SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

29 October 1980

Cde. L. I. BREZHNEV presiding.

Also taking part: Cdes. Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachev, V. V. Grishin,
A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she,
M. A. Suslov, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov,
K. U. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, V. V. Kuznetsov,
B. N. Ponomarev, M. S. Solomentsev, V. I. Dolgikh,
M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov.

I. Materials for a Friendly Working Visit to the USSR by Polish Leaders

BREZHNEV. Tomorrow the PZPR First Secretary, Cde. Kania, and the Chairman
of the PPR Council of Ministers, Cde. Pinkowski, are coming here. The commission
consisting of Cdes. Suslov, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Zimyanin, and
Rusakov has provided materials for our discussions with the Polish leaders.1 I closely
read these materials. I believe the comrades have covered all the major issues. Perhaps
one of you will have some sort of comments, and if so, please let's discuss this.2

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1 Translator's Note: One of the seven officials whom Brezhnev mentions here—Konstantin Rusakov—was
not originally listed as a member of the Soviet Politburo's Commission on Poland, chaired by Mikhail
Suslov. The Politburo resolution of 25 August 1980 specified a total of nine members, including Rusakov's
main deputy, Oleg Rakhmanin, plus two other officials whom Brezhnev does not mention here: Leonid
Zamyatin and Ivan Arkhipov. See "Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25
avgusta 1980 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublike," No. P210/II (Top Secret), 25
August 1980, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 1, L. 1. Because Rusakov himself was very closely involved in
all decisions about Poland, it is clear that he became a member of the Politburo Commission early on.
(Rakhmanin remained a member as well, though his role was increasingly overshadowed by Rusakov.)

2 Translator's Note: The points raised by Brezhnev and his colleagues during this meeting were featured in
a report approved by the CPSU Politburo at the end of September, which was distributed to lower-level
party and government organizations throughout the Soviet Union. During the Soviet era, the Politburo
regularly prepared and disseminated reports about important domestic and foreign issues to subordinate
party and state bodies at all levels: to the central party apparatus, to the central government structures, and
to the union-republic, regional, territorial, oblast, municipal, and district organizations all around the
country. These lower-level organizations had to ensure that all party members and employees were
apprised of the reports, which became the only acceptable position to espouse. The Politburo relied on the
CPSU Central Committee Organizational-Party Work Department to monitor the dissemination of the
reports and the implementation of the Politburo's directives. At various stages of the 1980-81 crisis, the
Politburo used this channel to transmit updates on the situation in Poland, ensuring a uniform outlook
within the CPSU. The report in late September 1980, entitled "On the Development of Events in Poland"
(O razvitii sobyti v Pol'she), discussed "the reasons for and class content of the crisis in Poland, the
USTINOV. I also closely read the materials that were prepared. I think they are well done and touch on all matters. The most important thing is that all the issues here are raised very pointedly — precisely the way they should be raised with the Polish leaders.

BREZHNEV. In Poland there is in fact now a raging counterrevolution under way, but the Polish press and the Polish comrades are not speaking out about this and not speaking out about the enemies of the people. And in the meantime these enemies of the people, the accomplices of the counterrevolution, and the counterrevolutionaries themselves are speaking out against the people. How can this be?

ANDROPOV. A direct way of putting the question is that in Poland the Polish leaders are saying nothing about the counterrevolution either in the press or on radio or television.

GROMYKO. The mass media are also silent about this matter.

ANDROPOV. Instead of exposing the antisocialist elements, the Polish press is giving overwhelming emphasis to the shortcomings of the CC leadership, etc. We must speak directly about the enemies of the Polish socialist order. The antisocialist elements, like Walesa and Kuron, want to take power away from the workers. The Polish leaders should have spoken directly about this, but we don't see anything about it in the Polish press.

