Intelligence Report

THE POLISH QUESTION: EAST GERMANY

(Reference Title: ESAU LII)

SECRET
RSS No. 0051/71
July 1971
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THE POLISH QUESTION: EAST GERMANY

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS

This study examines strains being exerted upon Poland and Polish-East German relations by changing Soviet security concerns, Western European economic expansion, Brandt's Ostpolitik, and, in particular, a more assertive East Germany. The study concludes that such forces -- contemporary versions of Russian and German national interests -- will continue to undercut Poland and to feed Polish-East German animosity.

The judgments of this study have met considerable agreement on the part of CIA East European specialists. Nonetheless, in view of the existence of some differences of interpretation and emphasis, the views expressed are those of the study's author, Mr. James V. Ogle, and of this Staff.

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THE POLISH QUESTION:
EAST GERMANY

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German Democratic Republic
- AREA: 41,646 square miles
- POPULATION: 17,000,000
- ARMY: 92,000
- GNP: $34.5 billion (1969 at 1968 prices)
- PER CAPITA GNP: $2,029
- TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER: $1,251 million (1969)
  OF THIS, EEC: $1,191 million

Polish People's Republic
- AREA: 120,725 square miles
- POPULATION: 33,000,000
- ARMY: 195,000
- GNP: $40 billion (1969 at 1968 prices)
- PER CAPITA GNP: $1,212
- TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER: $6,351 million (1969)
  OF THIS, EEC: $687 million
THE POLISH QUESTION:
EAST GERMANY

Summary

The recent fall of both Wladyslaw Gomulka and Walter Ulbricht has removed the last two old Bolsheviks of Eastern Europe and in a sense marked the end of an era. At the same time, certain traditional situations remain, not least the vulnerability of Poland to its much stronger neighbors. Thus, even though the advent of Gierek and Honecker has coincided, a bit fortuitously, with some improvement in Polish-East German relations, that relationship continues to contain a number of serious animosities, aggravated from without by the changing interests and actions of Russia and West Germany. This paper seeks to factor out these strains and animosities -- from a mixture of Polish history-geography, East German arrogance, factional disputes in both ruling parties, conflicting national economic interests, the spectre of German reunification, and ambivalent Soviet desires -- and to estimate the degree to which this abiding setting will affect Poland and East Germany without Gomulka and Ulbricht.

The prime-mover of sharper Polish-East German animosities has been the changing needs of Soviet security considerations in Europe. Soviet policy has been -- and remains today -- on the horns of a dilemma: the Soviet Union has been eager to press forward with its detente with the West German government (FRG) in the hopes ultimately of weaning Bonn away from a dominant place in the economic and military structure of Western Europe, and in the process Moscow has been aware of the desirability of ensuring that East Germany (GDR) adopts
a stance toward the FRG which would at least harmonize
with this effort. Yet at the same time Moscow has been
exercised over the internal security implications in
East Germany of Pankow's participation in détente with
Bonn -- concern apparently justified by the popular demon-
strations that greeted Willy Brandt at the time of the
first summit meeting of the two German premiers, at Erfurt
in March of 1970. And, more fundamentally, the Soviet
Union appears to have been concerned that Soviet pressure
upon East Germany sufficient to force Pankow to enter into
negotiations with Bonn could play into the hands of those
forces in the East German Party desirous of closer GDR
political-economic relations with the FRG than Moscow has
believed safe for the GDR.

We know that, for these reasons, two weeks after
the Russian-sanctioned Erfurt meeting, the Soviets gave
a Polish deputy foreign minister a secret briefing in
Moscow in which the USSR called upon Polish help to
check unspecified forces in East Germany which were
depicted as still entertaining sympathy for the concept
of the unity of the German nation. For their part, the
Poles quickly responded by drafting a Secret Memorandum,
for their own internal Party and government use, in which
they sharply indicted East Germany on a broad scale.

Close examination of this unique, authentic docu-
ment, and of the circumstances surrounding it, suggests
a number of fundamental conclusions about relationships
among Eastern European Communist states. Most directly,
the indictment itself shows that beneath the facade of
fraternal relations, East European states can level charges
against each other which, in an earlier age and in other
circumstances, would amount to a casus belli. The indict-
ment, plus supporting testimony also show that concern over the possibility of the restora-
tion of a united Germany remains fundamental to Soviet
and Polish foreign policy thinking, despite the seeming
remoteness of this possibility at present. Finally, the
circumstances of the indictment show the reverberations of
new Soviet moves regarding West Germany upon factional
alignments in both East Germany and Poland -- and the
consequences thereof for Polish-East German relationships.
To the end of uniting factions within their Party, the drafters of the Polish indictment included the widest possible span of charges, credible and incredible, against the GDR and its ruling Party, the SED. To begin with, the indictment condemned what it termed the East German "superiority complex," of which all Poles and Soviets were well aware. It detailed the ways in which East Germany was seeking a special role in Europe as middleman between the Soviet Union and West Germany -- not only by tying its economy more closely with the Soviet Union than with its closer Communist neighbors, but also by allegedly seeking a close economic relationship with West Germany which ran counter to official East German pronouncements. The indictment detailed the East German economic discrimination against Poland which this involved. It implied that the East Germans were unreliable members of the Bloc, alleging in this connection both that the East German army was ideologically impure and that East German propaganda had been soft on Dubcek. It further implied that East Germany entertained territorial aspirations against Poland, i.e., in regard to the Western Territories lost by Hitler, charging the existence of clandestine East German intelligence operations against Poland. Finally, the indictment held that the nationalism being cultivated by the East German military had pan-German implications, and hinted that some elements in East Germany were even seeking to re-establish a single German superstate.

Some of the more intriguing specifications in the Polish indictment prove on examination to be either trivial or unprovable; some may be exaggerated for internal consumption. But in any event, there is solid ground for the charges of East German economic discrimination against Poland. It is in the economic sphere that Polish-East German differences are best documented from a number of sources, and it was primarily Poland's economic troubles which led directly to the fall of Gomulka. The crucial issue here involves the question of economic integration within the framework of the Soviet-sponsored Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). Poland has always argued for multilateral East European banking arrangements with convertible currency which would permit modernization
of its large but backward economy; for its part, East Germany has always wanted to avoid any such commitments which would dilute its technological and trade advantages over the rest of Eastern Europe, advantages now stemming to a considerable extent from its special access to the West through Inter-Zonal Trade (IZT) with West Germany. We know that in 1969, after the Soviets had failed to back Polish CEMA integration proposals, an April visit by Gomulka to East Berlin apparently convinced him at last that East Germany, far ahead of Poland economically, was unwilling to reciprocate Poland's support with economic concessions. Reporting from inside East Germany confirms the Polish claims that the East Germans had mounted deliberate campaigns both to maximize bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and to expand IZT with West Germany, while attempting to block other East European contacts with the West. A month after his Berlin visit, in May 1969 -- a year prior to the Polish indictment -- Gomulka made a bid for talks with Bonn, downplaying prerequisites previously adhered to out of deference to East German sensitivities.

More importantly, it was not only growing Polish-East German bilateral dealings which led to the sharpening of difficulties between the two states: as already noted, Soviet European policy was changing as well, the crux of the new policy being that the Soviets no longer regard, or deem it appropriate even to portray, West German revanchism as the most serious threat facing them in Europe; in Moscow's view the chief threat, in the light of the no longer deniable success of the Common Market, has become that of an integrated Western Europe led by West Germany. The ultimate Soviet goal apparently is to neutralize West Germany within the framework of pan-European economic arrangements which, the Soviets hope, would not threaten the political status quo of Eastern Europe. Polish experts, including some now close to Gierzek, were quick to follow the Soviets in expounding this new analysis.

This general Soviet interest in exploring new Eastern European relationships with the FRG is contributing to differences, within both the East German and Polish...
leaderships, over the question of how far Pankow and Warsaw, respectively, should go. There is considerable testimony that a hard-line, conservative majority in the East German Politburo, apparently led by Honecker, has opposed rapprochement as an intolerable threat to East German internal security. The technocrat minority, apparently led by Premier Willi Stoph and at times encouraged to some degree by Ulbricht, have felt that the economic advantages of rapprochement could be obtained at an acceptable political price. In turn, the Poles have apparently been in a quandary about the implications of these internal SED differences for Poland. Warsaw leaders favoring quick rapprochement with West Germany have certainly resented the veto which the East Germans, and especially the Pankow conservatives (the Politburo majority), have sought to impose on East European detente with the West in general and with the PRC in particular. Yet the Poles also appear to feel that the long-range national interests of Poland would be even more threatened by the ascendancy of East German technocrats who -- according to the Polish Secret Memorandum and independent reporting -- were considered capable of moving directly toward unspecified "special arrangements" with West Germany, foreboding some form of reunification and the threat of a new German hegemony in Europe.

In any event, the reshuffling of Polish factional alignments triggered by the April 1970 indictment against the East Germans set in motion an ironical train of circumstances, leading first to Gomulka's greatest foreign policy achievement and immediately thereafter to his greatest catastrophe. When in May 1969 Gomulka abandoned his subservience to Ulbricht and made his bid for talks with Bonn, many of the hard-line Polish nationalists at first either condemned the new policy or withheld their support; yet in mid-May 1970, apparently as a result of the issuance of the secret indictment, this resistance was abandoned. Gomulka's new German policy was accordingly crowned on 7 December 1970 by the signing of a treaty with Bonn, the Polish press hailing this treaty as having secured the borders of Poland for the first time in 300 years.
In retrospect, however, it appears that Gomulka's neutralization of factional opposition to his new Bonn policy was a Pyrrhic victory, since it only accelerated plotting against Gomulka over the domestic consequences of the new line. While it was generally recognized that efforts to exploit the opening to Bonn and Western Europe would require massive Polish economic reforms to render Polish products competitive in the West, Gomulka's factional opponents rejected his version of reform, encouraged growing resistance to it, and took decisive advantage of the eventual popular explosion which the first attempt to implement the reform produced.

