Reimagined Communities

In reference to domestic commodification of the (first) Gulf War, McAlister wrote “Participation in watching and shopping did not reflect experience, it was the experience.” If Anderson’s imagined-communities-a-la-newspapers-and-novels applies to seventeenth-century Europe, then it applies ten-fold to twentieth century America. I could not agree more with Anderson and McAlister’s assertion that mass media, forms of entertainment, and general consumption are the formative forces in American nationalism, and the way in which American’s view their nation on the world stage. Particularly interesting were the ways in which McAlister took American cultural baggage and intertwined it with our national experience of the Middle East. For example: I thought I had left Mary Rowlandson behind in Civ I, but the captivity narrative that she pioneered could be read into countless cultural portrayals of the Middle East (notably in movies that equate the Middle East, an Islamisized moral geography, with terrorism). McAlister’s close readings post-9/11 images from the Middle East reveal that while we are in the grips of a postmodern world, we still make moral claims in other cultures based on our understandings of our own history (see McAlister’s read of the Abu Ghraib photo on pp. 298-299).

Of equal interest was her examination of the movie The Siege which appears to be an exemplary portrayal of postmodern, post-Gulf War nationalism. In it, multiculturalism is applauded, and deemed a part of the American identity. The rounding up of Muslims under martial law is deemed deplorable, and the main characters are African American and Palestinian-American (interestingly, the antagonist is a white character (Bruce Willis) who is supposed to represent the “intrusive… ruthless” and well supplied military: basically, the man).

The result of this media-saturated culture is a distinctly American view of the Middle East that is not necessarily reality, but definitely a creation of our own self-imposed identity, which ironically enough has been forged by our relationship with the Middle East. This surely poses a societal problem: if we are to successfully negotiate our tension with Islamic extremism, we must rewrite this narrative to correct our national understanding of Islam, and the Middle East. This may be too pragmatic/policy-focused a question for this class, but how do we fix a half-century’s worth of cultural damage, and basically create a new moral geography for the Middle East that makes us neither “supreme” nor the natural antithesis?

A note on the book itself: I thought it was excellent. McAlister does exactly what she sets out to do: examine the “intersection between cultural texts, foreign policy, and constructs of identity.” The walk-away message for me (as for Ben too, it appears) is that our national identity and our moral geographies are intensely media driven. TV, movies, newspapers, and CNN play a huge role in the creation of an “imagined community” by allowing for a truly shared experience throughout a country as large and diverse as the United States. Inaccurate though our media-culture may be at times, this book has proven it very powerful, and has (at least for me) exposed Anderson’s true genius.

In the final section of the book, McAlister emphasizes the important role that culture plays in the way in which states (and non-state actors) interact with each other on the world stage. The theme of the centrality of the media is continued, but she points out that it is becoming more and more central in the way that world events play out.

McAlister notes that, beginning with the Iran hostage crisis, we have seen an entirely new kind of terrorism, which she dubs “media terrorism” (220), that places greater importance on the way that a terrorist act is reported in the media than it does on the act itself. She also describes portions of the Persian Gulf War as a “staged media event” (239). Both of these trends can still be seen in the Iraq War today, with terrorist groups broadcasting the execution of hostages on the internet, and embedded reporters who gave us news coverage directly from the units that they reported on.

McAlister also describes the simultaneous rise of multiculturalism in the United States during the Persian Gulf War. While Americans were seeking more certainty abroad, they were confronted with less and less at home. The right decried what it saw as an increasing moral relativism, and its reaction had foreign policy implications that we still feel today.

The War on Terror is a phrase that deserves to be unpacked. People are accustomed to making sacrifice in wartime, so the idea that we are supposed to give up civil liberties, etc. is not without precedent. But even President Bush noted that it was going to be a different kind of war, and Dick Cheney admitted that it might not be over in our lifetime (278). Because there is no clear-cut foe, it allows for nebulous objectives to be extended and require more sacrifice from Americans. It also means that aims like “spreading freedom” are no longer merely diplomatic goals, but military objectives.

It seems as though neoconservatives have a greater understanding of the importance of controlling the narrative through which we understand our world. McAlister refers repeatedly to “moral geographies,” which, besides sounding like a phrase that Dean Cloke would use, allows someone to control the ways in which things are perceived. McAlister notes that reporters often buy into these “ideological frames” (294) to such a degree that they disregard information that is in front of them and focus on things that fit into their narrative.

These arguments, complemented by examples form everything from reports of torture to Delta Force make for a convincing argument, if not always riveting reading. It seems as though culture is no longer merely another aspect of foreign policy, but the driving force behind it.