BREZHNEV. They're already beginning to choose the Sejm, and they say that the army supposedly stands on their side. Walesa goes from one end of the country to the

conclusions drawn by the CPSU Central Committee [Politburo], and the ways to surmount the crisis.” For Further information about the report and its dissemination, see the documents in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 77, D. 105, Ll. 1-54, particularly “TsK KPSS: O provodimoi rabote v svyazi s informatseii TsK KPSS ‘O razvitiy sobytiy v Pol’she,'” Report No. 27908 (Top Secret), from I. Kapitonov, head of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational-Party Work Department, to the CPSU Politburo, 15 October 1980, ibid., Ll. 1-9. 3 Translator's Note: In both Moscow and Warsaw, Communist leaders were worried that Solidarity was seeking to sow discord within the army and weaken the cohesion of military units.” By the time of this CPSU Politburo meeting, Soviet leaders were already hearing from confidential sources in Poland that "some 60 to 70 percent of the army is leaning toward Solidarity" (see annotation no. 9 above). Even those Polish officials who initially disagreed with this assessment began changing their minds in early 1981. The head of a Polish delegation, Stanislaw Wronski, reported in mid-January 1981 that "the situation in the army has changed. It is now impossible to rely on the army completely, as would have been possible two months ago. Back then, the army was ready to act. Although the officer corps is still reliable, there is great turmoil among rank-and-file soldiers. The army could still use violent force against anti-social elements, but only half the soldiers, at most, would use firearms against the counterrevolution. The other half would remain neutral." Quoted from “O besede s chlenom TsK PORP t. Vron’skim,” Memorandum No. 398/58 (Secret), 19 January 1981, from A. Merkulov, head of the UkrCP Central Committee Department for Foreign Ties, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 2294, Ll. 26-28. Over the next few months, Soviet leaders were dismayed to learn that "the Solidarity organizing committee in Bydgoszcz prepared a special appeal to the Pomeranian Military District outlining the 'peaceful' nature of the movement and calling on [Polish] soldiers not to take part in repressive measures against the organization." By mid-1981, Soviet diplomats and intelligence officials were reporting that "no one on the Polish command staff can confidently say on
other, from city to city, and everywhere they accord him honors. But the Polish leaders are silent, and so is the press, and the television doesn't carry anything opposing the antisocialist elements. Perhaps it will indeed be necessary to introduce martial law.4

ANDROPOV. I believe the facts attest to the Polish leadership's failure to grasp the full seriousness of the emerging situation.

USTINOV. I absolutely agree with the text of the materials that the comrades prepared. Our Polish friends have had many conversations, but nothing has come of it. Things have reached the point where Walesa and his acolytes have occupied the radio station in Wroclaw.5 Our Polish friends essentially are operating in the same style that Gierek did.6 They aren't taking action against anyone or punishing any of the enemies of the working class.

whose side the army and navy will be if tensions reach the breaking point." Quoted from "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotisiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberez'e," Cable No. 183 (Top Secret), 14 June 1981, from V. Zelenov, Soviet consul-general in Gdansk, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19. To counter Solidarity's influence in the armed forces, Jaruzelski authorized the chief of the army's Main Political Directorate, General Jozef Baryla, to publish frequent attacks against the union in the three main military publications: the daily Zolnierz Wolnosci, the weekly Zolnierz Polski, and the monthly Wojsko Ludowe. See, for example, Baryla's "Sprawie partii i narodu zolnierze oddani sa calym sercem," Wojsko Ludowe (Warsaw), No. 12 (December 1980), pp. 13-15.

4 Translator's Note: On 22 October 1980, a week before this CPSU Politburo meeting, the Polish authorities took two important steps to prepare for the eventual imposition of martial law. First, the deputy chief of the Secretariat of the Homeland Defense Committee (Komitet obrony kraju, or KOK), Colonel Tadeusz Malicki, completed a draft of preliminary guidelines for military rule. This draft, which initially had been authorized by the Party-Government Crisis Staff (see annotation no. 3 above), was reworked slightly by the chief of the KOK Secretariat, Division-General Mieczyslaw Debicki, and signed on 23 October by the Secretary of KOK, General Tadeusz Tuczapski. See "Propozycje w przedmiocie trybu wprowadzenia stanu wojennego ze wzgledu na bezpieczenstwo panstwa oraz okreslenia skutkow wprowadzenia tego stanu," No. 2171/IV, 22 October 1980 (Top Secret), and No. 2177/IV, 23 October 1980 (Top Secret), in Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (CAW), Sygn. 1806, T. 38, Stronicy (Ss.) 214-220. The other important step on 22 October was a directive issued by Jaruzelski in his capacity as national defense minister. The directive was designed to go beyond the initial planning for martial law, which since August had been under the jurisdiction of the Party-Government Crisis Staff and the Lato-80 task force at the Internal Affairs Ministry. Jaruzelski ordered the Polish General Staff to undertake comprehensive, accelerated preparations for the introduction of military rule. The chief of the General Staff, General Florian Siwicki, who had long been one of Jaruzelski's closest friends and advisers, was placed in charge of the whole effort. Siwicki's deputies handled specific military aspects of the planning, in conjunction with the Internal Affairs Ministry.