In this atmosphere, the food price increases which Gomulka sought to put into effect on 13 December 1970, as part of the reform, were greeted by open rebellion at Party meetings called to discuss them -- possibly because, as was later reported, the apparat had become aware of bitter dissension in the leadership over this step. This attitude throughout the Party helped to ensure that when worker demonstrations broke out in the Polish coastal cities, the Party was paralyzed, and to convince both the Soviets and the Polish leadership that a change in the Party's high command was imperative. Circumstantial accounts of a pre-December Polish plot to oust Gomulka are suspect on several counts, probably exaggerating the degree to which the leaders of the nationalist and technocratic factions, respectively Moczar and Gierek, were able to coalesce and to anticipate and manipulate events. On the other hand, joint contingency planning by the two anti-Gomulka factions may indeed have begun after the elimination of the German issue as a focus of contention between these groups in the spring; such a previous understanding between Gierek and Moczar may have facilitated the swift removal of Gomulka and his replacement by Gierek on 20 December.

In the aftermath of the disappearance of Gomulka and Ulbricht, Honecker's Germany is apparently turning from the larger ambitions of Ulbricht, and seems ready, at least temporarily, to be more accommodating toward
its Eastern neighbor. Gierek's Poland meanwhile is fighting to cure the "plague of incompetence" which had put it at Ulbricht's mercy. East German economic assistance to Poland in recent weeks has been, by Polish accounts, remarkable, and the Polish media speak of a new era of cooperation. But the heritage of ill will will not be easily overcome, and the evolution of the two regimes will doubtless raise new problems and resurrect old ones. In the long run, any degree of liberalization in East Germany which entails an acceptance of improved relations with the FRG could evoke again the Polish fears of German hegemony. And, if economic reforms in Poland should eventually lead to innovations considered heretical in Pankow, this could provoke a renewed East German economic quarantine of the Poles. In the meantime Poland remains caught as before between the more vital East German and the infinitely more powerful Soviet economies, and only major economic concessions from the West, and particularly from West Germany, are likely to ease these constraints. Poland is seeking such help but is unlikely to find it on the scale needed. Thus the realities of the West German-East German-Polish-Soviet relationship seem likely to provoke new intra-party strains, new Polish-East German frictions, and new indications on all sides of the inability of comradely regimes to bridge abiding national suspicions and differences.
THE SETTING

I sincerely welcome the signing of the new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement as the first step in the reshaping of German-Soviet relations. The conclusions of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union means to me the establishment of German policy for a long time. Germany thereby resumes a political course that was beneficial to both states during bygone centuries.... The tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable....

---Telegram from Adolph Hitler to Marshal Stalin, 20 August 1939

The history of Poland is given its tragic color by the circumstance of being caught in an indefensible plain between Germany and Russia, forced either to ally itself with one or the other or to try to chart an independent course that has often ended in partition. These facts of Polish geography and history today add a special bitterness to a well-documented clash of Polish and East German national interests. This Polish-East German hostility is the outstanding example of the antagonism which the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has evoked from time to time in its relations with virtually all of its fraternal East European allies -- and sometimes with the Soviet Union as well.

These antagonisms toward the GDR are in part reflections of a Soviet dilemma. Because East Germany started as a recognized zone of occupation rather than as a nominally independent country, and because it controls part of
a German nation, the larger part of which escaped incorporation in the Soviet empire, East Germany has always been difficult for the Soviet Union to handle. Alternate exploitation, appeasement, and badgering of the irascible Walter Ulbricht, East Germany's long-time leader, has characterized the pursuit of changing Soviet policy in Europe. Ulbricht's awareness of his political importance to the Soviet Union, reinforced by the large East German economic potential, gave him some degree of leverage in Moscow and even more elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This was especially true of his relations with Poland.

The Polish-East German troubles have been both economic and political. Common membership in the Soviet bloc has exacerbated rather than eased Poland's difficulties on both accounts, for it has meant on the one hand that Poland could not move freely on the world market, and on the other that foreign policy moves had to be coordinated with an East German partner whose interests were often opposed to Polish interests. Blocked by East Germany in its dealings with West Germany, denied East German economic concessions, and opposed by both East Germany and the Soviet Union in attempts to achieve compensatory help through CEMA economic integration, Poland's economy has gone downhill while that of East Germany -- and West Germany -- has flourished.*

Changing Soviet policy in Europe brought these Polish troubles with East Germany to a head in 1967-1970. The Soviets felt a new need to open communications with West Germany, to head off the increasingly real possibility that West Germany would become the leader of an integrated Western Europe. These policy changes, in themselves, tended

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*This emphasis on "discrimination" against Poland reflects the thrust of Polish documents and commentaries dating from the period examined in this paper; such emphasis in this ESASU study should not be seen as a downplaying of the domestic Polish mis-management which led so directly to the fall of Gomulka.
to invalidate the previous Polish policy, so slavishly followed by Wladyslaw Gomulka, of subordinating Polish interests to East German prerequisites. The economic discrimination imposed on Poland by East Germany now became increasingly intolerable as the political framework within which it could be imposed — Polish-enforced hostility toward and isolation from West Germany — became increasingly outmoded.

Meanwhile, however, by encouraging East German participation in the Soviet detente with the FRC, the Soviets were encouraging a process, East German-West German rapprochement, which they themselves would have to check if it ever went too far. It was in response to an unprecedented Soviet warning about this latent East German danger that the Poles were emboldened to draft several unique and highly classified documents which permit a reconstruction of Warsaw's accumulated grievances against Pankow. Specifically, the Soviet warning was delivered by deputy foreign minister V.V. Semenov to Polish deputy minister of foreign affairs Jozef Winiewicz during a visit to Moscow on 1-2 April 1970. According to a classified Polish foreign ministry report, Semenov declared:

The existence of the GDR is a fundamental matter for us and for you. Attempts to restore the Reich must not be permitted because this would imply the unleashing of a new war. We must take all measures to prevent this.... All of us must exert efforts to render support to those forces which, in the GDR, are taking a course of action to widen the gulf between the two German states. It is noteworthy that changes regarding very fundamental questions are occurring in the GDR. The theses regarding the unity of the German nation... are presently being rejected. These matters, until recently, still created certain doubts for the German comrades.... (Emphasis added.)
With this encouragement to voice long-standing Polish fears about forces in the East German Party favoring reunification, and with the aim of uniting the warring Polish factions around the new policy toward West Germany which the general Soviet policy entailed, the Poles were emboldened to draft a Secret Memorandum in April or May 1970 for their own internal Party and government use, setting forth a blistering indictment of the East Germans.*

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*The cause-effect argument in this ESAU study is based on the sequence and unusual nature of the Polish documents; some CIA analysts do not attribute to the Soviet briefing such a pivotal role in the drafting of the Polish indictment.
THE POLISH INDICTMENT OF EAST GERMANY

1. The German Superiority Complex

The first "disturbing" trend noted by the Poles, in a reliable account of the Secret Memorandum, is the "conceit" of the new East German nationalism. The East Germans allegedly boast "that the GDR has the best economic model, that the Germans are intellectually and technically superior to the peoples of the other socialist countries." This, the Poles say, involves anti-Soviet feelings as well, and "what is even worse is that certain elements of the government and Party system of the GDR share these same opinions and views."

Many of the examples of "arrogant attitudes" are attributed to the East German military personnel who were in Poland for the "Oder-Neisse-69" exercise in the fall of 1969. At that time, according to the Secret Memorandum, the East Germans proposed that their participating units enter Poland on 1 September 1969 -- the 30th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland, timing highly offensive to Polish memories.

Such attitudes on the part of the East Germans are well documented. What is more, East German professions of superiority were officially enunciated at the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in April 1967 when creation of the "evolved social system of socialism" was put on the East German agenda. * Ulbricht's

personal disdain for Gomulka is also a matter of public record.* But it was not the purpose of the Poles, in their Secret Memorandum, merely to rehearse the insults they had most recently suffered at German hands. This first charge led to a second.

2. The East Germans Are Not Reliable Members of the Bloc

The Secret Memorandum charges that the East Germans had recently reversed the priorities in indoctrination of Army cadres and soldiers, putting patriotism first, before internationalism and hatred of the enemy, thus occasioning a critical evaluation by unspecified "military attaches of socialist countries." Many GDR officers and soldiers, the Poles say, "regard with skepticism the treatment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as an unmistakable enemy." Citing the mass military desertions to the West prior to 1961, the memorandum notes that "the process of desertions was halted primarily through the creation of conditions preventing desertions"; that is, only the Berlin Wall and new punitive regulations have masked the continued East German proclivity to desert.

Such charges are likely to have been exaggerated by the Poles for polemical purposes. Western observers usually consider the East German among the more reliable of the satellite armies, although some East German defectors have claimed that the first shots to be fired by East German soldiers would be at their own officers. Certainly, the East German army is no less reliable than the Polish.

Better evidence is furnished by the Poles to support their allegations that the East Germans have undermined

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East German-Polish bilateral military cooperation. First, what are described as the "unfortunate incidents" of the "Oder-Neisse-69" exercise are denounced and ascribed to the "ineffective work of the Main Political Directorate of the German National People's Army." The incidents referred to were apparently manifestations of hostility toward the Polish military by the East German military during the exercise, and East German exploitation of the Polish civilian population for hostile propaganda purposes -- photographing begging children and the like. Secondly, the Poles state that as a result of a general GDR neglect of "internationalism," GDR-Polish military meetings of all types either are ill-attended or do not materialize. Third, and most intriguing, is the Polish charge that bilateral cooperation between the two General Staffs, which had increased at East German initiative in 1965-1967, has now been replaced by "shifting these contacts to the level of cooperation within the framework of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact."

