problematic and contradictory.  Surprisingly, this is the only explanation he does not explicitly reject.  According to Servos, some historians contend that experimental science flourished because it was compatible with American ideals and traditions: “The laboratory was…a place to mold character, to inculcate in young men the virtues of honesty, perseverance, and fidelity to the little things” (614).  In contrast, theoretical science contained “something sinful in believing that he could use mathematical cunning to determine how nature worked, and something dishonest about winning a reputation in science through work at the desk…[Theoreticians] prospered off the labor of others” (614).  After a rather painful stint in Organic Chemistry, I disagree that laboratory work fosters more perseverance and attention to detail.  Indeed, painstaking theoretical work demands an abundance of patience and resolve.  Furthermore, it seems far more “sinful” to manipulate nature rather than use theoretical principles to understand it.  Indeed, Adams’ “The Dynamo and the Virgin” suggests that new technology – certainly more closely associated with applied rather than theoretical science – was actually replacing religion as a moral force.  As Adams comments, “To Adams the dynamo became a symbol of infinity.  As he grew accustomed to the great gallery of machines, he began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral force, much as the early Christians felt the cross” (380).  These machines also diminished Adams’ regard for nature: “The planet itself seemed less impressive, in its old-fashioned, deliberate, annual or daily revolution, than this huge wheel” (380).  Evidently, applied science seems far more heretical than theoretical physics or chemistry.  Lastly, the suggestion that theoreticians “prosper off the labor of others” is utterly absurd.  Every laboratory experiment relies heavily on abstract theories.  While laboratory scientists may not understand the intricacies of different theories, their work would be impossible without a theoretical framework.  Given all of the theory’s contradictions, it seems shocking that Servos did not fervently reject it like he did the previous arguments.  In fact, he states that “There is merit to an argument constructed along these lines” (614).  Granted, Servos does assert his explanation’s superiority when he contends that “another factor may have been as, if not more, important in shaping the Baconian character of American scientific work” (615).  However, I would have expected Servos to point out the “cultural” theory’s inherent flaws in order to bolster his own thesis.

            Servos presents a sound argument that derives its strength from the level of detail he provides.  While first reading the piece, I worried that Servos would not explain why math was so divorced from science during the early twentieth century.  However, several pages after repeatedly stating that science and math remained in separate fields, he does offer a plausible explanation for this phenomenon: “This may well have been a by-product of the effort by mathematicians to distinguish their subject as a professional pursuit independent of its applications” (618).  The argument that scientists did not receive theoretical training because mathematicians were trying to advance their own careers seems far more plausible than any vague conjectures about the scientists’ philosophical or cultural backgrounds.  Once again, though, it seems that Servos misses an opportunity to lend further support to his argument.  He states that “The discipline of mathematics was making great strides in America during this period.  But the greatest expansion occurred in those areas of mathematics most remote from the needs of scientists” (618).  Since theoretical mathematics flourished during this time period, doesn’t that undermine any argument providing a philosophical or theoretical explanation for trends in American science? After all, wouldn’t American mathematicians have the same purported ideals and values as American scientists?

            Servos certainly offers a viable interpretation of trends in American science.  However, his argument could have been even more convincing if he recognized alternative theories’ inherent contradictions.  I would be interested in knowing what Adams would have thought of Servos’ work.  Would he prefer concrete laboratory experiments over theoretical work?  Perhaps an investigation of various scientific journals published during that time period would further elucidate the predominance of experimental over theoretical science.

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5 Comments

  1. Elizabeth Gresk  •  Nov 8, 2009 @5:58 pm

    I can personally sympathize with American scientists of the late 1800s and early 1900s. In high school, I absolutely loathed math and science if it was ‘theoretical’. I much preferred to do an experiment or solve an actual problem than to talk about “why” something was happening. For me, this was mostly a matter of learning preference; I never liked math or science and didn’t really understand it until I saw it practically applied. At the end of the day, I didn’t really question theories or why something happened. If I saw it or someone else said, “Well it’s because of this…” I generally accepted it and moved on. It was easier to just believe what someone was telling me than to try and explain everything myself.

    I think scientists and mathematicians during the time period of 1880-1930 had a similar dilemma but the context was incredibly different. Not only were scientists and mathematicians grappling with questions of theory and application, they were doing so in the midst of an incredibly changing world. I think a quote from Henry Adams’ sums this up well: “In these seven years man had translated himself into a new universe which had no common scale of measurement with the old. He had entered a supersensual world, in which he could measure nothing except by chance collisions of movements.” (381). This particular phrasing seems full of desperation; basically the entire world was a new unknown and there was no way to comprehend it. In light of that, I don’t find it surprising that American academics generally preferred to do experimental work in specific fields. In some ways, I think that was the only way to even begin deciphering all of the new realizations that came with technological advances. Only after some foundational work had been done, could academics move on to the level of theoretical discussion (which did in fact happen in the mid-1900s). That being said, I’m not sure how to explain the gap between American and European sciences and methods of study at the time.