5 Translator's Note: The incident to which Ustinov is referring here was connected with the hunger strikes conducted by members of the Railway Workers' Committee in Wroclaw since 21 October. The strikes had provoked minatory comments in Moscow and other Warsaw Pact capitals because of the strategic importance of the Wroclaw-Gdansk railway. At the Warsaw Pact meeting in early December 1980, Brezhnev specifically warned that prolonged strikes on the railways would be "intolerable." See "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," p. 193.

6 Translator's Note: During the nearly ten years in which Edward Gierek was First Secretary of the PZPR (from December 1970 to September 1980), corruption in Poland reached new heights and the country ran up huge debts and began a sharp economic decline. Gierek's regime was forced to give in to worker protests in June 1976 (though the alleged "ringleaders" of the protests were later harshly punished) and again in the summer of 1980.
BREZHNEV. In Yugoslavia not long ago there was a small strike, but they treated it very seriously: 300 people were arrested and thrown into jail.7

USTINOV. If they don’t introduce martial law, the matter will be very complicated and will become still more serious. In the army there is a good deal of vacillation. But we’ve prepared the Northern Group of Forces, which is in full combat readiness.8

GROMYKO. We must speak to the Polish comrades firmly and sharply. They must first say all this to the people, so that the people will understand the full magnitude of the situation. But now they are criticizing Gierek, the CC, and the Party, while the antisocialist elements, who are literally operating without restraint, are giving them freedom.

As concerns Cde. Jaruzelski, he of course is a reliable man, but is now beginning to speak without any real conviction. He even has said that the troops will not act against the workers.9 In general I think the Poles must speak about all this and very pointedly.

BREZHNEV. When Jaruzelski was speaking with Kania about who should serve in the top spot, he flatly refused to be First Secretary and suggested that Kania serve in the post. That also says something.

GROMYKO. I believe that all major issues were well covered in the materials that

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7 Translator’s Note: Brezhnev presumably is referring to a strike in October 1980 involving some 3,000 workers at a tire factory in the Serbian city of Pirot. The strike, which was sparked by a 5-percent reduction in wages, lasted only a day. It is worth noting that in Yugoslavia, unlike in other Communist countries, strikes had long been officially tolerated and even reported in the press. As many as 300-400 strikes and work stoppages occurred each year.

8 Translator’s Note: This is one of several statements by Ustinov which suggest that he was one of the early proponents of Soviet military intervention in Poland if attempts to achieve an “internal” solution failed.

9 Translator’s Note: Valuable corroboration of Gromyko’s statement here is provided by a document from the former East German military archive, which recounts a briefing given by Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact’s Joint Armed Forces, to high-ranking East German military officials in early April 1981. According to the document, Kulikov told the East German officers that “half a year ago [i.e., in October 1980], Comrade Jaruzelski announced at a meeting of [Polish] military commanders that he would not issue any orders for the deployment of the army against [Polish] workers.” The East German document also notes that “Kulikov made it clear to [Jaruzelski] that the [Polish] army would not have to be used against the working class. The troops would be used only against the counterrevolution and enemies of the working class as well as against violent criminals and bandits.” Kulikov reported that Jaruzelski “declined to offer any concrete response to these points.” Quoted from “Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsübungen ‘SOJUS 81’,” Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in Militärarchiv-Zwischenarchiv-Potsdam (MZA-P), Archivzugangsnr. (AZN) 32642, Blatt (Bl.) 54. Jaruzelski’s comment in October 1980 about the use of the army against Polish workers harkens back to something he was rumored to have said during the 1976 crisis in Poland, namely, that “Polish soldiers will not fire at Polish workers.” There is no solid evidence, however, that Jaruzelski ever said such a thing in 1976. (Western citations of the statement have proven untraceable.) Even if Jaruzelski did say it, he may well have meant it in a disapproving tone, rather than as something for which the army should be lauded.
were prepared. As concerns the introduction of a state of emergency in Poland, this must be kept in reserve as a measure to protect socialist gains. Of course, perhaps, it doesn't have to be done immediately, and particularly not right after the return of Kania and Pinkowski from Moscow. Some time should elapse. But we should steer them toward that and fortify their resolve. We simply cannot lose Poland. During the battle with the Hitlerites to liberate Poland, the Soviet Union lost 600 thousand of its soldiers and officers, and we cannot permit a counterrevolution.