Polish and East German journals have provided hints of such differences on this matter of bilateral military cooperation versus Warsaw Pact cooperation.* The Secret Memorandum, in a different context, alleges that the Soviet "comrades" have been "repeatedly embarrassed" by the "exaggeratedly manifested fraternity" shown toward them by East German officers at the expense of "unity" with other members

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*For example, the East German foreign policy journal Horizont endorsed "complete military integration" a month after the 17 March 1969 meeting of the Warsaw Pact, which approved previously prepared plans modifying the Warsaw Pact command structure to provide joint command and greater cooperation. In 1970, after Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko revived the issue of combined armed forces in his 24 January 1970 Red Star article, the East Germans registered no dissent but the Polish Chief of Staff Boleslaw Chocha, interviewed on 14 May 1970, emphasized that the command structure of the Pact respected the sovereignty of member countries.
of the "socialist camp." In short, it seems to be the Polish view that the East Germans seek to escape from their concrete obligations for military cooperation with Poland by taking refuge in unrealizable but more grandiose plans.

Still on the subject of unreliability, the Secret Memorandum states: "It is a noteworthy fact that, during the events in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the mass media of the GDR neither organized nor conducted a complete political propaganda campaign." A number of individual cases of expression of private East German sympathy for Alexander Dubcek's Czechoslovakia are then cited.

In raising this issue, the Poles were undoubtedly aware of Ulbricht's intense hostility to Dubcek and of the fact that far from lagging in condemnation of Czech revisionism, GDR media were usually in the forefront of bloc attacks. Nevertheless, the Poles may also have noted the temporary cessation of such GDR attacks from late July through mid-August 1968 -- before and after Ulbricht's last-minute visit to Dubcek -- and the subsequent rumors that the East Germans may have begun to pull their punches before the invasion because of a desire not to jeopardize important impending West German trade credits. Whether or not the authors of the Polish Secret Memorandum believed such allegations, they apparently felt that the issue was sufficiently useful to be included for polemical purposes in the list of charges against East Germany.

3. East Germany Is Seeking a Special Role in Europe

The Poles make a number of specific charges about East Germany's alleged aspirations for a "special position" in Europe. These include the following:

a) "During the 12th Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED (in December 1969), the
discussion of relations with socialist countries was focused almost exclusively on cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union and dealt very superficially with the rest of the socialist countries, including Poland."

b) The GDR looks with suspicion on Polish overtures toward West Germany because: "In the GDR, there is the prevailing conviction that only the GDR (aside from the Soviet Union) is capable of correctly evaluating the situation of the FRG and is preordained to conduct these contacts."

c) Since the GDR sees itself as "the foremost partner among the socialist countries of the Soviet Union," GDR officials foresee close economic cooperation among the GDR, the FRG, and the Soviet Union.

d) And in consequence, the GDR is already taking steps to improve relations with the FRG and West Berlin; it already has more contacts with the FRG than any other socialist country; and East Germany has special access to the West European Common Market (European Economic Community — EEC) which is denied to others. Finally, say the Poles, the Inter-Zonal Trade (IZT) between East and West Germany used for this purpose can be seen as a precursor of German reunification.

This aspiration for a special role, says the indictment, led to discrimination against Poland. The Secret Memorandum notes the East German hostility to the Polish Military Mission in West Berlin and GDR obstruction of the transit of Polish goods to the West, especially to West Berlin where permits not required of either the Soviet Union or Western countries cost Poland in the neighborhood
of $200,000 per year. But these are old complaints, noted by defectors since the late 1950's. More specific and more recent charges were made as well.

4. East German Economic Discrimination Against Poland

The real breakdown in Polish-East German relations, according to the Secret Memorandum, came in October 1967. A meeting of the premiers of the two countries scheduled for that month "did not materialize" because, just prior to the meeting, "the German comrades" demanded the deletion of all measures to implement Polish-GDR economic, scientific, and technical cooperation from a joint protocol already approved by both sides. "This position," the Memorandum says, "was unacceptable to the Polish People's Republic."

Later in the Memorandum, discussing East Germany's special relationship to the Soviet Union, the rejection of the 1967 joint proposals is mentioned again, together with continuing East German obstruction in the purchase of licenses, cancellation of a marine engines contract, and reduction of joint purchases from capitalist countries. About the only area in which East Germany is willing to expand trade with Poland, the Memorandum says, is in regard to services, due to the labor shortage in East Germany. Even if these accusations cannot be firmly substantiated in each case, the general charge is well-founded.

5. East German Territorial Aspirations Against Poland

East German soldiers, the Memorandum says, refer to the Western Territories of Poland as "territories lost by Hitler." Even official GDR propaganda, the Poles say, justifies the Oder-Neisse line solely in terms of the lost war and the preservation of peace. "The rationale of Poland's historical claim to the Western Territories and the ethnic ties with Poland have never been used, on the assumption that the German people are unaware of these
reasons or would not be convinced of their validity."
The Polish Memorandum goes on to charge flatly that "the
GDR intends to increase its influence in the border areas
of Poland," and cites illegal border crossings, East German
intelligence penetrations, and the detaining and question-
ing of Polish citizens by GDR border authorities.

While the last points specified could be true, we
have no evidence to confirm or deny them, and indeed lit-
tle evidence of any kind on the real East German attitude
toward the lost territories. One report of a past episode
suggests that the East Germans on occasion may have been
willing to offend Polish sensitivity on the subject.
Comulka's interpreter, Erwin Weit, recalls in his book*
that GDR Volkskammer President Johannes Dieckmann, visit-
ing Poland in May 1964, began to refer to the GDR as "Mid-
dle Germany" after suffering imagined insults at Polish
hands. In general, however, the evidence suggests that
the principal Polish concern involves the GDR's policy
toward the German West rather than towards the lost German
lands to the East.

6. The East Germans Seek to Reestablish a Single German
Superstate

In its opening passages the Secret Memorandum as-
serts that "certain groups" in East Germany "have made
the assessment that Germany, after unification and achieve-
ment of a certain prosperity, will acquire the status of
a power." Reviewing official GDR policy toward the Federal
Republic, the Memorandum notes that reunification was
espoused from 1950 to 1955, and that this line was followed
from 1957 to 1959 in Pankow's promotion of a "conference

*Ostblock Intern, Hoffman und Campe Verlag, Hamburg,
1970.
of German states." (This apparently refers to GDR proposals in this period for German confederation.) The Memorandum then reviews the development of East German-West German contacts since 1964. Alleging that the propaganda war between East and West Germany has declined since Brandt became chancellor, and noting East Germany's granting of 100,000 West German visit permits in 1969 "for so-called cases of misfortune," the Memorandum concludes that "the GDR, in fact, is unofficially doing to a considerable extent that which it does not officially approve."

"Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR," the Memorandum goes on, "in talks with journalists, very strongly emphasize that the GDR has never demanded from the Federal Republic of Germany recognition of the GDR as a foreign country." Noting that some GDR citizens are expecting German reunification in the near future, the Memorandum cites "Western journalists" who see a "certain regrouping of forces" in the political leadership of the GDR: "They are of the opinion that young activists, commonly described as the 'group of technocrats,' are becoming increasingly more prominent within the leadership; this group is also distinguished by the fact that it advocates more strongly than ever before the incitement of GDR 'national patriotism' in the people." While this "national patriotism" may be perceived as an obstacle to reunification when seen from Bonn, it is apparently seen from Warsaw as a prelude to a new German hegemony.
POLISH FEARS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Anxiety concerning the possibility of German reunification has been voiced, from time to time, by a variety of Polish sources. To dismiss out of hand these Polish fears, however exaggerated and for whatever special purpose they are expressed, would be to concentrate too much on recent "demarcation" propaganda statements from East Germans, which are intended to strengthen East German bargaining positions vis-a-vis West Germany and to deflate the hopes of the East German public in regard to inter-German talks.

A number of alternative configurations for Middle Europe have been put forward over the years by various Eastern leaders—Soviet, German, and Polish—in reaction to the political potency of the reunification issue. The memory of these plans still influences Polish thought. And even if German reunification is a matter for the indefinite future, the fact that it remains an ultimate possibility also continues to exert influence on Eastern European, and especially Polish, foreign policy thinking. Finally, the record of past sparring over reunification can and is being used today for its leverage in ongoing negotiations.

The initial Soviet plan for Germany, immediately after World War II, was plunder and revolution for Germany as a whole. The Western currency reform of mid-1948 was one of the first steps toward permanent partition, for it applied only to the three Western zones, thus evading a Soviet veto and guaranteeing a viable private economy in these zones instead of continuing to maintain a single impoverished Germany. However, public Soviet policy statements continued to profess the desirability of a single German state until 1955, when West Germany joined NATO, and Bonn and Moscow exchanged ambassadors. Even in 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev repeated to Adenauer that reunification could be had for a concrete price, namely, West
German abandonment of NATO membership. This price was too high. Thereafter the Berlin Wall, in August 1961, seemed to cement the division of Germany.

With the erection of the Wall and the subsequent East German economic successes, the increasing self-confidence of the East German regime has become a new factor in the equation, and the Soviets have no longer been completely free to formulate German policy entirely in terms of their own interests. At the same time, the Soviet position on reunification has retained an element of ambivalence: for although the continued division of Germany would always be in the Soviet interest if all other factors were ignored, the Soviet vested interest in the division of Germany must now be reconciled with the growing Soviet concern to find a way to prevent Bonn from becoming the leading force in an integrated Western Europe.

