During the first half of the semester, we explored the distribution of economic and political power in early twentieth-century America. In his work “The History of Science Society”, John Servos examines the balance of intellectual power during this time period. He seeks to explain why most intellectuals engaged in experimental rather than theoretical science. Servos’ analysis seems particularly compelling in light of the other theories he discusses. However, he fails to draw a few key inferences that would lend further support to his reasoning.
Before presenting his argument, Servos discusses common explanations for why “in the sciences of physics and chemistry…Americans gravitate(d) toward experimental problems rather than toward the theoretical issues that occupied a significant number of their colleagues in Europe” (613). Servos readily dismisses the notion that Americans’ inherent practicality and disdain for abstractness compelled them to embrace Bacon’s investigative scientific method. After all, many experiments seem as impractical as theoretical inquiries. Similarly, he quickly rejects the theory that American scientists embraced “Baconianism” because “they exalted in collecting facts and feared demon mathematics, an idol that could pervert an unprejudiced understanding of nature” (614). Servos rightly deems this theory implausible since few scientists allow philosophical concerns to dictate their actions.
Of all the theories Servos considers, the last seems the most problematic and contradictory. Surprisingly, this is the only explanation he does not explicitly reject. According to Servos, some historians contend that experimental science flourished because it was compatible with American ideals and traditions: “The laboratory was…a place to mold character, to inculcate in young men the virtues of honesty, perseverance, and fidelity to the little things” (614). In contrast, theoretical science contained “something sinful in believing that he could use mathematical cunning to determine how nature worked, and something dishonest about winning a reputation in science through work at the desk…[Theoreticians] prospered off the labor of others” (614). After a rather painful stint in Organic Chemistry, I disagree that laboratory work fosters more perseverance and attention to detail. Indeed, painstaking theoretical work demands an abundance of patience and resolve. Furthermore, it seems far more “sinful” to manipulate nature rather than use theoretical principles to understand it. Indeed, Adams’ “The Dynamo and the Virgin” suggests that new technology – certainly more closely associated with applied rather than theoretical science – was actually replacing religion as a moral force. As Adams comments, “To Adams the dynamo became a symbol of infinity. As he grew accustomed to the great gallery of machines, he began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral force, much as the early Christians felt the cross” (380). These machines also diminished Adams’ regard for nature: “The planet itself seemed less impressive, in its old-fashioned, deliberate, annual or daily revolution, than this huge wheel” (380). Evidently, applied science seems far more heretical than theoretical physics or chemistry. Lastly, the suggestion that theoreticians “prosper off the labor of others” is utterly absurd. Every laboratory experiment relies heavily on abstract theories. While laboratory scientists may not understand the intricacies of different theories, their work would be impossible without a theoretical framework. Given all of the theory’s contradictions, it seems shocking that Servos did not fervently reject it like he did the previous arguments. In fact, he states that “There is merit to an argument constructed along these lines” (614). Granted, Servos does assert his explanation’s superiority when he contends that “another factor may have been as, if not more, important in shaping the Baconian character of American scientific work” (615). However, I would have expected Servos to point out the “cultural” theory’s inherent flaws in order to bolster his own thesis.
Servos presents a sound argument that derives its strength from the level of detail he provides. While first reading the piece, I worried that Servos would not explain why math was so divorced from science during the early twentieth century. However, several pages after repeatedly stating that science and math remained in separate fields, he does offer a plausible explanation for this phenomenon: “This may well have been a by-product of the effort by mathematicians to distinguish their subject as a professional pursuit independent of its applications” (618). The argument that scientists did not receive theoretical training because mathematicians were trying to advance their own careers seems far more plausible than any vague conjectures about the scientists’ philosophical or cultural backgrounds. Once again, though, it seems that Servos misses an opportunity to lend further support to his argument. He states that “The discipline of mathematics was making great strides in America during this period. But the greatest expansion occurred in those areas of mathematics most remote from the needs of scientists” (618). Since theoretical mathematics flourished during this time period, doesn’t that undermine any argument providing a philosophical or theoretical explanation for trends in American science? After all, wouldn’t American mathematicians have the same purported ideals and values as American scientists?
Servos certainly offers a viable interpretation of trends in American science. However, his argument could have been even more convincing if he recognized alternative theories’ inherent contradictions. I would be interested in knowing what Adams would have thought of Servos’ work. Would he prefer concrete laboratory experiments over theoretical work? Perhaps an investigation of various scientific journals published during that time period would further elucidate the predominance of experimental over theoretical science.
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Nov 11, 2009 
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