Of course, Cdes. Kania, Jaruzelski, and Pinkowski are honorable and committed comrades. When I spoke with them in Warsaw, they were very much disturbed by what we've been talking about. Kania even was literally at loose ends. At the same time he enjoys great confidence within the Party.

BREZHNEV. The antisocialist elements are so unrestrained that they have rejected the ruling of the Warsaw provincial court regarding the provisions it issued during the registration of the “Solidarity trade union.” And now they are even threatening to recall

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10 Translator's Note: Gromyko's statement here reflects an awareness of the delicate timing of the Kania-Pinkowski visit. On 31 October, the day after Kania and Pinkowski were due to stop in Moscow, Pinkowski was supposed to hold talks in Warsaw with the leaders of Solidarity about numerous issues, including the union's access to the mass media, its right to publish an unofficial newspaper, and its right to import printing and publishing equipment. Gromyko obviously realized that a sudden clampdown in Poland, at a time when the government had pledged to negotiate, would appear to be effected solely at Moscow's bidding.

11 Translator's Note: On 24 September 1980, Solidarity formally applied for registration as a legal entity. A month later, on 24 October, the Warsaw provincial court tentatively approved the registration, but ordered that several crucial changes be made in the union's proposed statutes: the deletion of a provision on the right to strike; the insertion of an explicit endorsement of the leading role of the Communist party; and the insertion of a pledge not to alter or impair Poland's international commitments. (Solidarity officials argued that provisions on the leading role of the party and on Poland's international commitments had already been included in the Gdansk accord, and therefore did not need to be reiterated in the statutes. They also pointed out that until the mid-1970s the Polish constitution had contained no mention of either the Communist party or the Soviet Union. In 1975 Gierek proposed that the leading role of the PZPR and the inviolability of the Soviet-Polish military alliance be formally enshrined in the constitution. When this suggestion stirred public protests from thousands of intellectuals—most of whom had been docile since 1968—and other citizens, as well as criticism from the Catholic church, the authorities accepted a somewhat toned-down version of the amendments.) The Warsaw court's unexpected ruling, which Solidarity promptly challenged in an appeal to the Polish Supreme Court, sparked a 17-day “registration crisis.” The crisis was still very much under way at the time of this CPSU Politburo meeting on 29 October. Emergency negotiations between Solidarity and the Polish government were slated to be held on 31 October, the day after Kania and Pinkowski were due in Moscow. The timing of the Kania-Pinkowski visit, therefore, was widely perceived to be linked with the upcoming decisions about Solidarity's status. (Pinkowski's talks with Solidarity on 31 October led to a fragile compromise, but within two days the government reneged on most of its promises. Although the authorities sought, through a combination of minatory and conciliatory statements, to deter mass protests, Solidarity began preparing for a general strike on 12 November, two days after the Polish Supreme Court was due to rule on the appeal. The "strike alert" ultimately was called off, however, when the Supreme Court largely vindicated Solidarity's position. The lower court's proposed changes to the statutes were annulled. Although the Supreme Court stipulated that the first seven points of the Gdansk accord, including a provision about the leading role of the party, should be featured in an appendix, these were counterbalanced by a second appendix reaffirming Articles 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, which guaranteed trade-union and collective bargaining rights.
deputies from the Sejm. What else will happen?