Less than two years after the Soviets in 1955 abandoned their avowed policy of seeking outright German unity, the GDR announced espousal of a policy of German confederation. The obvious propaganda uses of the two ideas, reunification and confederation, were the same: to put the burden of responsibility for division on West Germany and to demand so high a price for either proposal that West Germany would have to reject it. The signal difference for the SED leadership was that unification would imply an end to command power in East Germany, whereas confederation would not.
The confederation idea, first surfaced on 1 January 1957 in a Neues Deutschland article by Walter Ulbricht as an "interim solution" until reunification could be achieved, did not receive immediate explicit Soviet backing.* Such endorsement was eventually supplied by a joint statement by Khrushchev and Ulbricht, on 13 August 1957, and a Soviet note to the Federal Government, on 7 September 1957. According to Gomulka's former interpreter (see footnote, page 6), Polish support for the notion of German confederation was granted only in December 1958, after hard bargaining.

The reaction to the scheme in the Federal Republic was also equivocal. Although "confederation" had been initially espoused by the West German Social Democrats, they quickly abandoned it and the idea did not receive any official West German support. Nevertheless, a significant body of public opinion favorable to confederation did develop among some West Germans, who saw it as a compromise favoring the growth of personal contacts between West Germans and East Germans.

The confederation idea remained a standard in Ulbricht’s lexicon through January 1967, when it was reiterated

*However, Soviet support for a pre-unification all-German council, in the early 1950's had been a precursor to the confederation idea.
for the last time in his New Year's message. But already he was pointing to "the repudiation of our proposals" as one cause of "the political crisis in Bonn," by which he meant the emergence of the Grand Coalition which brought the Social Democrats and Brandt into the government with the Christian Democrats. GDR Prime Minister Willi Stoph's letter to the West German government, on 10 May 1967, did not mention confederation. Finally, Ulbricht dropped confederation and called instead, in early 1968, for interstate relations on a basis of equality.

The GDR shift reflected the fact that many new factors had appeared, only one of which was the initiation of Brandt's Ostpolitik. The Seventh Congress of the SED, in April 1967, had proposed the building of a new system of socialism which not only implicitly set East Germany apart from other Bloc countries but suggested that the GDR would reach a higher plane than all others. Some private SED statements now even implied that East Germany was claiming a status in building socialism superior to that of the Soviet Union.

Thus by 1967, the emphasis of the East German line had obviously shifted from professions of desire for "partnership" with West Germany to insistence on separateness and "equality." But Polish sources, including the Secret Memorandum, reflect a belief that for some East Germans, the "partnership" element in the East German line has not really been dropped; and the Poles may read GDR Premier Stoph's public statements to Brandt at their Erfurt meeting, on 19 March 1970, as confirmation of this view. Stoph accused Adenauer of having openly placed "West European integration above the unity of the nation," a development the East Germans "have always attempted to check." Although he reiterated that the "unity of the nation" had thus been abandoned by the FRG and although he referred to the years before the Wall as indicative of the evils of special "intra-German relations," Stoph added:

It goes without saying that relations between two given states are always of a special nature
in comparison with their relations with other states. The relations of the Federal Republic with the Austrian Republic or Switzerland, for instance, have special characteristics which distinguish them from the relations of the Federal Republic with, let us say, the French Republic.

Stopf's examples were peculiarly German ones, and the Poles might have concluded that such talk reflected, in addition to GDR propaganda purposes, a continuing susceptibility in some East German official circles to the advantages of a closer relationship with West Germany. The Poles are well aware of the background to Brandt's Ostpolitik -- the realization, which he dates from the Berlin Wall of 1961, that a rapprochement between the two Germanies must follow, and not precede, a general détente in Europe. In this vein, Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski predicted in the 25 April 1970 issue of Polityka, Warsaw's most prestigious political weekly, that Brandt's recognition of the GDR is inevitable -- because it is essential to his revised reunification strategy.

The Polish-favored alternative scheme which the changes of 1967 doomed was Gomulka's "Iron Triangle" -- a plan to weld a special relationship between Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. Conceived in 1958-1959, when East German interference first frustrated Gomulka's attempt to make contact with the West Germans, the Iron Triangle was for a decade Gomulka's "secret plan" to overcome the traditional isolation of Poland. Gomulka viewed this scheme as a "counterweight to the remaining states of the socialist camp," and as an alternative to Polish contacts with the West and to the "Pankow-Moscow axis," both of which he feared.

Gomulka may at first have been given some reason to believe that his scheme had Soviet support, for Soviet military and foreign policy thinking does treat Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia as a unit. The first
Warsaw Pact joint maneuvers, held in October 1961, involved this "first strategic echelon" of the USSR and the northern satellites. When Brandt's Ostpolitik challenge was accepted by the Soviets in 1969-1970, it was Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia that were ordered to coordinate their negotiations.

But in any event, Gomulka's speech of 17 May 1969 (offering negotiations with Bonn) spelled the end of the Iron Triangle. It had been doomed, this source added, by traditional Polish-Czechoslovak antipathy and by Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak resistance to economic integration. Most important, he asserted, the Iron Triangle concept was killed by the GDR's insistence that nothing be allowed to hold back its own technological and economic growth and the expansion of its special ties with West Germany.
POLAND VERSUS EAST GERMANY: THE ECONOMIC ARENA

The Warsaw-Pankow Struggle Over CEMA

It is with regard to CEMA integration that the box which Poland found itself in appears most clearly. And it is here that the charges of the Secret Memorandum can be documented most fully. The Polish and East German approaches in the economic arena have long been incompatible on many scores.

Poland is the largest of the Soviet Union's East European satellites, but with consistently poor economic performance, a lagging technology, and a large stake in the "export" of trans-shipment and other services on behalf of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. Poland therefore has an obvious interest, defended since at least 1962, in a multilateral convertibility within coordinated planning which could transform its quantitative strengths (in terms of labor force, GNP, railroad mileage, etc.) into qualitative improvement. That is, Poland has an interest in the creation of a CEMA currency or of CEMA accounting methods which would enable Warsaw to improve its trading position and stimulate its manufacturing industry. Only by achieving a qualitative improvement in its products through this means could Poland hope to compete with other East European countries (primarily East Germany) for Western markets from which Poland could obtain the machines and technologies which would permit its participation in a kind of second industrial revolution. East Germany, on the other hand, ahead of its allies in foreign trade with the West and far ahead of most in technology, wanted no "integration" which would dilute
its qualitative advantages. These differences came to a head in 1968.*

The growth rate of intra-CEMA trade, which had never equaled that of intra-EEC (Common Market) trade, was declining in 1967. Even in 1968, 95 percent of CEMA trade was still on a bilateral basis. There were at least two possible solutions to the impasse. East Germany defended "super-planning," which called for detailed production assignments for each East European state, to be determined by a hypothetical CEMA center. Poland, on the other hand, defended economic reform permitting the development of the multilateral East European market outlined above. Both solutions were unrealizable, however, due partly to insurmountable technical obstacles (e.g., the absence of a uniform CEMA price system and the great differences in production costs), but largely to the lack of give on all sides.

The East German position throughout the period 1967-1970 was hypocritical. The East Germans talked as if the expansion of East European trade with Bonn and the West were anathema; yet the East German emphasis on science and technology as the new arena for "struggle with imperialism" and on bilateral measures within CEMA to advance "structure-determining products and technologies, featuring top-level world standards"** was actually a more ambitious approach by which East Germany sought to dominate CEMA and make its own deals in the world beyond. The Poles were not fooled. Thus the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade Journal, Rynki Zagraniczne, reported on 19 September

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*See ER IM 69-76, June 1969, "CEMA After Twenty Years: The Struggle Over Economic Integration in Eastern Europe," Confidential, for a full discussion of this problem.

**Ulbricht's Ninth Plenum speech, Neues Deutschland, 25 October 1968.
1970 (when Poland was about to sign its own trade treaty with Bonn) that GDR exports to West Germany had increased from 316 million dollars in 1968 to 399.9 million in 1969, while imports had increased from 360 million to 550.5 million -- an increase of 52.9 percent as compared to Poland's increase of 9.1 percent in imports from West Germany in the same period.*

By January 1969, the Poles had begun to lose faith in their ability to push through CEMA reform. Many reports confirmed that the main stumbling block remained the GDR, although, according to some sources, the Soviet Union was also opposed to Polish plans for CEMA integration, especially the proposal for a convertible CEMA currency underwritten by Soviet gold reserves.

This complex of concerns was reflected in a secret Polish report on the visit of Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski to Moscow in late February 1969. Jedrychowski found the Soviets "not sure" whether a CEMA summit would serve useful purposes; they were of the opinion that it would be better to continue bilateral discussions -- and they felt that other members would prefer this too. Although the Soviets reassured Jedrychowski that the Soviet position on the German problem was "as hard as granite" and praised Polish-Soviet relations as a model for all socialist countries, the Poles probably took these reassurances with a grain of salt. The Poles privately continued to stress the dangers of increased East German economic dealings with West Germany, and gave this greater weight than the concurrent evidence of persisting SED opposition to political detente with the FRG.

*The fall of Gomulka may have coincided with an independent East German reassessment of the economic policies followed since 1967. The discussion in this section pertains to the East German policy of 1967-1970. The possible changes of 1971 will be discussed at the close of this paper.
On 10 April 1969, Gomulka and his most trusted colleagues visited East Berlin. Gomulka is said to have concluded from this encounter that the East Germans took it for granted that the GDR was the decisive economic power in the Communist world and should be its model.* Gomulka was allegedly convinced at last that East Germany was not willing to agree to Poland's plan for economic integration. And, finally, it was brought home to him that Poland was already hopelessly behind East Germany economically. When, later in April 1969, the Poles obtained the CEMA summit meeting they had sought in February (the 23rd CEMA Council session), the battle was already lost. No comprehensive integration proposals were adopted; each country was to prepare new proposals, for submission "by 1971."

