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Archive for the 'Borstelmann II' Category

JFK and his conflicted relationship with race

Monday, February 12th, 2007

In the epilogue, Borstelmann states retrospectively, “Non-southerners displayed reticence: Dwight Eisenhower of Kansas, Richard Nixon of California, Gerald Ford of Michigan, Ronald Reagan of Illinois, and George Bush [of Connecticut]. Southerners, by contrast, led the way: Harry Truman of Missouri, Lyndon Johnson of Texas, Jimmy Carter of Georgia, and Bill Clinton of Arkansas.” The one president to break the mold was JFK, though his relationship with race relations was tumultuous as best, and opportunistic at worst. This same relationship was in many ways reflective of the experience of the American nation on the whole. Borstelmann points out in the first chapter that “the United States has harbored competing inclinations among its white majority: toward racial hierarchy and domination on the one hand, and toward equality and color blindness on the other.” JFK is the embodiment of these competing inclinations, and a look at his chapter provides an interesting examination of the the government’s role at the intersection of domestic and international race relations.

Thought I found the book to be somewhat American-centric, I did appreciate the subjectivity that Borstelmann often provides by pointing out that in the 20th century, the world was run under white authority, despite the reality that the world has a non-white majority. JFK ignored this fact in his administration by ultimately choosing to focus on the Azores and Berlin as opposed to Angola, which seems to run contrary to his understanding of racial intolerance. Kennedy was clearly an anti-communist first, and an anti-racist second (though calling him an anti-racist would be inaccurate; an anti-”racism” American would be more apt). However, he recognized that when anti-communism was coupled with white supremacy it actually helped communist, and hindered the forces against it, by providing communist with ammunition and language to use against the West . Yet he still chose to fight a Eurocentric Cold War, which was certainly more palatable to the American public, and perhaps even more in line with is own personal morals.
Domestically however, he symbolically fought racism by appointing African Americans to high level positions, inviting ambassadors from newly independent African nations to Washington, and refusing to work with otherwise qualified racist Southern politicians. As Borstelman points out (over and over and over again), race relations at home, and race relations abroad were concurrently moving down the same historical track, parallel to each other, and inextricably linked.

It thus seems that Kennedy was taking the nation along on his own little schizophrenic anti-communist path: he realized that if racial tolerance wasn’t “modernized” at home, then he would lose potentially strategic anti-communist ground. However, he ignored the foreign side of his own argument by fighting the Cold War in Berlin instead of Angola. This was not the only contradiction in Kennedy’s America. While the U.S. saturated culture with language about the “free world,” the South was still lynching, harassing, and segregating its own citizens.

Don’t get me wrong: I adore JFK. Not to mention, he inherited a world that was pretty messed up already. What I find most interesting, however, is that the way he behaved towards both Africans and African Americans were almost perfectly representative of the entire nation’s feelings towards both groups of people: hesitant, yet understanding that it was about time for some major change.

The Cold War and the Color Line

Saturday, February 10th, 2007

Thomas Borstelmann’s The Cold War and the Color Line details the path of United States politics domestically and internationally through the lens of race. Borstelmann tells the reader that the purpose of the book is to explain how racial discrimination shaped US relations with the outside world. In a thorough examination of the US pre-1945, Borstelmann sets the stage for why attention was finally placed on changing racial issues at home and abroad in the Cold War period and beyond.
One interesting point that Borstelmann kept referring to and that I hadn’t really thought about was the impact of World War I on shaking the foundation of white power in the early 20th century world. Before the war, Europeans believed with absolute certainty that they had the highest form of civilization and were superior. Borstelmann says “the white race seemed to be engaged in a kind of suicide-some noted with sadness and some with hope”(21). This also lessened the idea that race was ultimate predictor and gauge of superiority, as nation proved to rank above race.
What does this say for the distribution of power at the time? Obviously, people were ignorant and happy to believe without question that whites were superior to everyone else in the world. As evidenced in the examples in the book, people were uneasy with dealing with color issues-even Presidents-and not wanting to create conflict in the southern region, most were happy when their lives were not being challenged. Avoidance unless absolutely necessary seemed to be the MO of choice by the government and general public. This is the whole point of the reading in my opinion-if there was no Cold War or conflict, who knows what would have happened differently in blurring racial lines? With a focus in the international world, especially Africa, the US was forced to confront problems that otherwise would have been avoided by the majority of high-ranking officials. In other words, action was taken at critical points for political reasons, not moral reasons that made people truly fight for racial equality because of the belief that everyone should be treated the same way.
As W.E.B. Du Bois stated, the color line was the central problem of the 20th century. Many Americans had images of blacks as savages in Africa or foolish servants to white authority, stereotypes perpetuated in African films and popular movies like Gone With the Wind. On the international stage, seen for example in the League of Nations, many high-ranked officials criticized the fact that other countries would have an equal vote to the United States, since the US was seen as the ultimate power and authority, and they were appalled at the idea that other countries with their “sub-par” non-white people could actually be equal to the US. Only in the 20’s and 30’s did science start slowly changing the way people thought about race and hierarchies. Hitler also showed the world the ultimate devastation that could result in a nation or world of racist thinking, which reduced the legitimacy and power of racist ideas in the post-war world.
I found it extremely interesting to read the detailed accounts of what shaped Presidents’ decisions on whether to champion civil rights and race issues. Many times it was not just personal moral reasons, but a larger concern on how the United States was seen abroad-ie political motivations. One fact that was intriguing to me was when Borstelmann asserts that the regional background of post-1945 Presidents is the best predictor for attention and fervor to end racial discrimination. Non-South Presidents were the least likely to want to get involved in the fight, such as Eisenhower who was extremely uncomfortable with a change to the racial hierarchy and seeing blacks in positions of power. He advocated following a “center line” with regard to race issues, a theme seen in many Presidents and in America for a long time post-war. However, Southern Presidents were the ones who tried to impact the issue of ending racial discrimination, especially Truman, Johnson, Carter and Clinton. Being from southern states and having personal relationships with the history and situations and struggles of the people made the work that much more important to them. (Kennedy is the one exception, as he was a northern Democrat who became involved more as a result of the timing of his presidency-with the test to US national identity being: Will there be greater racial justice or will the country continue to defend white privilege at home and abroad?(136)
One contention I have with Borstelmann is his statement at the end of the book saying that the US at the end of the Cold War had emerged as the multiracial leader of a multiracial world (271). I feel that this is far too generous and optimistic a statement, and undermines a lot of his argument that focuses on the negative feelings of resentment and hatred towards different races in the United States and abroad before, during, and post Cold War. Although great advances were made-and should not be overlooked-toward equality, I feel that these were made more for political gain and seen mainly in courtrooms or in the law, not necessarily on the streets between people or behind closed doors. It paints a pretty picture of hope and change, but I feel that at the end of the Cold War, the US was far from being a/the leader if you are looking at being a leader through a racial lens.