SUSLOV. In my view the materials are well prepared, and everything is well thought out. The current leaders of the PPR are not sufficiently strong, but they are honest and are the best among the leading core. True, Olszanski is working poorly, and Moczar is pursuing his own ends and can do a lot of harm. They must go on the counteroffensive rather than occupying a defensive position. This position, it so happens, is also reflected in the materials we are considering today.

BREZHNEV. They must have self-defense detachments.

ANDROPOV, SUSLOV, and USTINOV say that this measure is necessary. Defense detachments must be created and must be set up even in barracks, and perhaps also armed in due course.

SUSLOV. We at one point wrote a letter to Gomulka about how he should refrain from ordering firearms to be used against the workers, but in actuality he didn't heed us then, and firearms were used.

In light of the Supreme Court's ruling, the Polish government reluctantly agreed to register Solidarity as a legal organization—a step that Soviet leaders viewed with dismay.)

Translator's Note: Suslov's reference here should be to Stefan Olszowski, not Olszanski.

Translator's Note: Brezhnev explicitly raised this issue during his talks with Kania and Pinkowski on 30 October, suggesting that special units be set up in factories and mass media outlets. At the Warsaw Pact summit on 5 December 1980, Kania pledged that "we will create separate groups of the most trustworthy party members who, if necessary, will be given weapons. We have already chosen 19,000 of these party members and plan to have roughly 30,000 of them in place by the end of December." Quoted from "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," pp. 147-148. At a meeting of the PZPR Politburo the following day (6 December), Kania won support for a proposal to "create groups of [party members] who are trustworthy, with the possibility of arming them if such a need should arise." Quoted from "Protokol Nr. 53 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 6 grudnia 1980 r.,” 6 December 1980 (Secret), reprinted in Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego, p. 189. This matter was included in the landmark "Prospective Guidelines for the Introduction of Martial Law on Polish Territory for Reasons of National Security," which was approved by the Homeland Defense Committee (Komitet obrony kraju, or KOK) in late March 1981 at Jaruzelski's behest and signed by Kania on 27 March. The document called for "the arming of the most reliable and trustworthy volunteers who are determined, through complete sacrifice and devotion, to defend socialism." See "Mysl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze wzgledu na bezpiecznosc stanu," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), in Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewntrznycznych (CAMSW), Sygn. 1813/92/1. Lists of those who were to form this new "party guard" (gwardia partyjna) were compiled by the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry and approved by high-level authorities on 10 September and 5 October 1981. Only 7,768 names appeared on the final list, well short of the 30,000 that Kania had mentioned in December 1980. These guards were not actually armed until after the imposition of martial law, when they were equipped with a total of nearly 50,000 firearms and 7 million rounds of ammunition, making them a formidable paramilitary unit. See "Posiedzenie Kierownictwa MSW 15 XII 1981 r.,” 15 December 1981 (Top Secret), and "Posiedzenie Sztabu MSW, 8.1.1982 r.”, 8 January 1982 (Top Secret), both in CAMSW, Sygn. 251/1 and Sygn. 2309/IV, T. 2, respectively.

Translator's Note: Suslov is referring to the workers' protests along the Baltic coast of Poland in December 1970, which ultimately led to Gomulka's downfall. Some 55 protesters were killed and nearly 1,200 were wounded. At the time, Jaruzelski was the Polish national defense minister. In that capacity he supported and helped implement the decision by Gomulka and prime minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz to use
PONOMAREV. The documents prepared for the discussions with the Polish leaders are logical, and everything here is realistic. The materials strongly emphasize our alarm. We must convey this alarm to the Polish leaders.

GROMYKO. Perhaps we should give these materials to the Polish leaders.