The East German Economic Strategy

Several classified lectures and documents dating from this period of the spring of 1969 spell out the East German economic strategy which was to be followed as long as the CEMA impasse persisted, and confirm the charges

*The did not say, "the largest economic power" in the Communist world (which of course is the USSR), but "the decisive economic power." That the GDR may have such pretensions is also suggested by East German insistence, for example, on developing its own computer production program and not waiting for the much vaunted CEMA coordination in this area. By being first with the "structure-determining" components of the Bloc economic system of the future, Ulbricht apparently hoped to play the "decisive" role.

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made a year later in the Polish indictment. For example, the East German deputy minister of foreign trade said in a confidential briefing in East Berlin on 9 May 1969 that bilateral economic cooperation between East Germany and the Soviet Union was to be pushed to a maximum even if such development did not seem so urgent for the Soviet Union. Interzonal trade with West Germany, he admitted, put East Germany in an "embarrassing position" vis-a-vis other Warsaw Pact countries, excluding the Soviet Union, but it would be pursued "while at the same time continuing to campaign against expansion of trade between [other] Warsaw Pact countries and West Germany." A year later, an East German document issued in April 1970 similarly noted that the "integration center" of CEMA would be the Soviet Union and East Germany.*

Gomulka's bid to Bonn on 17 May 1969 was a direct response to this East German strategy and was made in full knowledge that it would make him unpopular with East Germany. The Poles, one report added, were fed up with the East German selfish attitude shown toward integration proposals, both in bilateral talks and at the April 1969 CEMA summit, and had concluded that the GDR was not prepared to reciprocate the Polish assistance so long given on the East German sovereignty issue. Polish attention turned increasingly toward the Federal Republic;

*The extent to which this is already a reality was pointed out by an article in the Bratislava Pravda, 22 January 1971, which noted that Czechoslovakia, the East (footnote continued on page 24)
a senior Polish official who talked with Gomulka in early December 1969 found him completely preoccupied with West Germany. Poland, this source explained, had to have a market for manufactured goods and had to have access to modern technology. West Germany could supply both.

By the time of the 24th CEMA Council session, 12-24 May 1970, which continued the "study" of CEMA integration,* Polish-East German hostility had been laid out before the Polish Party by the Secret Memorandum. The state of Polish-GDR relations at this point was demonstrated in a classified Polish report on the visit made by GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winzer to Warsaw, 27-29 April 1970, after the initial Premier-level East German-West German conversations had been held at Erfurt on 19 March 1970. "One of the main and most controversial subjects of the talks," the Polish report began, "was the matter of relations of both our countries with the FRG"; Winzer's comments to the Poles about the Erfurt talks, the Poles complained, did not include any information on the economic ties between the

(footnote continued from page 23)
European state second to the GDR in economic development, had only three industrial branch cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union whereas the GDR had more than 30. The East Germans publicly brag of their 30 agreements. The 5-year (1971-1975) Soviet-East European trade agreements concluded toward the end of 1970 (thus before the Polish events introduced certain modifications) are also suggestive of East Germany's special position. The trade volumes stipulated for the next five years were: USSR-GDR, $24 billion; USSR-Czechoslovakia, $15 billion; USSR-Poland, $14.3 billion; USSR-Bulgaria, $13.3 billion; USSR-Hungary, $10.3 billion; USSR-Romania, $5.9 billion.

*In early April 1970, a Soviet economist in Moscow had said that the integration program was not ready and could not be considered.
GDR and the FRG. This Polish report also alluded to "Brandt's strategic concept regarding the GDR and his hopes for regressive ideological processes in GDR society," processes that could have been indicated by "the events in Erfurt," (i.e., the pro-Brandt demonstrations there by East Germans). Using these fears of subversion in East Germany as his justification, the Polish negotiator had taken the April 1970 occasion to express concern to Winzer "over the subsequent effects of extensive and unilateral ties of the GDR with the FRG, especially in the economic and scientific-technical fields." When Winzer attempted to minimize the extent of these economic ties, the Poles responded with an entire catalogue of the benefits derived by the GDR in this regard. The report concluded: "I emphasized that our apprehensions stem from concern over the independent development of the GDR, because we are entering a complicated period in which it is impossible to deny the effect of economic relations on the political superstructure." Finally, as far as bilateral Polish-GDR economic relations and CEMA were concerned, the Polish reporting officer recounted how he had made "extensive, critical evaluations" of GDR conduct to Winzer, and how Winzer had responded with a "contentious attitude." Once again, the Polish catalogue of wrongs was fairly extensive and concluded: "I emphasized that the lack of economic integration results in political disintegration, as may be illustrated by the events in Czechoslovakia and the position taken by Romania."

Such Polish professions of concern for ideological subversion in East Germany, like some of the Polish expressions of fear about German reunification, seem exaggerated and polemical. But behind this evident Polish desire to beat the East Germans with any stick available rested the real economic basis for the Polish complaints: any cooperation between Bonn and Pankow, however motivated and by whomever carried out, could only reduce Polish bargaining power in East and West alike.
Europe and the Common Market: The Spectre Haunting Communism

The CEMA failures about which the Poles have complained so bitterly are all the more galling to Warsaw because of the contrast with the successes of the European Economic Community (EEC) -- the Common Market. This West European achievement has become a major political factor in its own right, in light of the gradual Soviet perception of the new threat posed by West Germany's position in a successful EEC. And the new European policy which the Soviet Union has developed in response has further exacerbated Polish differences with East Germany over the sensitive issue of East German economic relations with the FRG.

Prior to 1967, the Soviet view seems to have been that the EEC successes were temporary, and that the announced goal of full West European integration was unattainable. The general thesis of capitalist contradictions on which this view was based seemed to find concrete embodiment in de Gaulle's obstruction to EEC political progress and expansion. De Gaulle gained favor in Soviet eyes for his emphasis on bilateralism, his hostility to American influence in Europe, and his determination to counter West German power. But de Gaulle failed, France could not keep abreast of West Germany, and EEC integration proceeded. Soviet European policy correspondingly now saw the West German threat no longer in terms of neo-Nazi, militaristic revanchism (aimed first at East Germany), but rather in West Germany's almost inevitable leadership of an integrated West European economic community. The spectre haunting Communism was Europe.*

Two Soviet initiatives have derived from this new interest in hindering German-led West European integration. One has been to woo Bonn by authorizing direct approaches to West Germany by the erstwhile members of the Iron Triangle, an effort facilitated by the more-or-less simultaneous West German decision for Ostpolitik. The parallel Soviet initiative has been the decision to resurrect, with pan-European economic goals, the notion of a Conference on European Security (CES). Both initiatives faltered in 1968 due to the Czechoslovak crisis, but both were picked up again by the Soviet Union with a haste which was astonishing in the light of the anti-West German propaganda that had accompanied the Czech crisis. Initial Soviet contacts with the West Germans in the last months of 1968 were followed by the Budapest Appeal of 17 March 1969 calling for a CES.

Articles in the Soviet journal International Affairs, from December 1968 to March 1969, spelled out the Soviet perception of the West German-EEC threat. West Germany, the Soviet authors argued, was making a deal with the British for entry into the EEC, the price being British support for an integrated Europe in which the West Germans could "lay claim to political leadership."

"The main idea," another Soviet article asserted, "is that the EEC countries will act in a single front in their economic relations with the socialist countries, while the latter are [each] to act in isolation. That, at least, is what West Germany is striving for, with the support of integration champions in other Common Market countries."

(footnote continued from page 26)
Campaign for 'European Security'," by A. Ross Johnson, RAND R-565-PR, November 1970. A more current classified overview is provided by Intelligence Report No. 1698/71, 4 June 1971, "The Soviet Union and a Uniting Europe," Secret,
These new Soviet analyses were spelled out even more clearly in the fall of 1970 by a Polish official, Ryszard Frelek, who is today reported to be a speechwriter for Glierek and head of the Polish Central Committee's International Department. Writing in the September 1970 issue of the journal of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, which he then headed, Frelek termed the Budapest CES appeal of March 1969 "a transition from detente and cooperation based on bilateral relations, to detente and cooperation on a multilateral and general European basis." West Germany, he concluded, was already taking the initiative in Western Europe and "it would be well for this not to happen, since this would mean granting West Germany the leading political role in Western Europe."

Although East Germany had long had, and the Poles had long wished for, the economic ties with West Germany which the new Soviet policy encouraged, the political stability of both the East German and Polish regimes depended in some measure on continuing overt hostility toward West Germany: hostility toward West Germany had nourished the new nationalism of the "first developed socialist system" proclaimed in East Germany in April 1967; in Poland, hostility toward West Germany, the supposed threat to the Western Territories, had long been the mainstay of Communist rule. Additionally, both regimes had used the issue of contacts with Bonn to accuse the other of political adventurism. Thus the twists and turns of adapting to this new Soviet policy toward Bonn has created a political tension which has exacerbated the Polish and East German internal factional struggles and caused them to interact.
EAST GERMAN POLITICS AND BONN

The earlier-described Soviet briefing of the Poles and the ensuing Polish indictment of the East Germans in the Spring of 1970 both pointed to the existence of elements within the SED which favored East German rapprochement with the West Germans. The fact that the East Germans were apparently united in wanting to block rapprochement between other Eastern European countries and West Germany, something which the Poles especially resented,* should not obscure the possibility that the East Germans were divided on the quite different issue of inter-German relations, and that this division introduced a measure of ambivalence into the Polish perception of the East German leadership -- i.e., the Poles did not want the "hard" East Germans to veto detente in general, though they were even more fearful of how far the "soft" East Germans might go in rapprochement with the West Germans. There is evidence, from East German sources, that Polish (and Soviet) concerns over the dangers of the "soft" line were not without foundation. This evidence suggests that the issue of contacts with the West German Social Democrats sharpened disputes within the SED Politburo, from the initiation of

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*Different groups in the East German leadership may have favored obstruction of dealings by other East European states with the FRG for different, overlapping reasons. While SED technocrats may have been primarily concerned with preventing any dilution of the special GDR economic advantages over the rest of East Europe obtained through IZT, SED hardliners -- and the East German Politburo majority -- appear to have been also, and mainly, concerned to prevent the creation of an atmosphere that might tend to undermine their adamant stand against any GDR political concessions to the FRG.
the Soviet "Westpolitik" at the end of 1968, at least until the 14th Plenum of the SED, 9-11 December 1970.*

The Poles had long been concerned about the implications for them of such internal SED differences. Anticipating the warnings expressed in the April 1970 Secret Memorandum, a Polish journalist on 10 February 1970 said that the Polish Party was already asking itself what East Germany might do after the present generation of SED leaders was gone. The Polish fear, he said, was that the GDR industrial managers and intellectuals -- i.e., the SED technocrats -- were interested in a "reasonable" arrangement with the Federal Republic, and might eventually succeed in bringing such an arrangement about. Somewhat similarly, a Polish sociologist, talking to an American diplomat in August 1970, predicted that such rapprochement would lead to Germany becoming once again an integrated and very strong power dangerous to Polish interests.