    In response to Mary Jane’s discussion of Servos’ assumption that theoretical work was heavily influenced by experimental work and not vice versa, I have to agree with Servos. I can’t really imagine that every single theorist was just one day struck by a moment of inspiration where they suddenly figured out the universe. Additionally, at this particular point in history, science was still developing and theories were not concretely defined. As a result, it seems like more of the experimental work done during this time was truly experimental, as opposed to attempting to reason out a theory. As scientific research continued to evolve, I would guess that theories became more critical to experimentation. Additionally, I think it is important to distinguish between laboratory experiments and everyday experiences. Laboratory work is obviously a source of experimental data and one way to prove things. Everyday experiences also heavily influence people, often unconsciously. I think it is safe to say that all scientific theorists are at least somewhat motivated to create theories because of what they see actually happening in the world. At the same time, many experiments have been carried out using theories, and it is important to acknowledge the mutual relationship between theory and experiment.

  2. Rawson Rebecca  •  Nov 10, 2009 @12:37 am

    John Servos’ article presents an informative overview of the trends in the American scientific community at the turn of the century. Having little prior knowledge about this topic, I found it interesting that Americans, compared to their European counterparts, generally rose to prominence in the observational and experimental fields “for making precise measurements of physical constants or for innovations in the instruments of measurement rather than for theoretical contributions” (Servos, 613). With regard to American educational trends, it is noteworthy that Servos makes a point of also describing how educators approached the laboratory as “a place to mold character… to instill respect for painstaking manual labor. Value inhered not just in the product but also in the process of laboratory work, and such research fit easily into the moral universe of Victorian America” (614). Though Servos goes on to explain that this may not be the main factor in shaping the Baconian character of American scientific work, it did strike me as odd that there appeared to be a need for scientific work to accord with a set of normative, values defined by Victorian ideals.

    At the same time, the American focus on the physical sciences is echoed in Henry Adam’s work, “The Dynamo and the Virgin,” in which he recalls visiting the Great Exhibition in Paris in the year 1900. Adams conveys a sense of awe as he stands before the new powers represented by the dynamo. Speculating about the medieval strength of Christianity, he likens the power of this new modern technology to the same power that the Virgin wielded throughout previous centuries and cultures—a force that has inspired great art and architecture. Whereas the Christian symbol of this feminine power, the Virgin Mary, represented the unifying force acting on the European Middle Ages, the dynamo stood as an example of the forces of technology and industry acting on civilization in the early 20th century.

    In Adam’s estimation, while other societies had celebrated the power of femininity, Americans instead came to idolize the power of emergent machines. He writes, “The forces were interchangeable if not reversible, but he could see only an absolute fiat in electricity as in faith” (Adams, 2). As Mary Jane suggests, Adams seems to conclude that new technology appeared to be “replacing religion as a moral force” and that these applied sciences seem almost “heretical” (Reen). In this regard, I am reminded of our discussion of the mathematical and scientific underpinnings of the U.S. Census in dictating the racial categorization of immigration policy. Adams description also speaks to our class discussion of an American “progressivist faith in science,” which later contributes to the driving forces of the eugenics movement.