ANDROPOV. If we hand over the materials, we can't rule out the possibility that they'll be passed on to the Americans.15

BREZHNEV. This may very well be.

deadly force against the unarmed strikers. Suslov is correct in saying that the Soviet Union counseled against the use of force. Soviet leaders were in touch with the Polish authorities as early as 14 December, the day the strikes began. On 17 December, Brezhnev called Gomulka to express grave concern about the situation. The following day, the CPSU Politburo sent a letter to the PZPR Central Committee urging that the crisis be defused through political means, without further violence. Contrary to what Suslov says, the letter was addressed to the full PZPR Central Committee, not to Gomulka personally. This was important because it signaled the end of Moscow's support for Gomulka, paving the way for a change of leadership. For relevant documentation and first-hand accounts, see "List do członków Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej," 27 March 1971 (Top Secret), from Gomulka to the PZPR Central Committee, in Jakub Andrzejewski (pseud.), ed., Gomulka i inni: Dokumenty z archiwum KC 1948-1982 (London: Aneks, 1987), pp. 233-234; the interview with a PZPR Politburo member in 1970-71, Jozef Tejchma, in "Czego Gierek nie zrozumiał," in Reporter (Warsaw), No. 5 (1990), p. 13; and Edward Gierek: Przerwana dekada, p. 57. See also the very similar recollections of a CPSU Politburo member during the Brezhnev era, V. V. Grishin, Ot Khrushcheva do Gorbacheva: Politicheskie portrety pyati Gensekov i A. N. Kosygin (Moscow: ASPOL, 1996), pp. 54-55.

15 Translator's Note: It is unclear precisely what Andropov had in mind here. One possibility is that he was referring to a potential leak by a PZPR Politburo member or by some other senior Polish official (see the reported comment to this effect by Kania in Transcript of the CPSU Politburo Session, 31 October 1980). Colonel Kuklinski later recalled that even within the top levels of the Polish military, information about martial law planning was very tightly held in 1980-81 because "in the view of the military leadership, some members of the Homeland Defense Committee . . . were unreliable and were favorably disposed to the notion of restructuring the PPR's political system." (Quoted from "Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," pp. 18-19.) Similarly, a hardline member of the PZPR Central Committee, Zdzisław Drewniowski, told Soviet officials "in the strictest confidence" that "the heads of [Polish] state security organs at the województwo level have received instructions not to send special messages in writing to the first secretaries of the PZPR's województwo committees because of the possible leak of information from them to various branches of Solidarity." Quoted from "Informatsiya o nekotorykh sobytiyakh v Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublike," Report No. 0242/1 (Secret), 2 December 1981, from V. Dobrik, first secretary of the Lviv oblast committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UkrCP), in Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadnykh Obednan' Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), F. 1, Op. 25, Spravka (Spr.) 2235, L. 41. It is also possible that Andropov was alluding to the risks of foreign espionage in Poland, an issue to which he, as head of the KGB, was particularly sensitive. Events over the next year — with the discovery that Kuklinski had been working for the CIA — amply confirmed Andropov's suspicions. The defection of two high-ranking Polish military intelligence officers, Colonel Jerzy Suminski and Colonel Witold Ostaszewicz, to the West in the autumn of 1981 compounded the damage. See the comments by General Czesław Kiszczak, who in 1980-81 served as head of Polish military intelligence and then as minister of internal affairs, in Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie wszystko (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Most of the intelligence that Kuklinski, Suminski, and Ostaszewicz passed on, however, pertained to military affairs and national security. The sort of disclosure to which Andropov is referring seems to be of a broader political nature. Hence, it seems more likely that he was referring to an unauthorized leak by a disgruntled PZPR Politburo member who was hoping to discredit Kania.
RUSAKOV. Let them listen closely to Leonid Il'ich and take notes.

GRISHIN. Leonid Il'ich, you must begin the discussion and express our anxiety. Let them respond. The documents that have been prepared are good.

TIKHONOV. Of course, Leonid Il'ich, you must begin by speaking about these matters and set forth everything that is written here. We are inviting them to come here to express our alarm at the situation unfolding in Poland. The materials deal with all these issues very well. The actions of counterrevolutionary elements are unmistakable in Poland now. Let them say why they are permitting this, let them explain it. Communists are leaving the Party, fearing the antisocialist elements. That's how far things have gone.