Such Polish fears -- and expressed more officially in the Secret Memorandum -- were doubtless raised by statements published at a crucial moment by the prominent East German dissident intellectual Robert Havemann. Writing on 16 March 1970, on the eve of the Erfurt meeting, in the West German Der Spiegel, Havemann argued that a

*The 14th Plenum, the first to be held in six months, reversed the over-ambitious "structure determining" economic policy of Ulbricht -- a change which was certainly a plus from the Polish point of view. The Plenum also initiated a still-continuing propaganda vilification of the West German Social Democrats in which all putative SED factional groupings now participate with apparent equal enthusiasm. See Special Report, Weekly Review, 16 April 1971, "East Germany Agonizes Over Economic Policy," for a full discussion of the economic policy issues.
political thaw would be good for both the FRG and the GDR, and that "recognition of the GDR under international law does not involve the abandonment of all possibilities for German reunification but is even a first step on the long and thorny way to overcome our national division." With the GDR more open to the world, Havemann said, it would overcome "political provincialism" and the hawks would be restrained and the doves strengthened "in West and East alike."

Obviously, Havemann was attempting to win friends in the West for East Germany, but it is possible that he was also genuinely reflecting SED dissension coming to a head over Premier Stoph's meeting with Brandt, about to take place. There were many reports that this struggle between Havemann's "hawks" and "doves" had then become particularly intense. And this in turn could have given a more concrete and action-oriented cast to Polish misgivings.

A temptation to discount such Polish views of East German factionalism derives from the fact that most East German accounts of this factionalism available to the US come from who seems so obviously intent upon influencing West German attitudes toward East Germany. His message could nearly always be read: "Be kind to the good guys (Ulbricht and Stoph), lest the bad guys (Honecker) make it worse for all of us." Nevertheless, it can be presumed that he embeds this message in real information and, when supported from other reporting, his accounts deserve consideration.* Reporting became increasingly pertinent when Brandt and Stoph moved toward summitry in February 1970 -- and it should be noted that in the Bonn-Warsaw

*It should be noted that certain CIA analysts treat this reporting with more reserve.
and Bonn-Moscow talks, the summit meeting came last, not first.

a majority in the Politburo opposed the Erfurt summit talks. The opposition, continued, was based in part on secret, opinion polls conducted by the SED Central Committee and presented to the Politburo according to which 70 percent of the workers, and even more of the students and white collar workers, considered "Germany" (not the GDR) their fatherland, while 22 percent believed in convergence of the capitalist and socialist systems. While these data would surprise no one, they are the kind of evidence which East German hard-liners might indeed cite in a last-ditch struggle against the talks.

Partial confirmation that a debate along these lines had taken place at this time comes, albeit third hand, from a quite different source. According to this report, the Czechoslovak Party official Vasil Bilak, talking to Ulbricht on 7 and 8 March, found Honecker losing influence and Stoph gaining, with Ulbricht acceding to Stoph's more moderate views. Ulbricht, this report continued, hoped by proceeding with the talks to cause conflict and confusion in West German political life. In the longer run, Ulbricht is said to have thought that the East German economy would improve enough in five years to permit a relaxation of restrictions and an increase in contacts with West Germany.

Ulbricht's credentials as one who had allegedly given some measure of support to SED pragmatists (whom the Poles equate with a "soft" line on West Germany), also received support in April 1970 from a rare source: a Soviet Party figure, a professed "centrist" and personal friend of Ulbricht. This Soviet source told a Western Communist: "There are two Eastern European leaders who know how to proceed correctly -- Kadar and Ulbricht. Economic reform is further along in their countries than anywhere
else in Eastern Europe, while Poland and the Soviet Union have experienced the greatest economic failures. One could not believe how independent of the Soviets Ulbricht actually is. He uses all the old terminology and ideology, but he listens closely to younger experts on pragmatic subjects."

In any case, it can be presumed that after Gromyko's report in Moscow, following his visit to East Berlin at the end of February 1970, orders came down to go ahead with the West German talks. Premier Stoph met Brandt in Erfurt, East Germany, on 19 March. These talks gave no encouragement to proponents of German reconciliation, however, and the accompanying Erfurt demonstration of East German public admiration for Brandt fed the worst fears of the SED hard-liners -- and, as noted earlier, of the Soviets and the Poles as well.

One week before the second scheduled Brandt-Stoph meeting, on 15 May 1970, Ulbricht arrived in Moscow, unannounced and alone. According to Gromyko's account to West German negotiator Egon Bahr, Ulbricht was followed in a few days by Stoph, Honecker, and Winzer. Brezhnev, Gromyko said, was annoyed at the unexpected appearance of the GDR delegation, Gromyko informing Bahr that the "GDR delegation" (not "Ulbricht") had said that they were

*One of the young experts on pragmatic subjects, Dr. Klaus Bollinger, chief editor of Deutsche Aussenpolitik and a member of Stoph's staff at the Erfurt and Kassel summit meetings, addressing an American audience in October 1970, answered as follows when asked about Brandt's possible hopes for West German influence in the GDR: "His other ideas are another question; maybe we have additional ideas too. . . . We cannot get a better government in West Germany for the next 10 years. Brandt is realistic. . . . It will be our fault if his 'other ideas' succeed."
not prepared to meet Brandt in Kassel. The Soviets, however, had "advised" them to go ahead, and they had agreed.

When, however, the East and West German leaders duly met again at Kassel, West Germany, on 21 May, the GDR position was even more consistently obdurate than it had been at Erfurt. Only when Brandt was able to tell Stoph that he had just learned that Bahr had reported progress in the parallel conversations he was holding with the Soviets in Moscow did Stoph cease being completely negative and express GDR interest in continuing the inter-German talks, sometime, somewhere. The avoidance of an immediate total rupture of these talks by the GDR was apparently as much as those forces in East Germany favoring the talks could accomplish; and even this was only achieved thanks to the progress being made in Moscow.

According to an East German reporting two weeks after the Kassel meeting, Honecker had wanted Stoph to walk out. The talks with the West Germans, said, were intensifying dissension and factionalism in the SED. Honecker and the "over-60" group, he said, opposed Stoph and the "under-60" group: i.e., the younger, more pragmatic group which was less concerned with the ideological problems raised by negotiations with the social democrats. Ulbricht, said this source, was turning to the younger group.

On 4 September, three weeks after Brandt had signed the Soviet-West German treaty in Moscow, the principle informant on these matters told a visitor:

There has never been so much quarreling within the Central Committee of the SED as there is now. Central Committee members are highly disturbed about the Soviet-West German treaty.... Most are not clear how far the Soviets are going to go in their rapprochement with the West Germans. One-third of them, led by Ulbricht, are in favor of the treaty and Soviet policy; two-thirds of the
Central Committee, led by Honecker, are opposed. Both groups are supported by different groups in the Soviet government.

This reference to "different groups in the Soviet government" recalls the important role that policy toward Germany had played in the fall of Beria and Khrushchev. There have been indications from other sources of differences within the present CPSU Politburo on the German issue: the pivot of contention is the fact that in encouraging West German-East German talks the Soviets were encouraging a process which they themselves would have to check if it ever went too far. Despite Soviet insistence in May that the GDR go ahead with the second FRG summit meeting, the consensus in the Soviet leadership in the spring of 1970 appears to have become increasingly influenced by the arguments and warnings of, or similar to, the SED's hard-line conservatives. As a result, a Soviet representative at this juncture made the unusual direct appeal to the Poles, discussed at the outset of this paper, which was followed by Warsaw's Secret Memorandum.

In short, this sequence of events suggests that in the interest of detente (in the final analysis, of getting Bonn to ratify the Moscow and Warsaw treaties), the Soviets may have initially given some encouragement to a minority group in the SED, apparently including Premier Stoph and the technocrats, which the Soviet leadership nevertheless did not want to see come to power. Honecker apparently led the opposition to those forces, but the situation was made more difficult for the Soviets because Ulbricht also gave Stoph some measure of support. The Poles were then enlisted by Moscow as another check on Stoph; and this provided the Poles with an unprecedented, and much needed, bargaining position to make up for the previous decade of Gomulka-led vassalage to the East Germans.

In the event, however, Polish criticisms of the "soft" East Germans do not seem to have played a crucial role in the resolution of the East German factional
differences. More important was the fact that Ulbricht was at last yielding to the toll of the years, at a time when the Soviets above all wanted order in East Germany. And the man most likely to provide it, Erich Honecker, became First Secretary on 3 May 1971, confirming rumors current in SED circles since at least November 1970.