  3. Katie O'Mealia  •  Nov 10, 2009 @12:03 pm

    When reading Mary Jane’s response, I was struck by her statement, “While first reading the piece, I worried that Servos would not explain why math was so divorced from science during the early twentieth century”. One main reason that Servos gives is the lack of a proper educational basis for mathematics. There were few individuals in America who even understand complex mathematics, and even fewer who were capable of teaching it to the American youth. In the late 1800s there was only some mathematics in secondary schools. By identifying the problem of the lack of a sufficient teaching force, Servos sheds light on why “math was so divorced from science”. At the time, there were science courses in America, and thus a solid base from which students could work to become a knowledgeable scientist. Additionally, the emergence of graduate schools, beginning with Johns Hopkins in 1870, granted students more opportunity to explore and perfect scientific endeavors. However, without a standardized school system in which mathematics was required, these students could not and did not receive the adequate mathematical training. They were more focused in strengthening their physics or chemistry knowledge than in learning the rudimentary mathematics behind their experiments. They failed to regard mathematics as essential because that is what they were taught. By not requiring math at an elementary level, the teachers were sending a message that it was unnecessary for success in science.
    Servos then explains that with the expansion of regional teachers’ associations, and a somewhat national standardized system of education, mathematics could enter the picture. Cognizant of the severity of Americans’ lack of fundamental mathematical knowledge, teachers were making strides to change and diversify the 20th century curriculum. Three high school teachers of mathematics created The Reorganization of Mathematics in Secondary Education, which advocated “that high school work in mathematics be more cohesive and better integrated with subjects such as physics, that talented high school students be given the opportunity to take an elective course in elementary calculus during the senior year, and that colleges demand greater mathematical sophistication of their entering classes” (624). National organizations such as the “Society for the Promotion of Engineering Education, founded in 1893, made the strengthening of American instruction in mathematics one of its principle causes” (624).
    Thus, I think that Servos partially answers the question of how mathematics and science were so divorced in America. They were so separated because there was not a solid foundation in the American education for mathematics. Without the solid foundation, students failed to realize the importance of mathematics. However, with the help of teachers’ associations, the curriculum of elementary and high schools began to change in the 1900s and math began to take a more prominent space in education.

  4. Caroline Moore  •  Nov 10, 2009 @1:56 pm

    This week’s readings mark a departure from immigration and the color line into a period characterized by rapid advancements of science and technology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There were several things that surprised me in Servos’ article: first, the way math and science originally developed as mutually exclusive disciplines; second, that Americans tended to shy away from areas of science where math was concerned—and necessary—for a comprehensive understanding of the field; and, third, that science majors originally had so few/such lax math requirements. As Servos suggests, “the pace of development of a science in America during this period was inversely proportional to its mathematical content” (612). Not until scientists began to recognize math as a crucial component in the study of the physical sciences did the two begin to integrate. While I consider math and science so interrelated and codependent on one another, it is fascinating to learn that this tendency to associate the two was only beginning to emerge in the first half of the twentieth century.
    One argument that Servos rejects concerns the impact of cultural factors on the American inkling to turn to experimental science rather than theoretical. Servos points out that for many Americans, laboratory experimentation served a two-fold purpose. The laboratory was not just a place to conduct research initiatives or produce knowledge; it was also the venue that molded character, conditioned a virtuous work ethic, and instilled many values endorsed by the Victorian class (614). I have a tough time agreeing with the idea that theoretical work is inherently more “dishonest” than its experimental counterpart; it seems like trying to compare apples and oranges. Despite having no college level science courses, I can empathize with Mary Jane and agree with her point on the “abundance of patience and resolve” that painstaking theoretical work requires.
    The most plausible explanation Servos puts forth to account for the American experimentalist tendencies stems from the inferior level of mathematical training students received. While “the educational systems of Europe… provided science students with the requisite education in mathematics as a matter of course at an early stage in their training,” American school systems at the turn of the century failed to do the same (615). As I have come to find, most often students will gravitate towards a subject that he or she is both interested in and good at. As seen in the case of Arthur Day, a weak understanding of math limited career options and caused him to orient much of his career towards empirical research rather than hypothetical. Given the shortcomings of the American schooling systems in mathematics, it is not surprising that American scientists were more inclined to turn to the lab.

  5. Ryan Gofus  •  Nov 10, 2009 @4:07 pm

    Reading these two pieces together reminded me of the idea that America is herself an experiment. The founders themselves set out to solve a problem, and did so through actual practices and the implementation of ideas. Perhaps it was in this vein that American mathematicians focused on the more practical experiments. “American mathematicians were…committed to the idea that science was created by using one’s hands in the laboratory.” (Servos, pg. 626) Compared to their European counterparts, Americans became “active creators of knowledge.” (Servos, pg. 626) They yearned to produce something tangible, something with utility. Maybe it was because of the American tradition of competition that “It was crucial…to bring those with sound mathematical training into touch with vital physical problems.” (Servos, pg. 627) They needed to solve these problems, and in doing so, set themselves apart from the rest.

    The powerful response that Adams had upon experiencing the dynamo at the Paris exposition speaks to how much of a cultural force these new technologies were having. He compares its influence to the strength that Christianity had during medieval times. “He began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral force, much as the early Christians felt the cross.” (The Dynamo and the Virgin) Adams poses the idea that for modern men, technology is symbolically replacing the church as a force of moral motivation. Perhaps this notion can explain why Servos claims that American mathematicians focused so intently on the practical production of knowledge through experimentation. If technology was to save man, as Adams was implying, Americans had better be the center of its study and production.