RUSAKOV. I believe the document covers everything, but Kania might raise some other questions that are not covered in these materials. One such question is the matter of personnel. In particular, they will apparently raise the question of removing Jablonski, Werblan, Kowalczyk, and Kruczek from the Politburo. Even though, one must say, Kruczek serves a useful purpose; he is an authoritative comrade and in the past was a trade union official.16

The second question that Cde. Kania might raise is about multilateral assistance to Poland from the other socialist countries. The point is that Kania is against such assistance. I have in mind here that Cde. Baibakov in the materials had referred to internationalist assistance to Poland, and the Polish comrades said that the situation in their country is not the same as in Hungary or in Czechoslovakia.17

One further question might arise. Poland's relations are not particularly good with some neighboring socialist countries, for example, with the GDR. Earlier the Poles had a so-called visa-free regime with the GDR. Exploiting this, Polish citizens would travel to the GDR and buy up all the groceries and consumer goods. The German comrades believe it is necessary to end the visa-free procedure for crossing the border, and the Poles of course are against ending it.18 What should we do? I think we should not interfere in this matter; let them sort out the question among themselves. Everything else in the document is well done.

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16 Translator's Note: Władysław Kruczek, an aging official who played an important role during the Stalin era in setting up Communist-dominated unions, was a notorious hardliner. From the outset, he had opposed negotiations with the MKS and had called for a violent crackdown.

17 Translator's Note: Ruskov's statements here are far from clear-cut, but he seems to be speaking about the prospect of Soviet military intervention in Poland, akin to what happened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. It is possible that Nikolai Baibakov, the head of state planning, was simply referring to multilateral economic assistance, and that the Polish authorities mistakenly thought he was alluding to military aid. Kania's memoirs, and documents from the time, shed no further light on the matter.

18 Translator's Note: No visas had been required for travel between the GDR and Poland since 1972, but on 28 October 1980, the day before this CPSU Politburo meeting, the East German authorities announced that restrictions would be reimposed on travel to and from Poland as of the end of the month. The visa requirements were to remain in effect until there was substantial "progress toward stabilizing the situation in People's Poland and bolstering the socialist workers' and peasants' regime."
CHERNENKO. The materials prepared by the commission are comprehensive. They define all the major issues to which we should draw the attention of the Polish comrades, and the questions are raised very pointedly. The materials speak directly about the difficult situation and about the necessity of taking decisive measures against the antisocialist elements.

KIRILENKO. It's been three months since the strikes started and the danger has failed to subside. We have done a great deal for Poland; we've provided everything and recommended how to resolve matters properly. So far, they are not enlisting the military in the struggle against antisocialist elements and, as the comrades correctly pointed out, are not even exposing them for what they are. The situation with young people there is bad. There is no Communist youth league in reality. There are no detachments made up of young people. Perhaps they must disguise the soldiers and let them into the working mass. Undoubtedly one must first of all mobilize the Communists. The strange inaction on Kania's part is all the more incomprehensible to the leaders of the other socialist countries. For example, when I spoke with Husak and other Czech comrades, they expressed surprise at such behavior. The Czech comrades cited examples of when they had acted decisively against the ringleaders of a strike at a certain enterprise. This had yielded results.

GORBACHEV. I believe the Politburo has acted very properly by inviting the Polish leaders to Moscow for a discussion. We must speak to the Polish friends frankly and resolutely. So far, they are taking no appropriate measures and are merely in some sort of defensive position. Even this defensive position they haven't really been upholding for a long time now; they're being dislodged from it.

You should begin the discussion, Leonid Il'ich. The text, in my view, is very good, and I have no comments to add. It contains all the ideas that must be conveyed to the Polish friends. Then after your discussion we can hear what they have to say. At that

19 Translator's Note: This was especially true in Czechoslovakia (as Kirilenko indicates) and East Germany. During a meeting on 27 October 1980 between a top-ranking East German official, Joachim Herrmann, and his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Zimyanin, Herrmann conveyed the SED Politburo's view that "the situation in Poland is now worse than in Czechoslovakia in 1968, worse than under Dubcek." Zimyanin did not directly challenge this assertion, but he responded that it was still necessary to "be patient and take a cautious and discreet position vis-a-vis the Polish people and the Polish leadership." He also argued that the Warsaw Pact states "must not be provoked by our enemies, who are claiming that the Soviet Union will intervene with military force." Quoted from "Information über die Gespräche zwischen Genossen Joachim Herrmann und Genossen M. V. Zimjanin am 27. und 31. Oktober 1981," 4 November 1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV 2/2/A-2361; reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen", pp. 96-97.