Honecker in power, however, may not be the Honecker of the previous policy debates. He had assured his primacy in the Party, in part, by playing the hard-line role. It is not impossible, the evolution of Soviet policy permitting, that Honecker may eventually move toward the center to seek the allegiance of Stoph or Stoph's former following. If any such change finally occurs in Honecker's position -- particularly regarding policy toward West Germany -- it is likely to enhance Polish alarm.
The Realignment

Much more than in the East German case, open factionalism has long marked the Polish Party. In 1968, there had been a major restructuring of the Polish political scene*: the one-time Stalinists, largely Muscovite Jews, whose conversion to liberalism had brought the resistance fighter Gomulka back to power in 1956, were finally removed in 1968 by Mieczyslaw Moczar's nationalist "Partisan" faction, in a "revolt of the apparat" which showed the discontent of the lower and middle Party echelons. But Gomulka did not fall and the dissident factions, while clearing the way for new blood, did not themselves come to power. Edward Gierek's support at that time for Gomulka and the Soviet insistence on Polish stability, in the light of Moscow's agonizing experience with Czechoslovakia, were probably the largest factors in preventing more far-reaching change at the time.

In these shifting alignments, Polish policy toward Germany played a tangential and sometimes vital role. Gomulka's interpreter, Erwin Weit, reports in his previously cited book that in the summer of 1966 the general "Partisan" effort to isolate and embarrass Gomulka included the sabotaging of a visit to Warsaw by West German SPD faction chairman Helmut Schmidt. "Partisan" apparatchiks charged with receiving Schmidt allegedly prevented him from seeing Gomulka's confidant Zenon Kliszko, and falsified the record of Schmidt's conversations with them to make Schmidt appear as a hard-line revanchist. Meanwhile, the Polish technocrats' hunger for participation in the technological-

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scientific revolution prompted them to look with a mixture of envy and admiration toward both Germanies. But the key role for Germany in these factional struggles came from Gomulka's repeated reliance until 1969 on the bugbear of West German revanchism to defend his own rule and his alliance with the Soviet Union in defense of the Western Territories. And this involved Gomulka's support for Ulbricht, even though it was the East Germans who looked sullenly across the disputable border at Poland.

As discussed earlier, Ulbricht reneged on his economic commitments to Poland in 1967. Thereafter, the initial East European overtures in 1968 toward West Germany were overwhelmed by the events in Czechoslovakia. Having become convinced by April 1969 of East German hostility, Gomulka made his bid to Bonn in May. The East Germans responded by harassing Polish diplomats and journalists travelling between East and West Berlin. Expression of anti-East German sentiment became a point of pride for Poles of many stamps, but Moczar, and most notably his supporters in the pseudo-Catholic PAX group, held fast to an anti-Bonn line. The new Polish policy of seeking a detente with Brandt was encouraged by the new young men who had risen to the top in 1968, but was being opposed in the summer of 1969 by Moczar's hard-liners and the military.

In time, however, much of this opposition began to waver. Polish-FRG economic talks were started in October 1969. By December, the "Partisans" were being reported as undecided about the new foreign policy. Polish-FRG political talks then began in February 1970. It was at this point that the Soviets discussed East German problems with the Poles and the Poles issued their Secret Memorandum. This indictment of GDR policy may well have been put in writing specifically to bring around the Polish factions still opposing the new line toward West Germany. If so, it apparently succeeded. For in April 1970, a Polish diplomat who was an avowed supporter of Moczar told a US observer that the US should not stand in the way of West German recognition of the Oder-Meisse
anger if bad news was conveyed to him, and because his enemies in the middle levels of the apparat, as in 1968, were deliberately seeking to embarrass him. Gomulka meanwhile found his regime increasingly deprived of economic reserves, and boxed in between East German discrimination and obstructionism, and Soviet demands—Moscow apparently vetoing Polish plans to reduce military expenditures and failing to support Poland in CBMA. To escape from these pressures Gomulka's brain trust recommended two first steps: to restructure production costs by keying wages to a "synthetic" index; and to restructure consumption by lowering prices for hard consumer goods (rusting in warehouses), and raising prices for foodstuffs (needed for hard foreign exchange exports).

When Gomulka's economic boss Boleslaw Jaszczuk visited Gierek's province of Katowice at the end of August 1970 to explain these measures, Gierek arranged to be elsewhere. Gierek's deputy, however, explained to Jaszczuk that the wage reform formula was "absolutely incomprehensible" to the workers. Thereafter, the Katowice Party apparatus began clearly to convey the impression -- and not for the first time -- that it had no responsibility for the orders arriving from Warsaw. "It is even being said," he added, "that some of the disturbances at industrial enterprises took place with the silent encouragement of the local Party authorities."*

*These alleged "disturbances," prior to November 1970, were apparently minor ones and were not publicized or reported through other channels. This early report, however, makes credible later reports that troops had moved to Katowice on the eve of the price change announcement to put down possible trouble. The hint of Party complicity also supports the otherwise rather incredible report that the riots on the coast in December grew, at least in part, out of factional Party maneuverings.
Gomulka had been pressing to announce the price changes since October. But this action was twice postponed: initially, to avoid coinciding with the Soviets' 7 November Anniversary; and later, apparently, to avoid conflicting with the climactic Polish reception of West German Chancellor Brandt, whose visit was to symbolize the triumph of Gomulka's new foreign policy line. Thus, on 6 and 7 December, a large West German delegation was wined and dined in Warsaw when they came to sign the new treaty. On 9 December, Trybuna Ludu claimed that Gomulka's accomplishment had brought about a situation where, "for the first time in 300 years, no European state questions the borders of Poland." On 12 December, Warsaw announced the price changes.

Gomulka Falls

Perhaps Gomulka thought that his foreign policy success gave him the latitude to implement the obviously provocative price increases with a minimum of trouble. The timing, just before the Christmas holidays, proved to be a catastrophe. The Party meetings which heard of the price increases the afternoon and evening before the public announcement were, according to many reports, characterized by open rebellion. The apparat, which, according to some reports, was more-or-less aware of fighting at the top, was certainly aware of the impossibility of explaining the increases satisfactorily to the public.

The available evidence suggests that steps had been taken to prevent a blow-up in Poznan and Katowice, but the trouble came in the coastal cities. By the evening of the 14th, people had been killed in Gdansk. The disturbances also led to truly revolutionary organizational activity. With the successful general strike which began in Szczecin on 19 December, the strike committee there began to function as a government. A general strike across
most of Poland, to begin on 21 December, began to look like a real possibility. The Soviet ambassador to Warsaw subsequently told a Western diplomat that the situation over the weekend of 19 December was such that an explosion was certain if there were no change in leadership. As Gierek reported at the Eighth Plenum, "the Politburo was convened, under the pressure of its members" on the 19th. Gierek replaced Gomulka, and Moczar was promoted. The combination which so many had seen coming to power in 1968 thus took over Poland, and Gomulka and his "little Politburo" departed.

The circumstances surrounding Gomulka's fall are most pertinent to the Polish-East German problem. Although not ignoring traditional antipathies and other factors affecting the Polish and German nations as a whole, Gomulka's former interpreter ascribes much of the East German-Polish hostility to the personal animus between Gomulka and Ulbricht. They had, he added, "bet on different power groups [unspecified] in the Kremlin." Their quite different histories and personalities need not be documented. But even if the East Germans held no brief for Gomulka personally, the relative calm with which they accepted his fall deserves attention. They could hardly applaud the removal of a Communist leader as a result of popular pressure, and they might be expected to be wary of a successor thus bearing some democratic taint.

It is possible that despite the very dangerous worker demonstrations which accompanied the change of leadership,
the East Germans believe that there is some truth in the assertion of the Polish Party press that Gomulka was removed by the Party, "by its own efforts." In the spring of 1971, Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu stated that he had been aware of opposition groups which had formed in Poland "two months" before Gomulka's ouster. The gift of hindsight has appeared elsewhere as well. A remarkably circumstantial account, which has appeared in reporting and in the Western press, alleges that Gomulka was removed as the result of a "plot" worked out by Gierek and Moczar. By the time of the crisis provoked by the price increases, there were, these reports state, two Politburos, Gierek's "Politburo" moving to Warsaw just prior to the house arrest of Gomulka. This story may be a plant. It is known that a Polish Security Service directive of late January 1971 ordered the channelling to NATO intelligence services of "disinformation" concerning the December events. But it is also possible that the stories appearing subsequently do reflect, at least in part, actual contingency planning undertaken by Gierek and Moczar in the fall of 1970. Thus, if Gomulka was removed by a Politburo majority enjoying Soviet support and if this action was planned before the workers brought pressure to bear, then the Polish changes are legitimate within the context of Communist practice — and the East Germans have reason for their sany froid and a legitimate justification for the friendliness they have subsequently evidenced toward Gierek.

This, of course, does not exhaust the complexity of the question. The worker protests were motivated by specific economic grievances, and it is not only the former Polish leadership which could be made a scapegoat for these particular economic troubles. Some Polish sources, for example, attribute the shipyard workers' discontent to a Soviet refusal to accept completed ships. On the other hand, one Soviet notes speculation "within official Soviet circles" that the problems were the outgrowth of "intentional delays in spare parts deliveries by the GDR." But it is probably neither necessary nor appropriate to seek a one-to-one relationship
between past Soviet and East German economic pressure and the December events. The undoubted fact is that long-established Soviet and East German economic policies had always been prejudicial to Poland; but after the Polish working class at last rebelled, and Gierek then sought to shore up his regime, both the Soviets and the East Germans came to his aid with economic concessions.
Gierek's response to the second wave of strikes in January, a delegating of certain powers to workers' committees, raised the spectre of "social democracy." According to a Yugoslav correspondent, this move of Gierek's created a precedent which was most disturbing to those responsible for the internal order of neighboring Bloc countries. But Gierek has not permitted this movement to grow. He probably has little desire to experiment with the Yugoslav model, and in any case, the Soviets would not permit it.