20 Translator's Note: Evidently, the Czechoslovak Communist leader, Gustav Husak, was referring to a short-lived strike organized in Prague in August 1978 to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. This protest was quickly suppressed. The crackdown was typical of the hardline policies of Husak's regime, which was just as vehemently opposed to Solidarity as the East German authorities were. A recurrent theme in Czechoslovak press coverage of events in Poland in 1980-81 was the alleged parallel with the aborted "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Czechoslovak newspapers also frequently emphasized the "threat" that strikes in Poland posed to the Warsaw Pact.
point, perhaps, some points will come up that are worth discussing and exchanging views about.

BAIBAKOV. If Kania and Pinkowski raise economic questions during the discussion, we must tell them that we received a letter from the Polish side about this matter. We have given instructions to the appropriate comrades, and we are drafting recommendations for the provision of economic assistance. What can we provide? We can of course promise to extend existing credits of 280 million rubles, and then give them new credits of 150 million rubles. This is a short-term credit, which they now need to pay off a percentage of what they've borrowed. We must also say that we can substantially increase deliveries of fuel in 1981, for example, by 500 million rubles. Perhaps we can also agree to reduce imports of goods from Poland by roughly 250 million rubles, and in general all this will mean we can provide them with assistance of nearly 1 billion rubles. We have to divert deliveries of oil from all countries except Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam.21 As far as grain is concerned, we already decided on 500,000 tons and can give no more. Perhaps we can provide cotton and diesel fuel and add 200,000 tons. In addition, we must obviously tell them that our economists will help the Polish organizations in working out an agricultural plan to get out of the plight in which Poland now finds itself. That is, they will indicate what internal measures must be adopted to facilitate this transition. We will appeal to the other socialist countries about a certain reduction in deliveries of oil products in connection with the events in Poland. Of course they will all object to this, that's for certain. Well, what can be done? We have no other option, and we must obviously do this.

BREZHNEV. What's the value now of oil on the world market?

BAIBAKOV. The value of a ton of oil is 150 rubles, and a ton of gasoline and a ton of diesel fuel are 190 rubles each.22

ARKHIPOV. The note deals with economic questions. I think that in the discussion with Kania on these matters, things should be kept general. We are preparing a

21 Translator's Note: Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam were members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), an organization formed in January 1949 by the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Albania joined CMEA in February 1949 (but withdrew in 1961), and East Germany was admitted in September 1950. After the Sino-Soviet split emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union began seeking to extend CMEA into the Third World: Mongolia was admitted in July 1962, Cuba joined in July 1972, and Vietnam was admitted in June 1978. Their membership entitled them to receive energy supplies and other crucial goods from the Soviet Union.

22 Translator's Note: The world price of oil had gone up precipitously within the past year-and-a-half (from around $18.50/barrel to more than $34.00/barrel) because of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. Pricing within CMEA was based on a five-year sliding scale of world prices, which meant that the impact of the recent price increases had not really been felt yet by the CMEA recipients. For the Soviet Union, however, the opportunity cost of supplying oil to CMEA countries seemed greater than ever.
document; today I went over a draft, and we'll work on it a bit more and show it to N. A. Tikhonov. But it seems to me that it doesn't make sense for us to give them oil and oil products, since they can't use it properly. They have strikes at plants and factories, and they squander fuel. Hence we'd be better off selling it and giving Poland the money.

RUSAKOV. There was a letter from Cde. Kania on economic questions. They request the formulation of an economic approach to the further development of the Polish economy and the extraction of it from its plight. I think that you, Leonid Il’ich, will respond to Kania that our comrades are working on these materials and will provide such assistance.

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BREZHNEV. Clearly, we should endorse the materials presented here and consider it worthwhile to be guided by our delegation in negotiations with the Polish friends.

EVERYONE. Correct.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 31]

23 Translator's Note: Of all the members of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on Poland, Arkhipov was perhaps the most skeptical about the wisdom of providing large-scale economic aid to Poland. As the first deputy prime minister, he was broadly responsible for economic affairs, and he was one of the main proponents of a shift in Soviet-East European economic relations along lines more favorable to the Soviet Union.