The Soviets might permit Polish movement toward the Hungarian model, but this would also certainly prove most offensive to the East Germans. The politically essential difference between the East German and Hungarian models is in the nature of the information feedback in the two countries outside the market/planning area: the Hungarians permit and cultivate feedback on consumer preferences and popular attitudes through the mass media and through published opinion polls, whereas the East Germans offer no such role to the media and handle public opinion polls as Party secrets.

This "feedback" problem has at least been raised in Poland, in the form of two articles appearing in the 4 and 5 February 1971 editions of Zycie Warszawy, one of the authors of which, Jerzy Jaruzelski, is reportedly the brother of Minister of Defense Wojciech Jaruzelski. Noting that multiple channels are necessary for distortion-free information, the authors said that the mass media should play a role "greater than ever before." They also called for a Polish "Gallup," decrying Gomulka's "disinclination to ascertain true feelings" as having been responsible for his "notorious price increases" of December 1970 and their repercussions. Finally, noting that a number of advisory organizations have been created in recent days, the authors call for "institutional forms which would guarantee a freer exchange of views."

But while the Polish public would probably prefer the Hungarian model, all the more because it might discomfit Pankow, there is little indication as yet that
Gierek would prefer it. Judging by his performance in Katowice, he would probably prefer to keep the humanist intellectuals on the sidelines, co-opting the technical intelligentsia as needed. Thus far, there has been almost complete silence from the Polish intellectuals and public regarding political matters since Gierek consolidated his rule. The primary concerns of both regime and public are to a great extent economic; and in mid-February, faced with a third wave of strikes, Gierek shifted from political to economic concessions and rescinded the food price increases of December.

The economic aid cited in justification of this final concession was that of the Soviet Union. But the East Germans, too, were trying to buy peace in Poland. The Polish-East German 1971-75 trade agreement signed on 26 January 1971 represented an increase of more than 70 percent in trade and services over the 1966-1970 agreement. An earlier protocol, signed on 19 October 1970, had projected an increase in reciprocal trade of only 55 percent. Reported in mid-February 1971 that while Soviet aid had been "unimaginably large," the aid offered by East Germany was "even more significant." Although he admitted the persistence of anti-Polish sentiment in East Germany, he said that the East Germans recognize that their own interests will suffer if the present Polish government falters. The "unexpected understanding" and cooperation of the East Germans has been noted by Polish diplomatic sources as well. A joint commission, presided over by Polish Vice Premier Szyr and East German Vice Premier Fichtner, has been set up to see to it that the agreements on joint production projects "are correctly implemented." The Polish media now speak of "new forms of cooperation," an "essential step forward in socialist integration," and "a higher stage" in economic cooperation with the GDR.

Despite this improvement, Poland's economic problems will almost certainly persist -- in part because of Poland's own shortcomings in economic management; and with these problems there will continue much of the past cause of Polish-East German friction. The Poles seem intent on
going forward with West German contacts, and Warsaw is probing for US, West European and even Japanese economic concessions. But in the absence of dramatic increases in Western trade and investment, Poland will remain a very junior partner still caught between East Berlin and Moscow.

For ten years, East Germany had the most advantageous of all possible relationships with Poland. The strident but increasingly superficial ideological orthodoxy of Ulbricht masked an ambitious advance toward the high ground of the scientific-technological revolution, unwittingly aided by the very thoroughgoing, if at first underestimated, ideological orthodoxy of Gomulka. Now, the Gomulka-like mistakes seem unlikely to be repeated by Poland, but the heritage of ill-will with East Germany will not be easily overcome. Neither Gierek nor Honecker has yet had time to evolve permanent policies in the four-sided relationship with each other, the Soviet Union and West Germany, but in any event a fundamental conflict of Polish and East German national interests is likely eventually to limit the options of both leaders. A technocrat ascendancy in East Germany, foreshadowing greater East German-West German economic if not political cooperation and again raising the spectre of German hegemony, would not be well received even in a liberalized Poland. And if Poland, for its part, chose the "Hungarian" road, with its open channels of information, the East Germans might well resume a strengthened quarantine against Poland.

The long-term likelihood, therefore, would seem to be for a renewal of friction along the lines of some of the Polish charges raised in the 1970 Secret Memorandum. For all their probable exaggeration, these charges probably come closer to revealing the true dynamics of the Polish-East German situation better than do the day-to-day propaganda assurances concerning Communist unity or basic antipathies towards West Germany.
SELECTED CHRONOLOGY

(Note: The following chronology lists both selected events covered in this paper and certain of the most relevant concurrent events elsewhere in Europe. Classified entries are in all capital letters.)

December 1966

Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and SPD takes office in Bonn; Brandt is Foreign Minister, implementation of his Ostpolitik begins.

1 January 1967

Ulbricht repeats for last time call made since 1957 for confederation of the two Germanies.

27 January 1967

Romania and Federal Republic of Germany agree to exchange ambassadors, the first victory of FRG Ostpolitik.

8-10 February 1967

Warsaw Pact foreign ministers confer on Romanian move.

1 March 1967

Polish-Czechoslovak bilateral treaty, the first of a series of bilateral East European treaties seen as a response to the Ostpolitik threat.

15 March 1967

GDR-Polish bilateral treaty.

17 March 1967

GDR-Czechoslovak bilateral treaty; thus, the first set of the new treaties formalizes the "Iron Triangle," a policy goal of Gomulka's since 1958.
16-22 April 1967  Seventh Congress of East German SED held, East German claim for "evolved social system of socialism" put on agenda.

24 April 1967  Warsaw Pact summit in Karlovy Vary discusses Bonn's Ostpolitik.

10 May 1967  Stoph letter to Kiesinger; does not mention confederation.

19 June 1967  Gomulka speech on Zionists disturbs the previous factional balance and starts disintegration of his power over Party apparatus.

October 1967  EAST GERMANS RENEGE ON BILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH POLAND, POLISH PREMIER CANCELS VISIT.

December 1967  EAST GERMANS CURTAIL CULTURAL EXCHANGES WITH THEIR ALLIES, INCLUDING POLAND.

3 January 1968  Dubcek replaces Novotny as Czecho-slovak First Secretary.

8 March 1968  Student demonstrations in Poland provide opening for a conservative and nationalist "revolt of apparat," purge of Polish "Zionists" and remaining revisionists.

19 March 1968  Gomulka speaks "in name of Politburo," support from Gierek and others keeps him in office but his power is questioned.

23-24 March 1968  Dresden meeting of Bloc leaders held regarding Dubcek.
2 April 1968  Kiesinger suggests West German-Polish negotiations.

6 April 1968  New GDR Constitution approved by voters; separate state status formalized.


3 August 1968  Bratislava meeting of Warsaw Pact Five and Czechoslovakia formalizes Cierna pledges of a few days earlier.

9 August 1968  Ulbricht Volkskammer speech appears to make bid to Bonn.

August 1968  West Germany announces it is ready to talk to GDR at ministerial level.

20 August 1968  Warsaw Pact Five invade Czechoslovakia.


13 December 1968  Bonn and Pankow agree to expand Interzonal Trade.


10 April 1969  Gomulka visits East Berlin; ALLEGEDLY recognizes failure of previous policy of subordination to East German interests.
15 April 1969  Gomulka speech says each country must develop its own potential.

23-26 April 1969  CEMA summit in Moscow, integration plans postponed.

27 April 1969  DeGaulle, defeated in referendum, resigns; new urgency given to Eastern fears of Common Market enlargement and integration.

30 April 1969  Ulbricht tells 10th SED Plenum GDR has special problems deriving from all-German obligations.

17 May 1969  Gomulka makes bid to Bonn, with all previous preconditions downplayed.

17 May 1969  GDR IMPOSES STRICT CONTROLS ON EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS, ESPECIALLY THE POLES.

28 September 1969  West German elections; Grand Coalition falls, CDU in opposition, Brandt to be Chancellor.


2-3 December 1969  Moscow summit gives green light for East European bilateral talks with Bonn.

8 December 1969  Moscow-Bonn talks begin.

13 December 1969  Ulbricht tells SED Plenum negotiations with Bonn can begin.
22 January 1970 Brandt letter sent to Stoph, East German-West German summit meeting proposed.

5 February 1970 Polish-West German political talks begin.

12 February 1970 Stoph reply sent to Brandt.

2 March 1970 LAST DITCH EFFORT REPORTEDLY MADE BY EAST GERMAN POLITBURO MAJORITY TO CANCEL TALKS WITH BONN.

19 March 1970 Brandt-Stoph talks held in Erfurt, East Germany.

1-2 April 1970 SOVIETS TELL POLES TO SUPPORT THOSE ELEMENTS IN GDR AND SED WHICH ARE OPPOSING RESTORATION OF REICH.

April 1970 APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE POLISH SECRET MEMORANDUM CONTAINING INDICTMENT OF EAST GERMANY.

May 1970 POLISH FACTIONS OPPOSING TALKS WITH BONN SWITCH POSITION, NOW FAVOR TALKS.

15-17 May 1970 SOVIETS ADVISE GDR TO GO AHEAD WITH SECOND ROUND OF TALKS WITH BONN.

21 May 1970 Brandt-Stoph talks held in Kassel, West Germany.

12 August 1970 Bonn-Moscow treaty signed.

October-November 1970 According to post-December reports, Gierek and Moczar begin contingency planning against Gomulka.
7 December 1970  Bonn-Warsaw treaty signed.
9-11 December 1970  14th Plenum of East German Party; new economic line announced and bitter attacks on West German Social Democrats renewed.
13 December 1970  Price changes announced in Poland; PARTY APPARAT IN OPEN REBELLION AT NEWS.
14 December 1970  Workers in Polish coastal cities demonstrate against changes, burn Party buildings, blood is shed.
19 December 1970  Polish Politburo convened "under the pressure of its members."
20 December 1970  Gierek replaces Gomulka.
3 May 1971  Honecker replaces Ulbricht.